THE QUEST FOR A UNIFIED KOREA:
STRATEGIES FOR THE CULTURAL AND INTER-AGENCY PROCESS

Edited by
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
THE QUEST FOR A UNIFIED KOREA:
STRATEGIES FOR THE CULTURAL
AND INTER-AGENCY PROCESS

Proceedings of a Symposium
Co-hosted by the
Marine Corps University
and
Marine Corps University Foundation

June 2006

Edited by
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
The Marine Corps University's Perspectives on Warfighting is a series of occasional papers edited by the Marine Corps University and published by the Marine Corps University Foundation. This series focuses on studies of the art of war. History is the basis for the study of war. It is through such study that we may deduce our tactics, operational art, and strategy for the future. Though the basis of the series Perspectives on Warfighting is history, they are not papers about history. They are papers about warfare. By study, discussion, and application, we shall learn to fight and win our nation's battles.

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editor's Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Authors</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Keynote Speech: Transfer of Wartime Command-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Personal Thoughts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond P. Ayres, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Korean Strategic Culture of the last Eight Korean</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today's North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and South Variants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert M. Collins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Today's Korean Question: Establishing Peace on a</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denuclearized Korean Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul F. Chamberlin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Inter-Agency Process and Future</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheon Seong-whun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Role of State Institutions, Organizational Culture and</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Perception in South Korea's International Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking Process, 1998-Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Byungki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Remarks by Lee Kap-jin</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Compatibility and Consensus: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s North Korea Policy</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul R. Kan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Russia’s Role in the Future of the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seung-Ho Joo</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PSYOP in the Korea War: Anecdotes from Yesterday – Considerations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Tomorrow</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David S. Maxwell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Editor’s Introduction

On 13 June of 2006, the Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation co-hosted their first ever academic symposium dealing with the Korean Peninsula. Entitled “The Quest for a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process,” the conference brought together scholars, practitioners, and others to address several challenging and ongoing questions dealing with the Korean Peninsula. The impressive list of speakers and panelists included retired General Officers and Ambassadors from the United States and Korea who have years of experience in Korea and the region, scholars from top universities and research institutes in both the United States and Korea, and practitioners – from both the military and policy communities – again from both countries. A complete list of panelists and speakers is included in the back of this book.

There were many diverse perspectives presented at the symposium, and as the reader will see in the book, they were often quite compelling. If there was one thing that all conference participants agreed on, it was that the Korean Peninsula was (and is) in a state of flux. This is easily demonstrated if one simply considers that since the symposium convened during the summer of 2006, North Korea has test fired several ballistic missiles and conducted their first test of a nuclear device, South Korea has had local elections that nominally declared the lack of confidence in the populace at large for their President and his left-of-center supporters, and Washington and Seoul agreed to large-scale changes to the ROK-US military alliance that will have a significant impact on the foreign policies of both nations in the region for many years to come. The content of all of the papers presented at the recent symposium was relevant to all of the issues discussed above as well as others that the reader is likely to find interesting.

There were three panels at the symposium, as well as two keynote speakers (Brigadier General Russell Howard USA (RET) of the Fletcher School gave an excellent speech addressing Northeast Asian regional issues at a dinner for the panelists the night before the symposium). One of our keynote speakers, Lt. General Raymond P. Ayres, USMC (RET), presented an outstanding speech during our luncheon, and graciously also presented us with a copy of his speech.
General Ayres speech, in its entirety, is presented at the beginning of this volume immediately following the introduction. The speech addresses the issue of changing Wartime Operational Control of ROK and US military forces (an issue that is highly relevant today) and offers important perspectives for those who will continue to deal with military issues on the Korean Peninsula in coming years.

The panels addressed important issues from the past, present and future of the Korean Peninsula that remain important for the analysis and planning of future operations or relationships (both diplomatic and military) in that artificially divided nation. Korea remains an important security pivot in US foreign policy and military planning in the region.

On the first panel, “Dealing with the Strategic and Cultural Aspects of Future Challenges on the Korean Peninsula,” two of the papers presented are included as chapters in this book. Both individuals who were kind enough to contribute their chapters to this volume are former active duty military personnel who continue to contribute to the scholarship relating to Korea through their work with the government and policy communities.

In Chapter 1, “Korean Strategic Culture of the last Eight Korean Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today's North and South Variants,” Robert M. Collins discusses the discernible patterns of security preferences that impact the leadership decision-making of both North and South Korea in a unique manner. In order to do this, he addresses how the last eight nation-states that Koreans identify as central to their history have developed a broad strategic culture that has been shaped by specific experiences, geography, history, and strategic thought, not to mention regional enemies. Mr. Collins weaves a fascinating analysis that shows how the shared strategic culture of Koguryo, Paekche, Shilla (and Unified Shilla), Palhae, the Koryo Dynasty, and the Choson Dynasty has distinctive parallels to and significant impact on the strategic cultures of both North and South Korea today.

In the second paper from the first panel, “Today's Korea Question: Establishing Peace on a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula,” Paul F. Chamberlin suggests a unique and comprehensive approach to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula in light of complex relationships and history among the concerned states. He offers policy recommendations and important perspectives that provide balance and shed light on the political, military, and cultural issues that play a role in resolving the “Korea Question.”

The second panel of the symposium was important because it addressed an issue that has come to the forefront in the Post-9/11 era
– the inter-agency process. It has now become apparent from recent military operations that present and future planning must involve not only military experts, but international and geo-political experts, regional experts, and various national and international agencies from both the United States and our allies. It was in the spirit of this important development in governmental policy and doctrine that the second panel was convened.

In chapter three Dr. Cheon Seongwhun, a Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul Korea, addresses the role of the international inter-agency process on the Korean Peninsula in his essay entitled, “The Inter-Agency Process and Future Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.” Dr. Cheon analyzes the past and present international process in general, and then looks at key issues such as the role of UNCHR and human rights in North Korea, different attitudes toward the North Korean regime in both Washington and Seoul, the role of the six-party talks, and how all of these issues and others will effect future contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.

Dr. Kim Byungki, a professor at Korea University and one of the other presenters on the second panel, has contributed the chapter entitled, “The Role of State Institutions, Organizational Culture and Policy Perception in South Korea’s International Security Policymaking Process, 1998-Present.” In his essay (as he says in his introduction), Professor Kim seeks to “identify, conceptualize and dissect in a very preliminary manner the general institutional context, information-gathering and processing trajectory, policy preference and dynamics underlying international security policymaking process in the Republic of Korea (ROK).”

The final chapter from the second panel (Chapter 5) comes to us from the former Commandant of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, Lt. General Lee Kap-jin, ROKMC (RET). General Lee’s remarks not only pick up on some of the key issues addressed in the first two papers, but also address many important issues that have had an impact on the inter-agency process within the South Korean governments of Kim Dae-jung and more recently under Roh Moo-hyun. General Lee’s remarks present an often provocative, highly compelling, and well-articulated background on many of the concerns that former senior military officials and the South Korean populace in general have, relating to the inter-agency and leadership process in Seoul.

The third and final panel of the symposium was important because it provided interesting analysis regarding perspectives of other nations who have a stake in the future of the Korean Peninsula.
Entitled, “Future Scenarios and Strategic Issues for the Korean Peninsula,” the panel gives our volume three papers that address distinctly different issues. Two of our contributors give us chapters that address China’s role in the future of the Korean Peninsula, as well as Russia’s seldom discussed but extremely important role in the future of the two Korea’s. The final essay provides insights into Psychological Operations on the Korean Peninsula – as seen from a combined (ROK-US) perspective.

In chapter 6, entitled, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding China’s North Korea Policy,” Dr. Paul Kan, a professor at the Army War College, articulates his analysis on the important “China Question.” Dr. Kan states that, “bridging both internal and external explanations may temper the expectations of American policy makers that China’s greater exertion of influence on North Korea will be more fruitful or even more likely.” Dr. Kan’s essay provides a conceptual framework for understanding Chinese international behavior and its relationship with the North Korean regime by examining the concept of feasibility.

Dr. Seung-Ho Joo, a professor at the University of Minnesota-Morris and an expert on Russia-Korea affairs, provides us interesting and insightful analysis in chapter 7, entitled, “Russia’s Role in the Future of the Korean Peninsula.” Dr. Joo examines issues such as present and future Russian interests in Korea, the line that Russia walks between the two Korea’s, Russian attitudes on Korean unification, and Russian policy toward North Korea’s nuclear program. The chapter is particularly relevant because Russia has been a key player in the six-party talks yet received very little attention in the scholarship regarding the two Korea’s in recent years.

The final chapter in our volume addresses an issue that will be very important in any future Korean conflict or military operation. In his essay entitled, “PSYOP in the Korea War: Anecdotes from Yesterday - Considerations for Tomorrow,” Colonel David Maxwell addresses lessons that can be learned from the past and important ways that these lessons can be applied to future psychological operations on the Korean Peninsula. Colonel Maxwell’s essay is important because it calls our attention to how important the ROK-US Alliance is in maintaining the security and stability of the Peninsula, and his analysis shows key concerns for dealing with the North Korean military and propaganda threats.

In this volume, our authors have given us several important theoretical frameworks, new concepts, and diverse perspectives
regarding strategies for the cultural and inter-agency process as it relates to the future and the ultimate quest for a unified Korea. Through their research and writing, our distinguished scholars, military officers, diplomats, and practitioners have made valuable contributions to the scholarship relating to the security of the Korean Peninsula. It is my sincere hope that this book will inspire continued interest and motivate further study within the military and policy communities for more study on the issues that are so important for achieving a successful cultural and inter-agency process relating to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dr. Park Syung-je of the Korean Military Analysts Association, for his support and suggestions for this symposium. This conference came about because of a conversation that originated between Dr. Park and Major General Donald Gardner, USMC (RET), the President of the Marine Corps University. It was because of their vision and ideas that this conference came into being. General Gardner was also a motivator who’s belief that Korean Security issues should be addressed in a forum at the Marine Corps University kept this symposium going – from its inception during the summer of 2005 until its successful conclusion on 13 June 2006.

Deep appreciation goes to all of the participants. Panelists for this symposium came from all over the United States (including Hawaii) and Korea. Their perspectives and knowledge gave all who were fortunate enough to attend, insights that will be extremely helpful in future Marine Corps military to military relationships, planning for future contingencies, and important scholarship that will be included in future curricula at the Marine Corps University.

Finally, on behalf of the Marine Corps University, I wish to express my appreciation to the sponsor of this event – the Marine Corps University Foundation. Without their support – both financial and operational – this symposium quite simply could not have occurred. We are grateful for the contributions that the Marine Corps University Foundation makes, not only to our scholarly fora, but to a wide variety of academic endeavors that our scholars and students are engaged in.

Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
About The Authors

Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr., USMC (Ret) retired from active duty on October 1, 2002 after more than 36 years of commissioned service in the US Marine Corps. He is an infantry officer with experience at all levels of command ranging from Infantry Company through Marine Component at the Unified Command level. His staff assignments began at the battalion level and culminated as the Operations Deputy at Headquarters, US Marine Corps. He has extensive expertise in Operational Planning and in Policy and Strategy development at the Service, Joint, Interagency, and International levels. General Ayres’s last assignment was as Commander, US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Europe, and South; Commander Marine Corps Bases, Atlantic; and as Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and Europe. From 1997 to 1999 he served as the Plans, Policy, and Strategy Director for the UN Command and Republic of Korea/US Combined Forces Command in Seoul, Korea. He oversaw the rewriting of the Operations Plan and the creation of a new Plan to deal with crisis in the North; worked closely with Dr. Perry’s team on a new strategy for the Korean Peninsula; and helped resolve difficult bi-lateral challenges stemming from the economic crises in Northeast Asia and the Pacific.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. is a former intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency and a retired Marine. He has lived and worked in South Korea and continues to visit there frequently. Bechtol holds a doctorate in national security studies from the Union Institute and is the author of Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea (Dulles VA; Potomac Books, 2007) as well as a contributing author to several books on North Korea. Dr. Bechtol is also the author of more than a dozen articles in peer-reviewed journals. He is currently an associate professor of international relations at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and an adjunct professor of diplomacy at Norwich University. He lives in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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Mr. Robert M. Collins has spent 26 years in Korea and currently serves as the Chief, Strategy Division, Assistant Chief of Staff C5, Combined Forces Command, in Seoul, Korea. He advises the ACofS, C/J5 on strategy, security policy, and contingency planning issues of interest to the command. He also provides daily assessments to the command group on political-economic issues regarding the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia that have an impact on the command and US interests in the region. He has a B.A. in Asian History from the University of Maryland, an M.A. in International Politics (major
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Dr. Cheon Seong Whun is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Seoul, Korea and an editorial consultant for the Radio Free Asia (RFA). He received his B.S. in Industrial Engineering from Korea University, his M.Sc. in Engineering Economic Systems from Stanford University, and his Ph.D. in Management Sciences from the University of Waterloo, Canada. Before joining KINU in 1991, he served with the Office of Arms Control, ROK MND. His research interests are conventional arms control, verification of compliance, WMD nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, deterrence theory and strategy, missile defense, peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, national interest and strategy, regional security and Korean unification strategy. He is the author of numerous books including Non-Nuclear Policy of the Unified Korea: Looking Beyond and Being in the Process of Unification (Seoul: KINU, 2002), US National Missile Defense and
South Korea’s National Security (Seoul: KINU, 2001), Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula: A Comprehensive Approach (Albuquerque, NM: Cooperative Monitoring Center, SNL, 1999) and Implementing Korean Denuclearization and Establishing a NWFZ in Northeast Asia (Seoul: KINU, 1999). He is the recipient of Commendation of President of the Republic of Korea in 2003, an award for excellent research from the Korea Research Council for Humanities & Social Sciences, Office of the Prime Minister in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and an award of the Vice Premier and Minister of National Unification in September 1994.
Chapter 1

Keynote Speech
"Transfer of Wartime Command - Some Personal Thoughts"

Raymond P. Ayres, Jr.

Who should run the next war in Korea? This has been a very topical issue lately, so I thought I would share my thoughts on the subject—without regard to the current positions of either the ROK or the U.S. governments.

The United States is the executive agent for the United Nations for all matters related to the armistice on the Korean peninsula. That would include the resumption of hostilities. This responsibility is executed through the United Nations command—or UNC. It is clear to me that as long as the U.S. is the executive agent, the commander of the UNC must be an American.

The UNC is not a warfighting command. The warfighting would be done by the Combined Forces Command—CFC. CFC is a bilateral command formed between the Republic of Korea and the United States. It has its basis in the treaty between the two Nations for the defense of Korea in the event of another attack by the North. The commander has always been an American. In fact, it has always been an American Army general officer—dual-hatted as both UNC and CFC. This dual-hatting makes perfect sense for the purpose of ensuring consistency of focus.

The U.S. Contribution to CFC is the United States Forces, Korea—USFK. The ROK contribution is almost the entire Armed Forces of Korea. There are separate rules governing command of the designated forces during the ongoing Armistice period and during the resumption of hostilities. For the most part, the Nations command their own forces on a day-to-day basis, and the Commander CFC exercises command during war.

The CFC organization for combat includes five major Combined Component Commands: Ground (GCC), Navy, Air, Marine, and Special Operations (called CUWTF or SOF). Three of these are
commanded by an American general or admiral with a ROK Deputy Commander. The GCC and SOF have ROK commanders with U.S. Deputies. More on these exceptions later.

There are numerous units below these levels provided by both the ROK and the U.S. The issue of transfer of wartime command that we are hearing about deals with the CFC and component levels, not at the levels below that. Many aspects of "operational control" of combat units have been resolved satisfactorily years ago. For example, an entire U.S. Army Corps would fall under the OPCON of a ROK Field Army commander for combat operations.

The U.S. has a very clear national policy that U.S. forces will only engage in combat under a U.S. commander. I agree with that policy wholeheartedly. Differences in interpretation and in opinion exist when it comes to the question of "at what level" there must be a U.S. commander. Is the policy met completely by having the commander of CFC be an American, or must there be an American commander at every level, or only at certain levels? The answers are not entirely clear.

There is another compelling question: "If the U.S. has such a policy, why wouldn't an identical policy be equally reasonable for other Nations to apply?" More specifically, if the war is taking place in the Republic of Korea, a sovereign nation, why should their forces operate under the command of a U.S. commander? Another question to which there is no simple, "right" answer in my opinion. I'm sure that this last question is the driving force behind president Roh's initiative for a "self-reliant defense" and "wartime OPCON" of ROK forces.

Movement toward ROK lead in the defense of the ROK is a welcome development in my opinion. What would not be welcome would be the premature assumption of responsibility.

This issue is not really as complicated as it appears. It is complicated by the fact that the vast majority of people who are discussing it are, for the most part, either ill-informed or totally uniformed on the subject. They have no fundamental understanding of warfighting or of the complexity of wartime command and control—even if they have national responsibilities for security and defense. Many of these people wear suits, but certainly not all of them.

The experts in these areas have spent countless hours over many years working through the details of these command relationships during deliberate planning and in exercises and wargames. It will ultimately be up to those experts, who actually understand the challenges, to educate those who don't.
There are no details that can't be worked out once the right conditions have been set. In an ideal world the ROK would be totally self-sufficient with regards to its own National Security. Up to this point in time it has not been ready for such self-sufficiency, and to be blunt—the desire for full sovereignty, by itself, will not change the current capabilities of the ROK for National Security. It just doesn't work that way.

There are areas where it has been mutually agreed that the ROK side was ready to assume responsibility. The SOF forces are commanded by a ROK general. Rear area security is the responsibility of a ROK Army commander. The Combined Civil Affairs effort is led by a ROK general. The counter-fire fight has been assumed by the ROK side.

There are other areas where the U.S. remains best able to command and control, particularly air and sea operations. No nation in the world comes close to the U.S. capabilities in these areas—and it would be foolhardy to weaken our combined capabilities in these areas in particular.

This brings us to ground operations. Despite being surrounded on three sides by the sea, and not withstanding the critical importance of airpower, Korea remains a predominantly ground theater of operations. The next Korean war will be won on the ground. The Army is dominant among the ROK Services.

Allow me to tell a little personal story as an example of the thinking. I was a brand new major general when I became the C/J-5. Shortly after I arrived in Korea I was attending a ceremony. A ROK Army major general indicated that I should take a seat that was senior to him in position. I told him that he should sit there because he was much my senior. He insisted that I take the seat “because I had already been a division commander!” That was a very telling comment in my opinion.

More than ten years ago the ROK four-star Deputy CFC Commander was designated as the GCC Commander. (Prior to that, the CFC Commander functioned as his own Ground Component Commander.) The Chief of Staff was designated as the GCC Deputy Commander. No separate staff was formed to be the GCC staff. The CFC staff continued to function as the GCC staff.

In my opinion when this arrangement was agreed to it was more cosmetic than actual. That was probably fair enough in the beginning; however, the time has long passed for this to be turned into reality. There needs to be a separate Combined GCC staff established to support this most critical component of CFC. Had we done this in 1998 or 1999, when we should have, all the necessary
lessons would have already been learned, and the doubts would have been relegated to history. There was an informal proposal on the ROK side in 1999 to form a GCC staff by combining the two forward ROK Field Army staffs and having the Corps all report directly to the GCC. The U.S. contribution could have initially been formed from the two U.S. Liaison Groups assigned to the ROK Field Armies. There would have been challenges, but they would have all been overcome by now.

Had we created a true Ground Component seven or eight years ago we might not now be wrestling with less-than-fully-informed opinions and positions relative to “wartime OPCON.” We wouldn’t be hearing and having discussions about “parallel chains of command” and “ad hoc” command relationships—all of which are nonsense.

Why would the Republic of Korea and the United States voluntarily agree to put themselves in a position where they were less able to combat an enemy attack by deliberately creating an inefficient organization for combat? That would be absurd.

Could the ROK assume executive agency for the UN with regard to the armistice? Perhaps, but I suspect that the North would never agree to such an arrangement. If it did, there would be a ROK commander of the UNC, and then there could be a ROK commander of CFC.

The U.S. policy regarding command of U.S. forces could easily be complied with. The commander of USFK would exercise Combatant Command over all U.S. forces, and we would have a U.S. Commander over each major force element that the U.S. provides. How the subordinate units might be distributed for tactical operations in a combined organization for combat are mere details that don’t impact on the policy in the least.

The day will come when the ROK is totally responsible for its own National Security and for its own defense. I have no idea when the conditions will be right for that to occur. I suspect it will be decades—for financial reasons alone. What I do know—for certain—is that the day has come, and is long past, for the ROK and U.S. to create a true Ground Combat Component under ROK command. Thank you very much for your attention.
Chapter 2

Korean Strategic Culture of the Last Eight Korean Nation States: Comparing the Past to Today’s North and South Variants

Robert M. Collins

Summary

Through the prism of strategic culture, most nations with enduring histories over hundreds if not thousands of years, exhibit discernible patterns of security preferences that impact the leadership decision-making of that nation in a unique manner. Korea is no different. The last eight nation-states that Koreans identify as central to their history have developed a broad strategic culture that has been shaped by specific experiences, geography, history, and strategic thought, not to mention regional enemies. Some characteristics and determinants of Korean strategic culture are not uncommon to other strategic cultures, particularly those within East Asia, but they are unique in their combination and application to the Korean Peninsula. The shared strategic culture of Koguryo, Paekche, Shilla (and Unified Shilla), Palhae, the Koryo Dynasty, and the Choson Dynasty¹ has distinctive parallels to and significant impact on the strategic cultures of the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic Korea (hereafter referred to as North Korea). The employment or non-employment of alliances by Korean nation-states serves as a significant determinant in the success or failures of any of the Korean nation-states in the pursuit of their national strategy.

¹. Though Kaya occupies a distinct place in Korean history, it is not included in this study due to its failure to attain unified state status that paralleled that of its contemporaries of Shilla, Paekche and Koguryo, as well as the paucity of references by which one can define a definitive strategic culture. Kaya did, however, have significant relations with Japan to the point of obtaining Japanese military support against Shilla. Separatist states (such as Later Paekche) that are soon assimilated into one of the 8 states mentioned above are also not discussed.
Introduction

Over the last three decades, political scientists have attempted to derive the concept of strategic culture from the broader concept of political culture to explain how states and their leaders tend to deal with security issues, particularly threats to their homeland. While strategic culture has been employed as an assessment tool for explaining the orientations toward violence by the great powers of the East and West, it is employed infrequently to explain how Korea, in its various state forms, approached the use of force in the conduct of resolving security challenges. The relationships between these approaches as applied by past Korean states to those of present day North Korea and South Korea are significant and demonstrate profound historical parallels in the consequence of geography, history, experience, the employment of alliances, and strategic thought designed to connect policy to strategies to deal with the proximity of threats.

Scholars attempt to explain variations of security policy approaches of a nation by applying a framework by which one can compare and contrast security preferences. As one might imagine, one can discover both parallels and contradictions when conducting such comparisons among eight Korean nation-states that share relatively similar geography, as well as the later Korean states' perspectives of their Korean predecessors and applying or not applying the concept of lessons learned.

Perhaps paramount among Korean strategic culture evaluation criteria is geography. In stark contrast to the advantages of America's geography of separation from threats by two huge oceans, Korea's geography has posed distinct security problems for each Korean state in the challenging Northeast Asian setting, problems not unlike that of Poland in Europe. As a peninsula serving as a land bridge between the island power of Japan and the various continental powers of Northeast Asia over the centuries, Korean decision-makers have always been challenged by great powers in multiple directions. As dynasties rose and fell, new dynasties or regional powers arose with invariable national strategies based in

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2. One of the better standards for examining strategic culture of one nation is that written by Alastair Iain Johnston and his examination of China's Ming Dynasty. Johnston posits that strategic culture should be measured by nature of force as applied by man, nature of one's enemies, and the use of force, as well the preferences of decision-makers in the use of that force. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1995.
expansionism. These reoccurring expansionist states challenged Korean states each time, and each Korean state implemented different operational strategies to cope. These strategies included Korea's own version of expansionist or even counter-expansionist policies based in offensive and counter-offensive operations, the use of 3rd country forces, diplomatic negotiations to delay or redirect impending confrontations, retreat from overwhelming odds just to wait out invading forces, adaptation of tributary status to regional powers, and even the use of Confucian and Buddhist rituals. Some were effective, others disastrous.

Another dominant factor is the internal volatility of not only the Korean state's domestic situation, but that of each state's enemies as well. In each Korean nation-state's experience, internal disputes have at times left Korean states unprepared to deal with external threats as the expenditure of Korean resources and attention internally dissipated the Korean state's security capability, which, in turn, provided opportunity for Korea's enemies.

Another factor in Korean strategic culture is the nature of Korea's enemies. As Northeast Asia's balance of power changed suddenly due to Chinese, Manchurian, or Japanese internal instability or expansive policies, Korea was faced with a direct and immediate challenge to either invasion or demand for tribute. With the rise of each new threat, Korean states found themselves in varying states of preparedness or even willingness to address the evolving situation forthright.

Examining ideas about strategy and war as well as the changing nature of warfare provides innate approaches to the execution and thinking about war. An appreciation for strategic thought is imperative for any decision-maker in developing appropriate national security strategies. Identifying those who provided each Korean state with strategic thought is a difficult task, particularly during the Three Kingdom's era of Koguryo, Paekche and Shilla, as writings from that era have not survived in any significant number. For the most part, the Samkuk Sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms), researched, compiled and written by the Koryo Dynasty Confucian intellectual Kim Pu-sik serves as a base document outlining pertinent security issues relative to the time.

But perhaps most relevant to today, examination of Korean strategic culture over the past two millennia demonstrates that each Korean state devised survival strategies employing varying forms of alliances to provide a secure environment that enabled domestic prosperity. These alliances, continental or maritime, applied with varying degrees of success, proved to be pivotal in each Korean
state’s decision-makers’ security calculus, and demanded mutual and shared accommodation of goals and interests with each alliance partner.

**Koguryo**

Koguryo (37 B.C. – 660 A.D.), which dominated the Korean Peninsula above the Han River Basin, and most of Manchuria including the Liaotung Peninsula, maintained an aggressive expansionist strategy throughout its existence. Geopolitically, Koguryo’s location ensured it was challenged on two fronts - various Chinese powers and Mongol-like tribal groups to the west, and Paekche and Shilla to the south. It was in constant conflict with these western and southern neighbors, fighting border wars to secure western and southern strongholds and loyal fringe tribes that would pay tribute and thus contribute to state wealth. Koguryo adopted Confucian traditions, including administrative and organizational principles to carry out their aggressive policies and control of numerous tribal groups.

North Korea is not the first Korean state to promote military-first politics as the law of the land, as Koguryo developed a distinct warrior culture that promoted the values of the military over all others. It trained many of its young men in the Kyongdang (in its beginning similar to Shilla’s Hwarang society) and maintained this Spartan-like tradition throughout its existence.

Koguryo plays no small part in Korean strategic culture. Its strengths are the admiration of both North and South Korea, its victories legend in both nations’ textbooks. North Korea even sees itself as the natural successor to Koguryo, primarily because of its similar occupation of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula and its militaristic society. Furthermore, had not Koguryo succeeded in resisting China’s Sui and Tang Dynasty invasions at the end of the sixth century and the early seventh century, both Paekche and Shilla would have undoubtedly fallen as well, thus likely eliminating Korea as a culture and society.

Though there is little written record of Koguryo’s strategic thought, there is sufficient record from follow-on states that attest to the military might of Koguryo. King Kwanggaeto (ruled 391-413) undoubtedly serves as the most significant strategic thinker of his time and the Stele of Kwanggaeto serves as the best written testimony to that effect. He carried out Koguryo’s greatest expansionist efforts, primarily on the western frontier against the Chinese Wei Empire. Koguryo’s greatest field general was Ulchi
Mundok who defeated Sui Chinese invasions with brilliant deception and retreat/attack strategies. Ulchi Mundok is honored by the South Korean government as they name their annual national government exercise Ulchi. No other king was as successful at confrontation on the western frontier as Kwanggaeto until King Yon Kaesomun (approximately 642-661) held off Tang invasions in the mid 7th century. After his death, his sons went in different directions to different states and Koguryo soon fell to the combined attacks of Tang China and Shilla. When one thinks about the current succession issue in North Korea and the significant parallels between Koguryo and North Korea, one cannot help but wonder if history will repeat itself.

Koguryo was not so aggressive and strong that it did not employ alliances. It alternated alliances with Paekche and Shilla in order to hold one or the other in check as they employed their own expansionist policies against Koguryo’s southern frontier. The strength of Koguryo’s enemies from the West in northern China dominated Koguryo strategy sufficiently enough to cause the transfer of its capital to Pyongyang from Kungnaesong on the Yalu.

For Koguryo, all of its enemies were as expansionist as it was, though with considerably less success and strength. Beginning with Puyo in northern Manchuria at the outset of the Koguryo state, through the Wei, Sui, and Tang empires in China, and with Paekche and Shilla in the south, Koguryo’s strength and military culture maintained its national security until Shilla and Tang established an alliance that employed a two-front attack strategy that eventually led to the defeat of Koguryo in the year 668.

**Paekche**

Paekche (18 B.C. - 660 A.D.) was predominant in the Korean Peninsula’s southwest during the Three Kingdoms’ era. Its height of power was in the mid-fourth century as its strategy of expansion had transformed a nation that had recently evolved from confederated walled town states to the largest occupier of Korean Peninsula territory at the height of its power. Paekche occupied today’s provinces of Cholla in the south, Chungchong, Kyonggi and part of Kangwon in the center, and Hwanghae in the north up to the Taedong River. It occupation of the key Han River basin sent it into a direct collision course with Koguryo and eventually Shilla.

Paekche was far less militaristic than Koguryo but, as a maritime nation, it maintained a strong economy and an alliance with the Japanese of the Yamato Wa. This alliance was never truly successful
when Paekche needed it the most as there are few battles recorded in the History of the Three Kingdoms that indicated that the Japanese contributed to success in its major battles with Koguryo. However, that alliance may have had some success against Shilla employing the confederated kingdom of Kaya and the Japanese as proxies to attack Shilla, forcing Shilla to desperately seek Koguryo help to survive.

Paekche also maintained alliances alternately with Koguryo and Shilla when the strength of one or another was too great for Paekche to resist on its own.

But perhaps its biggest failure was cutting off relations with Tang China in 652, leaving Paekche unprepared for the creation of the Tang-Shilla Alliance that destroyed Paekche in 660. Shilla forces attacking toward the Paekche capital of Sabi from the East provided the anvil to Tang’s massive amphibious operation landing up the Kum River serving as the hammer that destroyed Paekche forces in an admirable but woeful last last stand by Paekche’s most famous general, Kye-baek.

Paekche strategic thought was dominated by Buddhist thought as Paekche was the vessel through which Buddhism spread across Korea and into Japan. No record of strategic thinking survives today, but perhaps Paekche’s last King, Uija, exemplifies Paekche national security strategy more than anyone else. He attempted to carry out expansionist policies but chose the wrong allies (rejection of Tang) to help carry out his strategies, which ultimately led to a failed state.

Paekche’s strategic thought maintains parallels to that of South Korea economically as trade was a major contributor to the nation’s defense that possessed inadequate resources at times to survive on its own. Paekche’s strategic culture had little in common with that of North Korea.

Shilla

Shilla (57 B.C. – 935 A.D.) grew out of confederated states into the dominant political force in southeastern Korea in the area of today’s Kyongsang Provinces. As one examines Shilla’s strategic culture, it is impossible to ignore the successful employment of alliances at each step of its national development to survive and to expand. Shilla’s relatively small population base and relative isolation from the Asian continent required Shilla to alternately ally itself to Paekche, Koguryo, and the primary powers of China over the centuries until it could grow stronger.
Shilla’s strategic culture had two distinct periods with the difference being a national strategy of expansionism during the Three Kingdoms era culminating in the defeat of Paekche and Koguryo and consolidation of the most of the Korean Peninsula, and an isolationist strategy during the United Shilla stage. Probably the primary reason for this change is realpolitik. Shilla’s alliance with Tang eliminated the expansionist Koguryo and Paekche, and challenges by Tang afterward likely demonstrated to Shilla that further expansion would only lead to war with a nation that could mobilize superior capabilities. Both periods of Shilla’s existence were served well by professional militaries, but corruption and resultant internal struggles at the end of Unified Shilla contributed greatly to its downfall.

Early in its development, Shilla permitted the stationing of up to 50,000 Koguryo troops in its territory to first thwart and then deter Japanese invasions facilitated through the small confederated Korean kingdom of Kaya west of the Naktong River. Shilla survived because of this alliance with Koguryo and the forward basing strategy permitted Koguryo, and as much was recognized formally by the Shilla king.\(^3\) Just as some in South Korea see US presence there in the latter half of the 20th century in a negative light, so too did Shilla eventually see the presence of Koguryo troops as problematic. Eventually over time, Shilla made adjustments in its alliance with Koguryo as the situation dictated.

Shilla’s ultimate success was its strong alliance with the Tang Dynasty in China. Its strategy with Tang to first defeat Paekche and then conduct a two-front war against Koguryo – Tang from the Northwest and Shilla from the South – ultimately led to the unification of most of the Korean Peninsula. There were some problems with the alliance with Tang immediately after these victories, but those were settled and the Tang – Shilla Alliance served each of them well.

Most importantly, Shilla’s success at unification of the Korean Peninsula guaranteed a solid base from which Korean culture could develop from a stable environment...no small achievement.

Shilla’s enemies were probably more numerous than that of any other Korean state. Japan, Paekche, Koguryo, the confederated kingdom of Kaya, and even for a time its greatest ally Tang China for a brief period, ensured Shilla’s existence was challenged in during...

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every generation. Each of these enemies employed expansionist policies directed at all or some part of Shilla's territory and resources. Shilla's constant fight for survival is likely the paramount success story in Korean history.

Unified Shilla maintained comparatively amicable relations with Tang China as a tributary state, which contributed to the peace between the two after initial problems following the defeat of Koguryo. But Palhae was a quite different challenge. Palhae and Unified Shilla are frequently referred to in Korean history as the Northern and Southern Kingdoms. But because of constant pressure from Palhae along its borders, Unified Shilla elected to build a series of walls and strongholds along its northern frontier that roughly ran from the Taedong River in the West to Wonsan Bay in the East. This wall represented a proto-type of today's Military Demarcation Line inside the highly militarized Demilitarized Zone. In that vein, Unified Shilla demonstrated its isolationist strategy and essentially became an island as is South Korea today because direct access to the Asian continent is denied.

Shilla's strategic thought during the Three Kingdoms era is identified by most Korean historians as based in the school of Hwarang. This traditional education of young Shilla men in the military arts is seen as being responsible for shaping decision-makers at an early age. But perhaps more importantly, Shilla developed from six tribal leagues that banded their resources together and developed a defense system of alternating responsibility. In other words, Shilla decision-makers had to deal with alliance-type arrangements from an early point and this experience served them invaluably as the nation grew stronger against peninsula-based and international enemies. Strategic thought during Unified Shilla has not survived any better to date in written form. Perhaps most well known in this area is the civilian scholar Kim Tae-mun, who wrote considerably about Shilla culture and (Korean) identity in an attempt to counter the growing influence of Tang Dynasty Confucianist thought in Shilla.

6. Kim Tae-mun’s works have not survived to today but provided background material for Kim Pu-sik’s History of the Three Kingdoms and the Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms which provides the bulk of today’s knowledge of that era.
Palhae

Simplistically speaking, Palhae’s strategic culture parallels that of Koguryo due to its founding in 698 A.D. by Koguryo elites led by former Koguryo general Tae Cho-young. The difference was the willingness of these Koguryo elites to successfully employ diplomacy as a rational choice in relations to other regional states.

Once those elite consolidated their power over the tribal leagues of eastern Manchuria and northern Korea, Palhae began to expand its territorial holdings through the execution of expansionist policies that ultimately led to the control of most of the territory once held by Koguryo. By the 8th century, Palhae controlled northern Korea, all of Northeastern Manchuria, and the Liaotung peninsula.

Palhae began as the State of Chin in 698, after which Tang China came to recognize it by the year 713, and the name was changed to Palhae. A compromise was forged between Tang and Palhae as the latter resumed tributary missions to Tang. One of Palhae’s strong points was locating its capital as far from potential enemies as possible in the far northeast of Manchuria. This gave Palhae broad flexibility to absorb losses along its distant borders to the west and south without serious threat to the capital or the state’s ruling structures.

Palhae also maintained broad diplomatic relations with Unified Shilla (as well as a significant number of border wars) and Japan (34 diplomatic exchanges), with whom it kept diplomatic and commercial contacts until the end of the kingdom. Because of its proximity to many powerful states, Palhae became a buffer zone for the region. Palhae’s greatest success was not in alliances but in maintaining the status quo with nations on its borders. Palhae’s strength was such that Shilla was forced to build a northern wall in 721 as well as maintain active defenses along the common border. Today’s Demilitarized Zone is not the first of its kind on the peninsula.

Nothing survives in writing of Palhae’s strategic thinkers, but its enemies were basically the same as that of Koguryo, though clearly less ambitious. But Palhae had one great weakness in its strategic culture that it could never successfully overcome which ultimately led to its short lifespan. While its ruling class consisted of former Koguryo elite who brought with them the strategic culture of Koguryo, Palhae’s population was composed primarily of the Malgal tribes of northern Manchuria and northern Korea. This cultural split between the rulers and the ruled ultimately led to a weakened security structure.
Palhae lasted until A.D. 926 when Khitan tribal leagues to Palhae’s west developed into an aggressive state and overthrew the Palhae’s Koguryo rulers, who could not adequately mobilize an apathetic populace.

Palhae offers little in terms of lessons learned that North Korea has drawn from. Palhae’s transition from expansionist policies to a focus on diplomacy is not recognizable in Pyongyang today. But Palhae’s latter policies are paralleled by South Korea as it has employed friendly relations with all regional powers beginning with the introduction of Nordpolitik by President Roh Tae Woo in 1988. This initiative eventually led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Russia and China, which at the time, was regarded as no mean feat.

Koryo

Unified Shilla eventually fell because of the corruption at the court and the internal battles for control of the king. As Shilla lost its domestic power, parts of the country broke off under local power and eventually three separate states vied for power. Koryo (918-1398) eventually overcame Later Paekche and Shilla and began a new dynasty that began to reshape Korean culture and society. The reshaping of its strategic culture began also with the rise of the Confucian literati.

Koryo’s strategic culture can be characterized by preference for diplomacy and Confucian philosophy of moral choice in the use of force, acceptance of tributary status to successive dynastic powers, strategic thought dominated by civilian scholars and based in pluralist acceptance of multiple centers of gravity, and sporadic effectiveness in defense against the rapid rise and fall of Northeast Asian powers, and inconsistent readiness by the Koryo military. Koryo is unique in Korean history as it acquiesced to tributary status to more continental dynasties than any of the other seven Korean states examined here. This is primarily due to Koryo decision-makers’ preference to play a balancing role in the constantly shifting balance of power in Northeast Asia during the 10th to 14th centuries.

Koryo’s geographic location nearly identical to that of Unified Shilla, placed it in a precarious position where its northern border was constantly threatened by each new continental empire coming into power or by the independent Jurchen tribes in the Yalu River basin.

7. The English term ‘Korea’ is derived from ‘Koryo.’
Though Koryo began its rule over the Korean Peninsula with an expansionist strategy carried out by the Koryo Dynasty’s founder that defeated and absorbed Shilla and the breakaway state of Later Paekche, as well as attempts at pushing its northern border ever farther northward, it soon began to settle for the status quo through recognition of the suzerainty of Chinese dynasties.

The rise of the Khitan Empire known as the Liao Dynasty confronted Koryo first in a border war in the year 993. Liao demanded Koryo recognize Liao suzerainty but Koryo deliberately refused to take sides with China Song or Liao as the Koryo court debate concluded it unwise to tip the scales of regional power in one direction or the other. Liao followed this refusal with two invasions deep into Koryo territory in 1010 and 1018. Koryo’s capital of Kaesong was destroyed but in the last invasion, the Koryo military acquitted itself superbly by destroying the Khitan invasion force of 100,000 with retreat/counterattack and slash/burn tactics.

Relations with the short-lived Chin Empire that succeeded the Liao Dynasty were generally successfully stable. However, between the Khitan’s last invasion and the rise of Chin, Koryo fought numerous battles with the Jurchen tribal leagues along its northern border. This led Koryo to build the “long wall” from near the mouth of the Yalu River southeasterly to the area of modern Hungnam in North Korea. In case you are counting, that would make today’s DMZ the third such barrier in Korean history.

Perhaps Koryo decision-makers made no more greater mistake than attempting to resist the Mongols who were expanding their empire at the speed of their horses. That resistance motivated the Mongols to invade Koryo six times over a 30 year period and occupying the peninsula to prepare for its invasion of Japan, using the Korean populace as resource number one. The occupation caused the population to suffer immensely at the hands of the brutal Mongol occupiers while the decision-makers and the King’s court sequestered themselves on the island of Kanghwa where the Mongols could not reach.

Koryo had no shortage of strategic thinkers. Much of their work has survived today. From appeasers to expansionists, all were isolationists who acknowledged multiple “realms,” the Confucian term for multiple strategic centers of gravity. Perhaps the most famous were the brothers Kim Pu-ui and Kim Pu-sik who focused on independence from these multiple centers of gravity.

Koryo offers valuable lessons for Korea today. Not once did Koryo ally itself with any of the continental empires and it suffered greatly for doing so.
That, coupled with inconsistent military preparedness, even during the century of military dictatorship, led to extreme hardships for the Koryo population that likely rivaled the hardships suffered by the average North Korean today. What is a significant parallel between Koryo and the Korea's of today is the presence of multiple powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula in a precarious security environment.

Choson

Koryo fell because its leaders felt they could abandon its tributary relationship to China’s new Ming Dynasty and attack into the Liaotung Peninsula. They sent one of their leading generals, Yi Song-gye to attack, but once he reached the Yalu River, he saw the folly of the effort, returned to the capital of Kaesong, and conducted a coup detat against the Koryo Dynasty. The beginning of the Choson Dynasty (known then as the Yi Dynasty) in Korea began with a recommitment to tributary status to Chinese suzerainty and rejection of expansionist policies, and this did not change until the Choson Dynasty fell to Japanese colonialism in 1910. This rededication of a strategic culture based in service to a superior power eventually evolved into isolationism that rejected modernization at a time when the rest of the world was doing exactly that.

Choson’s strategic culture can be characterized as isolationist with strategic thought dominated by neo-Confucian philosophy, ritual and xenophobic approaches to international relations of any sort short tributary commitment to the Chinese “Son of Heaven.” All but China were regarded as enemies and therefore inferior culturally, and by extension, militarily as well. Cultural strength based in neo-Confucian ethic was considered a more superior defense than the military, but not the absence of the military. A class of neo-Confucian scholars came to dominate Choson politics and decision-making, with little input from the military.

Despite a civilian-led administration and security structure, there were some significant military actions within decades of the Choson Dynasty’s founding. Korea’s most respected king, Sejong the Great, restored the borders to their current location along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the north, thus changing Korea’s geography to its present status, albeit bifurcated by diametrically opposed political entities in the North and South. King Sejong’s superior leadership not only created the written Korean language but established a highly efficient administrative infrastructure
responsive to the needs of the entire populace, including military action to protect the interests of the state.

But Choson’s military structures fell in drastic disrepair by the beginning of the 16th century due to the neo-Confucian confidence in culture over military readiness as a means to defend the realm. The consequences of not possessing an early warning system composed of embassies and envoys led to disaster for Choson, but provided the opportunity for Korea’s most famous military hero to demonstrate that brilliant strategy and tactics are not necessarily the domain of the West.

Without a doubt Korea’s most solid strategic thinker was Admiral Yi Sun-shin of the late 16th century. His many memorials to the Yi court urged military preparedness for Choson against all enemies. Yi’s works are still inspiration to modern military thinkers in Korea on both sides of the DMZ.

Though the Choson considered almost everybody as an enemy, those that faced Choson militarily were Japan and the Ching Dynasty that succeeded the Ming Dynasty. Japan’s devastating invasions of 1592 and 1597 were only stopped because of Korea’s late but eventual successful mobilization of the entire nation, as well as the interdiction by Ming Dynasty forces because China realized it was the ultimate objective of Hideyoshi Japan. When Choson was unprepared for the fall of the Ming to the Ching, Choson chose to support the outgoing dynasty once again, despite pleas from the Ching to understand their intent. China invaded Choson twice in the early 17th century at a time when Choson had not completely recovered from the Hideyoshi invasions three decades earlier. This provided still another example of Korean state’s poor early warning capability about changes in Northeast Asia’s balance of power.

A few Western powers that were trying to open the East, also came in contact with Choson, including France and the United States. The latter two lost ships to Choson coastal units and conducted incursions into Kanghwa Island in retribution. In the U.S. incursion of 1871, more Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor in that action than in any other except for Iwo Jima.

The Choson Dynasty offers an important lesson for Korea in what it wasn’t more than what it was. A belief that culture or anything else can replace military readiness as a deterrent against enemies does not pass the reason test. The lack of an adequate intelligence

system to provide early warning of changes of regional powers’ intent also provides a valuable lesson learned.

North Korea

North Korea has developed a strategic culture somewhat unique in world political history, unless one counts that described in George Orwell’s now-not-so-fictional novel, 1984. Concisely put, North Korea’s strategic culture can be characterized as expansionist with leadership preferences for the employment of coercion and violence to attain political objectives, supported organizationally and philosophically by xenophobic strategic thought emphasizing independence. North Korea has used its geography to advantage to form alliances with world powers and manipulated historical experience to fit a ruling mythology that provides the populace a vision of leadership.

The Kim Family Regime’s total and absolute control of every facet of North Korean life facilitated by the most centralized political structure in the world enabled Kim Il-song and now Kim Jong-il to create a state that feeds the resources and production, including its entire population, into a strategic culture based in expansion over all that is Korean, a coercive foreign policy designed to maximize negotiation positions and extort economic and political concessions in its favor from ‘friends’ and enemies alike, and a military-first policy to which the regime prioritizes all decisions and employs coercively to support attainment of its foreign policy objectives.

Its geography is favorable geostrategically because of its border with China and Russia, which gives it broad access to the Asian continent if it wanted to do so. North Korea derives significant advantages from the combination of geographical and political links to Beijing and Moscow, not the least of which is either explicit or implied support to North Korean security objectives.

From preparation for its invasion of South Korea in 1950 to today’s Six Party Talks, Pyongyang has successfully taken advantage

9. Helen Hunter’s study of North Korean society is the most complete description of how a leadership structure can achieve cult status that focuses every aspect of decision-making in every sector of society, not to mention internal and external security. See Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 1999. For more on the foundations of North Korea’s strategic culture, see also Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il-sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press), 2002.
of the PRC and Soviet Union/Russia's less than harmonic relations with Washington to further or protect regime interests.

North Korean strategic thought is the sole responsibility of the monolithic leadership central to Kim Regime existence. In a country where movie stars are not allowed a lead role in more than one film in order to avoid the development of a following of anyone other than Kim Il-song or Kim Jong-il, authorship of any writings on strategic thought other than those two is strictly anathema to the political system. Korean People's Army officers in the past attended the Soviet Union's Frundze Academy in the past where they were no doubt exposed Clausewitz and Jomini and Russian strategic thinkers, but that academic exchange program has ended. Military officers and civilians no doubt write to some degree on strategy, but it is no doubt unsigned and devoted to the glory and philosophy of the Kim Family, just as other non-scientific writings are in North Korea. Besides the Kim Family, however, we know that General Kim Chaek was the architect of the Korean War strategy and focused on mass forces attacking strategic and tactical weak points of the enemy. Other officers who served with Kim Il-song in the Soviet military's 88th Special Reconnaissance Brigade, such as O Chin-u, Choe Hyon, Yi Ul-sol, Yi Tu-ik, and Choe Yong-gon, undoubtedly contributed to the North's focus on special operations forces. These forces are direct operational lineage from that period and represent a style of warfare preferred by the North Korean leadership.  

The Kim Regime's Juche philosophy has distorted North Korea's strategic thinking and it has undermined its pursuit of national interests. (The same was true of the Choson Dynasty that mistakenly believed its culture was strong enough to resist penetration by the West during the latter half of the 19th century.) North Korea's ideologically-driven philosophy to unify the Korean Peninsula (basically an expansionist philosophy that parallels those of each of the earlier Three Kingdoms) has undermined its economy and is contributing to current instability issues in North Korea.

North Korea's present alliance with the People's Republic of China also gives Beijing several advantages. The most distinct of these is that North Korea provides Beijing with strategic and operational depth from the United States and its forward presence as established by Washington's bilateral alliances with Seoul and Tokyo, of which North Korea is fully aware.

North Korea’s alliances have also brought it considerable economic benefits as well. Kim Il-song historically manipulated its relations with the PRC and the former Soviet Union to maximize foreign aid and assistance to his resource-starved nation, a pattern that has been paralleled with some success over the past decade by Kim Jong-il in his dealings with the PRC, the United States, and South Korea. Interestingly, no other Korean state over the last two millennia was able to see its northern border as a relatively secure environment.

In terms of the role of enemies in North Korean strategic culture, a Korean state has not seen another Korean state as an enemy since the fall of Palhae in 926. North Korea’s propaganda machines do not identify the South Korean people as enemies but have historically projected the South Korean government as enemies and ‘puppets’ of the United States, though, consistent with reconciliation efforts, they do not directly refer to the Roh Administration in that fashion. Japan as an enemy plays a major role in the regime’s legitimacy and its political mythology as to its origins as a guerilla movement fighting against Japan colonialism. But Pyongyang’s biggest challenge is its confrontation with the United States, and no Korean state has ever maintained confrontational relationship with a major power outside Northeast Asia or one with such standoff capability.

North Korea’s present-day strategy for dealing with enemies has transitioned from overwhelming military power designed to coerce its enemies into courses of action favorable to Pyongyang, to one based in asymmetric warfare and a ‘hug-your-enemy’ approach that employs proximity to the greatest advantage. The North Korean leadership has been developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to provide alternative operational strategies. Indeed, the deployment of long-range artillery in close proximity to the Demilitarized Zone enables North Korea to strike Seoul with relative ease, to include the use of chemical rounds. This ability to strike an enemy capital in such close proximity with a massive array of tactical weapons is unparalleled in today’s world, with the possible exception of the situation which Jerusalem faces. These proximity capabilities, coupled with the extended operational reach provided by North Korea’s missile fleet, as well as the development of nuclear weapons has enabled North Korea to deal with its enemies with superior capabilities in a brinkmanship manner that Pyongyang describes as a deterrent. What makes this so effective is the ability to deliver massive fires with large numbers, maximizing the

difficulty for combined ROK and US forces to take out these forces all at the same time.

North Korea’s parallel to the strategic culture of its predecessor states is based in the warrior class mentality, read military-first politics, and expansionist policies of Koguryo and Palhae. North Korea shares similar geography with most other Korean states, but to a different strategic advantage with allies to the North. Its enemies are different when one considers Pyongyang’s view of the South Korea – United States Alliance, and this has resulted in North Korea developing military capabilities to keep pace with what Pyongyang sees as the threat, just as Koguryo and Palhae did centuries ago. North Korea has less in common with the less aggressive strategic cultures of Shilla and the Koryo and Choson Dynasties, except for alliances with Chinese power.

South Korea

South Korea’s strategic culture can be characterized as defensive in nature from a geographically isolated position, protects the status quo through a robust alliance with a world power, and is supported by modern democratic ideals and a highly productive economy that is integrated into the international system. Its modern military employs modern concepts of warfare in an integrated command structure with allied forces.

The role of geography places South Korea in a virtual island position, compelling a maritime alliance to defend against a land-based threat. While South Korea’s geostrategic location gives it no particular advantages in terms of defense, its ports and immediate access to the seas give it significant advantages economically, something the North cannot begin to match, and a facilitator of economic growth that is ultimately the biggest threat to the Kim Regime.

Seoul’s strategic thought is based in moral choice, and leadership preferences have recently changed South Korea’s approach to North Korea from one of confrontation to that of reconciliation. This is a major step in strategy for Seoul and is articulated in the March 2004 publication of its national security strategy. Due to the focus on economic and societal interaction inherent in the strategies of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyon Administrations, Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang can also be described as being a ‘hug-your-enemy’ strategy, though Seoul would no doubt change that label to ‘hug-your-

brother’ strategy. In stark contrast to the North, Seoul employs modern diplomatic, informational and economic instruments to seek conflict resolution with North Korea.

Besides the strategic thought studied at formal advanced military and civilian schools where they are exposed to the likes of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu and the like, South Korea has had many who have contributed to the South’s overall strategic thought. Lieutenant General Kim Hong-il layed the foundations for the ROK military command, General Paik Sun-yup is a national hero led the ROK Army First Division in the Korean War and who continues to lecture on tactics during the Korean War, former President Park Chung-hee who set the infrastructure base and policy models to develop South Korea’s national strength through economic development, General Yun Yong-nam who established multi-dimensional high-speed maneuver warfare and defense in depth so critical to the defense of Seoul which is less than 30 miles from the DMZ, and recently retired LTG Kim Hee-sang who wrote extensively on combined operations, military cooperation with neighboring states, and the need for a self-reliant ROK military.

South Korea’s present alliance with the United States is robust and contributes significantly to regional stability and their combined deterrent capability has set the conditions for regional economic prosperity. While the U.S. contributes forces on peninsula to support South Korea (not unlike Koguryo did for Shilla in the 5th century), South Korea has contributed significantly to U.S. security efforts in Vietnam, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

South Korea has identified its number one security threat as the North Korean nuclear program in their Peace and Prosperity Policy. Therefore, its participation in the Six Party Talks is critical to resolving this threat. Though the ROK military is arrayed along the Demilitarized Zone to guarantee a deterrent against North Korean adventurism, Seoul’s primary focus is on diplomatic solutions to secure peace on the peninsula. Some in South Korea see Japan’s challenges over the Dokdo Islets as a security issue, this is highly unlikely to turn into a conflict between two democracies, nationalistic reactions aside.

South Korea’s present-day strategy for dealing with enemies is now focused in the deterrent capability and readiness of the Combined Forces Command, but its future direction lies in Defense Reform 2020. This military transformation plan calls not only for modernization of its weapons and equipment systems and force structure, but also for gaining wartime operational control of
selected forces from the Combined Forces Command and constructing a command and control system whereby the ROK can take the lead in its own defense.

Conclusion

However briefly, this paper attempted to examine how geography, history, experience, strategic thought and strategy shaped the preferences in the use of force by the decision-makers in the strategic culture of each of the last eight Korean states. Though on the surface there appeared to be more similarities than differences between the states – indeed there were some stark constants in geography and origins of enemies – there also were dramatic differences that were shaped by the strategic thought of individual Korean state. It is within these differences that lie the lessons learned for today’s Korean state.

The role of a robust alliance that was able to conduct coordinated military operations against peninsular and regional enemies stands out as a key component of the successful Korean state’s national security strategy, a concept that today cannot be over-emphasized. Conversely, the balancing role attempted by the Koryo Dynasty proved too difficult in the face of rapidly changing power dynamics within the region, particularly in the face of a weak continental friend.

The function of strategic intelligence to forecast major changes in regional power dynamics is also a dramatic lesson learned from the experiences of Koguryo, Koryo, and Choson, each of which failed to maintain embassies or diplomatic missions in regional capitals that could forecast changes in the ebb and flow of power.

South Korea’s parallel to the strategic culture of its predecessor states is based in the moral choice authority of Confucian doctrine that emphasizes defense of the nation but not expansionist policies. The South Korean Constitution’s Article Three does state that the entire peninsula falls under the authority of the Republic of Korea, but Seoul’s official policy on unification is peaceful as opposed to forced. South Korea shares similar geography to that of Unified Shilla, and in that sense is compelled to maintain a maritime alliance. Its enemies are similar in deployment to that of Unified Shilla and Koryo, but its success at stability after initial difficulties are remarkably near identical to that of Unified Shilla. South Korea has little in common with any of the Three Kingdoms except in the robust will to defend the homeland and is significantly more responsible for its defense than the weak and conciliatory Choson
Dynasty. Shilla and Unified Shilla seem to offer the best model for strategic culture from which to learn lessons for the modern Korean state.
Today’s Korean Question: Establishing Peace on a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula

Paul F. Chamberlin

I. Introduction

Calls for a “peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula gained some prominence in high level multinational and bilateral meetings from September 2005 through January 2006. On September 19, delegates to the fourth round of “Six-Party Talks” issued a Declaration of Principles to achieve the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” One provision states, “The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”2 The presidents and foreign ministers of the ROK and United States expressed support for a peace regime/mechanism to complement the Six-Party Talks in November 2005 and January 2006, respectively.3 The state of insecurity prompting and resulting from a North Korean ballistic missile demonstration and test in July

1. The governments of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea), Russia, and the United States established the Six-Party Talks forum in 2003 to achieve the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
3. “Joint Declaration on the ROK-US Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” also known as “The Gyeongju Declaration,” November 17, 2005, Korean Overseas Information Service, Korea.net, http://www.korea.net/News/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20051118008, accessed January 18, 2006. The quoted text is “The two leaders agreed that reducing the military threat on the Korean Peninsula and moving from the current armistice mechanism to a peace mechanism would contribute to full reconciliation and peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula. Pursuant to the September 19th Six Party Joint Statement, the two leaders agreed that discussions on a peace regime should take place amongst directly-related parties in a forum separate from the Six-Party Talks and would follow progress in those Talks, and expected that the discussions on a peace regime and the Six Party Talks will be mutually reinforcing.”
2006 reinforces the importance of establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Making sense of the Declaration’s complex goals and ambiguous language requires clarification of some key terms. The “de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” means North Korea’s return to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a certified non-nuclear weapons state — like the ROK. “In a separate forum” implies the Six-Parties agree that efforts to achieve a permanent peace regime should be conducted outside of the Six-Party Beijing Talks on a bilateral or multilateral basis by the “directly related parties.” The “directly related parties” vary depending on the issue, as detailed in this paper. The term “permanent peace regime” evokes thoughts of how to resolve chronic problems, legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement, and achieve a true state of peace among the major belligerents of the Korean War. Achieving such peace first requires resolution of the Korean question that emerged in 1945. Divorcing Pyongyang’s efforts to become a nuclear weapons state from the unresolved Korean question and associated security issues is not possible. These issues are too closely intertwined.

Many policy-makers and opinion-leaders focus on a particular Korean issue as if it were a relatively simple stand-alone problem that can be resolved in isolation from the much more complex whole. This approach works in some cases, for example, providing humanitarian assistance to starving North Koreans. In other instances, it is doomed to fail. The July 2006 missile demonstration is an example, but the nuclear issue is more important.

With respect to the nuclear issue, entirely too much is at stake for a relatively simplistic solution. Americans may regard North Korea’s intransigence in nuclear discussions as evidence that Pyongyang is intent on becoming an aggressive nuclear weapons state. While this might prove to be the case, this view reflects ignorance of Korea’s general history as victim of regional aggression, not aggressor, despite the Korean War aberration. It also dismisses Pyongyang’s stated motives. North Korean officials claims a nuclear arsenal is essential to deter foreign — specifically, U.S. — aggression. If this rhetoric is sincere, then Pyongyang’s reluctance to verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs reflects its reluctance to surrender to foreign forces with no assurances of its future survival as a sovereign state. Such concern stems from the unresolved nature of the Korean question and a lack of confidence in the intentions of the United States and perhaps other countries.

Therefore, efforts to establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and induce North Korea’s return to
the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state require a comprehensive approach.

This paper reviews key factors pertinent to establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and inducing North Korea’s return to the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state in the following sections: Section II addresses the Korean question; Section III, security concerns, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; and Section IV, elements of a permanent peace regime. Sections V and VI comprise conclusions and recommendations.

This paper concludes that the Korean War is de facto over, but a true state of peace is not yet at hand in large part because the Korean question remains unanswered, making its resolution Task One. Focusing efforts on a mechanism to legally end the Korean War distracts from resolving the root issue: the Korean question. Only a comprehensive approach, sincerely conceived and implemented, to resolve the Korean question and other key issues has a chance of success in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and effecting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Key recommendations to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s return to the NPT are summarized below and detailed in Section VI:

• Resolve the Korean Question: The governments of the ROK and DPRK should recognize and establish normal diplomatic relations with each other as sovereign, pre-unification states pending unification.

• Legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement: Upon resolution of the Korean question, the two Koreas, China, and the United States should then legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

• Normalize U.S.-DPRK Relations: The peace implied by legally terminating the Armistice Agreement will be reinforced by the major Korean War belligerents normalizing relations with each other. As a practical matter, the hold-outs will be North Korea and the United States, assuming the Korean question is resolved as suggested in this paper. Therefore, Washington and Pyongyang should initiate steps to normalize relations with the process to be completed upon resolution of the Korean question and North Korea’s return to the NPT. In the interim, several confidence building measures (CBM) are suggested, including a U.S. congressional resolution to support the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations.
• **Facilitate North Korea’s Return to the NPT:** The UN Security Council and IAEA should agree to accept North Korea’s return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state on a no-fault basis, and North Korea should initiate measures to gain IAEA certification of compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. As this will be a lengthy process, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea should agree to revise and implement an updated U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in the interim.

• **Assuage North Korea’s fears of foreign aggression:** The United States should state its intentions not to attack North Korea and lend credence to these statements by implementing measures to normalize U.S.-DPRK relations and other suggestions in this paper.

• **Develop a Six-Party Implementing Agreement:** The Six Parties should develop an agreement to implement the Declaration of Principles based on progress made by the “directly related parties” on the various issues. The agreement should lay out each country’s intended actions and envisioned measures to help achieve the above goals.

• **Guiding Principles:** Transactions should be conducted transparently, verifiably, and with intent to achieve mutually satisfactory benefits, understanding the subjective nature of this latter principle.

II. The Korean Question:
What Korean government(s) should govern Koreans?

*The End of Unified Korean Sovereignty*

Korea was a unified and relatively independent, sovereign country for 1,200 years until Imperial Japan incorporated it into its empire in the early 20th century. This subjugation ended Korea’s status as a self-governing sovereign nation-state. However, Korea remained a unified nation throughout the period of Japanese colonization and World War II. In 1943, the heads of the U.S., UK, and Chinese governments met in Cairo, Egypt to plan military operations against Imperial Japan. They agreed that Korea shall “in due course be free and independent.”

Korean Liberation – A Two Part Tragedy

August 1945 was a momentous month from which Koreans yearn to fully recover. Their nation was simultaneously liberated and divided, despite Washington’s vision mentioned above.

In early August, Soviet Red Army troops rapidly advanced deep into Korea while U.S. forces in Okinawa prepared for the final invasion of Japan. This surprising Soviet advance prompted the United States to propose a temporary military control measure along the 38th parallel ostensibly to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces. The principal goal, however, was to prevent Moscow from adding the Korean Peninsula to its growing empire of newly acquired countries. U.S. forces arrived in southern Korea on September 8. The envisioned temporary military control measure unfortunately became a de facto border.

Rise of the Korean Question

This tragic turn of events immediately gave rise to the “Korean question” of what Korean government should govern the Korean people. After almost two years of futile diplomatic efforts by the United States and USSR to establish a unified Korean government, Washington referred the Korean question to the newly formed United Nations in late summer 1947.

In November 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved that the Korean people should elect representatives to establish a Korean government. Elections were held on May 10, 1948 but only below the 38th parallel in southern Korea. The Soviets forbade them in the north. South Koreans announced the establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, which the United Nations promptly recognized as the legitimate government of the Korean people. Roughly three weeks later, North Koreans announced the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 8. While these developments addressed near-term governance requirements, they did not answer the Korean question to parties who could imagine only one government as a satisfactory solution.

Korean War and Armistice

To resolve the Korean question by force, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. A decisive response by the United Nations defeated this aggression and ultimately established a slightly new land border in the form of a Military Demarcation Line that lay at the center of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which ran generally along the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula – not offshore. Interim efforts by the United Nations Command (UNC) to achieve Korean unification on behalf of the ROK in late 1950
prompted decisive intervention by “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV), which reinforced the [North] Korean People’s Army (KPA).

Thirty-seven months after the KPA suddenly invaded South Korea, the belligerents on July 27, 1953 signed an Armistice Agreement that ended major combat operations and thus de facto the Korean War. As the Agreement makes clear, the Korean War was an effort to resolve the Korean question. The signatories specifically recommended the pertinent governments negotiate “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question...” as detailed below:

In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. [Emphasis added.]

The Armistice Agreement essentially closed the chapter on these early efforts to resolve the Korean question by force. The Agreement and its enforcement mechanisms remain relevant.

The Korea question, however, should be updated to reflect the reality of two sovereign Korean governments on the Korean Peninsula since 1948. The updated question should be what Korean government or governments should govern the Korean people until unification?

Although the Armistice Agreement recommends a political settlement of the Korean question, some observers argue that the Korean War is legally on-going, because it has not yet been concluded with a peace treaty or some such agreement. Others disagree with the need for such instruments on the grounds that “the passage of a certain amount of time may turn a general armistice into a de facto peace treaty.” Should a half-century constitute that passage of time?

6. Ibid. Note: The recommended conference was inconclusively held in Geneva from April 26-June 15, 1954.
8. Ibid.
Post-Cold War Initiatives

German unification and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s inspired South Koreans to pursue peaceful initiatives to resolve the Korean question in a new security environment and thus end the Cold War legacy of divided Korea. Four ROK presidential administrations have implemented policies to move towards peaceful unification. These efforts accelerated in 1998 with Seoul's announcement of a “sunshine” engagement policy named after Aesop's tale of a hot sun and cold wind that competed to induce a man to remove his coat. Since the end of the Cold War, the two Koreas have developed three major agreements that hinted at a resolution of the Korean question and a nuclear agreement.

1992 Basic Agreement

In 1992, the two Koreas seemed to agree that a state of war did not exist between them. This is the clear implication of their “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation” - commonly called the “Basic Agreement” - that entered into force on February 19.

Government officials of the two “sides” pledged to “recognize and respect” each other’s “system” and not to “interfere in [each other's] internal affairs.” They also agreed to “abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until ... a state of peace is realized.”

More relevant to this discussion, they accepted that the inter-Korea relationship is not “a relationship between states... [it] is a special one constitute [sic] temporarily in the process of unification.” Implicitly, Seoul and Pyongyang acknowledge the existence of the other as a “side” and “system” - not government or sovereign country. They also acknowledged that the existence of two Koreas is an aberration in light of Korean history and that the establishment of unified Korea is a mutual goal. The nature of unified Korea and the unification process require coordination.

The Basic Agreement represents some progress in resolving the Korean question, if both governments regard it sincerely. An important shortcoming of this agreement from a foreigner's perspective, however, is that it does not explicitly resolve the Korean question of what Korean government(s) should govern the Korean people in this pre-unification period. This question cannot be

10. Ibid., preamble.
resolved until each government explicitly acknowledges the sovereignty of the other within agreed territorial limits. Agreement by the heads of state is an essential first step.

An equally important second step is for each government to amend its constitution to reflect the executive agreement. The ROK constitution states that South Korea’s territory is “the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”\textsuperscript{11} North Korea’s constitution describes the DPRK as “an independent socialist state representing the interests of all the Korean people.... The DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea ... and reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.”\textsuperscript{12} The Basic Agreement states the territories are “the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.”\textsuperscript{13} However, the two governments disagree on territorial limits.

The Basic Agreement was not fully implemented. Developing the stipulated institutions was a problem in early 1992. Since late 1992, ROK awareness of North Korea’s covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons degraded support for the Agreement, despite North Korea certifiably “freezing” its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program from October 1994 through mid-December 2002.

2000 Summit Agreement

ROK President Kim Dae-jung and DPRK National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il\textsuperscript{14} conducted an unprecedented inter-Korea summit meeting in June 2000, despite North Korean provocations since 1992. The two heads of state essentially reaffirmed that the two Koreas were not at war with each other and established a foundation for inter-Korea rapprochement.\textsuperscript{15}

To improve inter-Korea relations, Seoul and Pyongyang are building on the 2000 Summit and the Basic Agreement to some extent. Seoul has provided extensive humanitarian assistance to North Korea and is pursuing economic projects that include a nascent major industrial complex at Gaeseong (also spelled Kaesong). South Koreans believe such engagement is essential to

\textsuperscript{11} ROK Constitution, most recently amended October 29, 1987, Article 3.
\textsuperscript{12} DPRK Socialist Constitution, most recently amended September 5, 1998, Articles 1 and 9, respectively.
\textsuperscript{13} Basic Agreement, Article 11.
\textsuperscript{14} Kim Jong-il is the de facto head of state and holder of all key position titles except president, who is the late Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il prefers to be called Chairman, as he is Chairman of the National Defense Committee.
\textsuperscript{15} South and North Korean Joint Declaration, June 15, 2000, issued in Pyongyang, North Korea, June 15, 2000.
promote inter-Korea reconciliation and reduce the threat of a second Korean War, which at best would produce a pyrrhic victory for the ROK-U.S. alliance and catastrophic damage in the ROK.

Stated U.S. policy supports this rapprochement. However, some American policy- and opinion-makers are clearly skeptical about the utility of Seoul’s engagement efforts, which they believe neuter U.S. hard-line policies to force North Korea into certifiably abandoning its nuclear weapons programs. This policy stance is remarkable, given North Korea’s demonstrated ability to withstand external pressure, regardless of the consequences on ordinary citizens.

In summary, resolving the Korean question is the first major task to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula. Resolving security concerns is an important follow-on task.

III. Security Concerns

Persistent tension exists on the Korean Peninsula despite the end of the Korean War in large part because of the unresolved Korean question, as just discussed. This tension is also a byproduct of longstanding anxiety among major Korean War belligerents that merit resolution or confirmation in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 (2001) security environment. North Korea complains of U.S. hostile policy. Americans perceive an unremitting North Korean threat to U.S. interests. South Korea highly values the ROK-U.S. alliance and believes the best way to ameliorate tension is by improving inter-Korea relations within the alliance. The current U.S. government has mixed views of ROK inter-Korea engagement policies.

North Korea

Post-Cold War Vulnerability

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union had a major impact on North Korea. Pyongyang lost not only the USSR as a friend and important trading partner but also as one of its two military allies. Moscow normalized diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1990. China followed suit in 1992. Pyongyang felt isolated and vulnerable to aggression by ROK and U.S. forces, including those stationed in South Korea at the request of the ROK government.16

16. Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, signed at Washington: October 1, 1953; entered into force: November 17, 1954. One stated goal of the treaty is “to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.” At the invitation of the government of the Republic of Korea, the United States has stationed US. Forces Korea (USFK) in South Korea to help strengthen the fabric of peace and bolster Asia-Pacific states confidence in the U.S. commitment to regional peace and stability.
Sincere resolution of the Korean question and other issues addressed in this paper should ameliorate such concerns in the future if the relevant actors have the political will to do so.

DPRK President Kim Il-sung managed North Korea’s deteriorating security environment in the early 1990s by establishing diplomatic agreements with South Korea and a full-scope Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In retrospect, these agreements seem to reflect short-term coping tactics more than long-term strategic decisions. North Korea’s full-scope Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA came into force on April 10, 1992. The inter-Korea agreements were the Basic Agreement mentioned above and a “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Pyongyang and Seoul signed the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” on January 20, 1992 to enter into force on February 19, 1992. The so-called “Joint Accord” comprises five nuclear related articles, summarized below:

- Article I prohibits the testing, manufacturing, production, reception, possession, storage, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons.
- Article II commits each Korea to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.
- Article III forbids nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
- Article IV calls for mutual inspections to assure compliance with the Accord.
- Article V calls for the establishment of an inter-Korea joint nuclear control commission (JNCC).

**Foreign Disappointment and Response**

The optimism generated by the establishment of the aforementioned agreements soon dissipated. Within months, the Joint Accord essentially became a dead letter, due to problems in establishing bilateral inspection procedures and forming the JNCC. IAEA inspections in the spring and summer of 1992 revealed “inconsistencies” in North Korea’s submitted statement of nuclear materials, which remained unresolved as of August 1, 2006 when this paper was written.¹⁷

International concerns increased regarding Pyongyang’s covert efforts to become a nuclear weapons state. Initial IAEA inspections in 1992 raised serious questions about North Korea’s intentions and

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capabilities. These concerns reached crisis proportions in spring 1994 when North Korea removed spent nuclear fuel from a research reactor without required IAEA monitoring. Amidst concerns that North Korea might already have reprocessed enough nuclear waste to build two nuclear weapons, diplomacy laid the foundation for a solution through an “Agreed Framework” that the U.S. and DPRK signed in October 1994.

The Agreed Framework established a series of mutually reinforcing procedures to bring North Korea back into the NPT and normalize U.S.-DPRK relations. Its success depended solely on each signatory honoring its commitments in four articles, as it was not a legally binding agreement like a treaty. The Agreed Framework could have been a huge confidence building measure. Key provisions are summarized below:

- Article I, which met the most important U.S. concerns at the time, called for North Korea to “freeze” its plutonium-based nuclear program and for the United States to supply “heavy fuel oil” and two 1,000 MW(e) light-water reactors (LWR) for a nuclear power plant by a stated “target date” of 2003. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo subsequently formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to conduct the LWR project.
- Article II, which may have been most important to Pyongyang, called on both countries to move towards normalizing diplomatic relations.
- Article III obligated North Korea to implement the inter-Korea “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and to engage in inter-Korea dialogue. The United States committed to provide formal assurances to North Korea “against the threat or use of [U.S.] nuclear weapons.”
- Article IV committed each party to strengthen the NPT, with North Korea specifically permitting the resumption of IAEA inspections as certain conditions were met.

Full compliance with the agreement by both parties was somewhat problematic from the beginning. With respect to the United States, for example, unanticipated delays in crafting appropriate diplomatic protocols stipulating standards and conditions for the LWR project delayed the construction start date to a time that made it impossible to complete the project by 2003. For example, concrete was not poured for the foundation until 2002.

This delay arguably provided paranoid North Korean officials with grounds for feeling that the United States did not intend to honor its obligations, damaging whatever confidence the Agreed Framework might have generated in the first place. Talk in the
United States about the imminent collapse of the Kim Jong-il government in the mid-1990s probably reinforced such North Korean sentiments.

Additionally, the emergence of a skeptical, opposition-party dominated Congress in 1995 created a domestic U.S. political climate that made it virtually impossible for the White House to propose normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea. The extent to which such problems influenced North Korean behavior will likely remain unknown for some time.

North Korea, however, seemed to be more blame-worthy for the collapse of the Agreed Framework. While it promptly and certifiably “froze” its plutonium-based nuclear program, it neither engaged in inter-Korea dialogue on a sustained basis nor implemented the inter-Korea Joint (denuclearization) Accord per Article III. By the late 1990s, U.S. government officials began to suspect that North Korea was conducting a forbidden “highly enriched uranium” (HEU) program, empowered by a trading relationship with Pakistan. The extent and purpose of this suspected program may have been ambiguous at the time, but it did seem to constitute a possible violation of Article III of both the Agreed Framework and Joint Accord. Accordingly, President Clinton informed the Congress in March 2000 that he could no longer certify that “North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.”

In October 2002, North Korean officials in Pyongyang essentially admitted to a visiting U.S. delegation that it had another nuclear weapons development program. Presumably this was the suspected HEU program, as the plutonium-based program had been certifiably “frozen” since 1994. For U.S. hard liners, this admission validated their long-nurtured suspicions about North Korea and prompted them to stop complying with U.S. obligations under the Agreed Framework, providing heavy fuel oil, for example.

For more objective observers, however, the admission raised more questions than it answered. For example, why would Pyongyang start another nuclear weapons program in the mid-1990s during a period of relatively positive U.S.-DPRK relations? Did Kim Jong-il envision it as a bargaining chip if the LWR project were to slip or U.S.-DPRK relations were to sour? Or was Pyongyang simply pursuing an alternative course of action to become a nuclear

weapons state? The answers to these questions probably will remain unknown for some time.

As a result of U.S. decisions to ignore its Agreed Framework obligations in late 2002, the North Korean government expelled IAEA monitors, unfroze its plutonium-based program, restarted its "frozen" nuclear reactor, and resumed reprocessing spent nuclear waste to extract weapons grade plutonium. A worst case analysis in June 2006 reports North Korea has extracted enough plutonium to make up to thirteen nuclear weapons.\(^{20}\) This would be more than a six-fold increase over 2002 when it was assessed to have "perhaps one or two nuclear weapons."\(^{21}\)

On February 10, 2005, Pyongyang asserted having a nuclear arsenal. The official [North] Korean Central News Agency stated, "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the NPT and have manufactured nukes for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK [sic]."\(^{22}\)

On July 4-5, 2006 (U.S. time), North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles, including a "Taepodong 2" (potential ICBM), despite requests from a number of countries not to do so. This relatively large demonstration alarmed neighboring countries and the United States, although the Taepodong 2 test apparently failed within a minute of launch.

**Status, Motives and Implications**

Has North Korea truly become a nuclear weapons state? Is it bluffing; if so, why? The above chronology suggests Pyongyang has been long committed to becoming a nuclear weapons state. However, its willingness to negotiate away its plutonium-based program in 1994 implies it might have initiated an HEU research and development program as a hedge if the United States were to renge on its Agreed Framework obligations. Belligerent U.S. rhetoric since

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2001 probably exacerbated North Korean paranoia and strengthened the influence of hard-liners who oppose efforts to improve relations with the United States.

If North Korea is committed to becoming a nuclear weapons state, several possible reasons come to mind. National prestige certainly could be one. Another could be to support a more aggressive foreign policy against South Korea and other states, although Koreans historically have not attacked their powerful neighbors. Economics could be a third reason, given the presumably lucrative market for nuclear weapons technology. Another reason could be for self-defense, as Pyongyang asserts.

With respect to the self-defense argument, security concerns have prompted India, Pakistan, Israel, and the five declared NPT nuclear weapons states to establish nuclear arsenals. The United States established a large nuclear arsenal to deter “communist” aggression since 1950.

The July missile demonstration implies significant North Korean retaliatory capabilities. Alternatively, the demonstration could have been to attract foreign buyers, a disturbing proposition but not illegal. More likely, it met some domestic political event that may not be clear for some time. Paradoxically, it could have been a signal for DPRK-U.S. dialogue, as North Koreans – like most countries – prefer to negotiate from strength. Whether the demonstration was a statement of strength or weakness remains to be determined.

North Korea certainly has reason to regard itself as an isolated, vulnerable state. As security planners look to their west and northwest, they must question the reliability of their Chinese ally and Russia to assist them in time of need. East and south are Japan and the ROK both allied with the United States, which has acted belligerently since 2001. This relatively new U.S. behavior must have been a great disappointment to Pyongyang in light of an encouraging high-level U.S.-DPRK meeting shortly before the 2000 U.S. presidential election.

U.S. Policy – end 2000

On October 12, 2000, President Bill Clinton and other senior U.S. government officials met with Chairman Kim Jong-il’s special envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, in Washington. The subsequent joint communiqué announced the two governments had “decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relations.”

October 23, Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited Chairman Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. However, the decision to improve relations remained U.S. policy for only three months.

**U.S. Policy – since 2001**

The inauguration of President George W. Bush in January 2001 introduced a reversal of U.S.-North Korea policy à la the Cold War. Tough rhetoric from the newly inaugurated administration -- quickly interpreted as “hostile policy” by the North Koreans -- could not have persuaded them that Washington was a reliable negotiating partner or potential friend.

- President Bush has personally disparaged and threatened North Korea on several occasions. In March 2001, for example, he called North Korea “untrustworthy” and questioned the wisdom of South Korea’s “sunshine policy” during a summit meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung. President Bush has also expressed loathing for the North Korean head of state, Kim Jong-il, and referred to him in such insulting terms as a “pygmy.”

- In December 2001, the Bush administration cited North Korea as a reason to review nuclear force sizing in the Nuclear Posture Review.

- In January 2002, President Bush described North Korea as one of three countries comprising an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union speech. During a trip to South Korea a few weeks later, he said the United States did not have any plans to attack North Korea. This statement probably did not assuage Pyongyang’s security concerns, and any prospects that it might have done some good were surely squelched in May by the “pygmy” comparison.

- In September 2002, the Bush administration formally announced its justification for “preemptive” war against imminent threats in its newly published U.S. National Security Strategy. Six months later, the Bush administration launched a “preemptive war” against Iraq on the grounds that its association with al Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction programs presented an immediate threat to U.S. security. All these claims have been seriously

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questioned, if not refuted. Nevertheless, the administration reiterated its “preemptive” war doctrine in the March 2006 version of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

- U.S. officials and opinion leaders have often hinted at the desirability of “regime change” in North Korea, which North Korean security planners certainly cannot ignore in light of U.S.-led “regime change” in Iraq. Residents of Northeast Asia and their governments are quite aware of this rhetoric and history.

- In September 2005, the Bush administration officially endorsed the Six-Party Declaration of Principles, on the one hand. On the other hand, Washington quickly increased its hard line rhetoric and policies toward North Korea. Administration officials promptly announced the termination of the LWR project called for by the Agreed Framework and asserted in Congressional testimony that “all options remain on the table” – tacitly including “preemptive war” – to resolve the nuclear issue. The administration also imposed financial sanctions against a bank in Macao for handling illicit North Korean financial transactions.

Moreover, Vice President Cheney reportedly said of North Korea “We don’t negotiate with evil. We defeat it.” during preliminary efforts to craft what became the Declaration of Principles.

- In 2006, Bush administration officials have articulated U.S. policy is to end “tyranny in our world.” They have also referred to North Korea as an outpost of tyranny since 2005.

- On July 15, 2006 the United Nations Security Council with strong U.S. support passed UNSC Resolution 1695 that condemned North Korea for its ballistic missile demonstration 10 days earlier. The resolution demands that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and recommit to a self-imposed 1999 ballistic missile test


28. Ibid.

The Quest for a Unified Korea

It requires UN member states to “prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.” It also requires member states to “prevent the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.” North Korea rejected the resolution on the grounds that it exceeds UNSC authority, as the DPRK is not part of the Missile Technology Control Regime inter alia.

Other Factors

Another North Korean concern is Washington’s refusal to engage North Korea in direct negotiations, despite the October 2000 U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué that “noted the value of regular diplomatic contacts, bilaterally and in broader fora.” U.S. officials have argued that negotiating with North Korea is futile, because Pyongyang does not keep its agreements.

Pyongyang may feel the same way about Washington. How could Pyongyang not interpret U.S. actions since 2001 as other than “hostile policy?” A former Assistant Secretary of State during President Bush’s first administration acknowledged that the U.S. has credibility problems around the world, including in North Korea.

Despite North Korea’s discouraging track record, some independent observers note that Pyongyang scrupulously observed the nuclear freeze (Article I) of the Agreed Framework while ignoring Article III, as mentioned. This behavior suggests that North Korea, like any state, does what it considers to be in its best interest. Competent diplomats understand this reality and achieve verifiable diplomatic agreements in accordance with this principle.

The fact is we outsiders may never know exactly why Pyongyang has persisted in its nuclear weapons development programs until U.S. and DPRK senior officials sincerely conduct bilateral discussions and efforts to resolve mutual concerns. Why the world’s only superpower won’t talk to North Korea is perplexing, given the dangers of misperceptions and implications of failure to achieve

32. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly during discussion following his luncheon remarks during a “Seoul-Washington Forum” co-hosted by the Brookings Institution and Sejong Institute on May 1, 2006.
stated goals. While negotiating with North Korea is difficult, it is not impossible.

**Other Countries’ Security Concerns**

Just as North Korea’s security concerns merit consideration, so do those of the resident Northeast Asia countries and the United States. Five of the Six-Parties are concerned about North Korea becoming a nuclear weapons state and the consequences on regional security. However, not all Northeast Asian resident states agree that stopping North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is their first priority. Maintaining regional stability and deterring U.S. aggression against North Korea are more important.

**South Korea**

Seoul regards North Korea as its major security threat, because of Pyongyang’s unresolved nuclear weapons program, recent missile demonstration, and other worrisome military investments.\(^{33}\) The unresolved Korean question fuels background concerns regarding Pyongyang’s intentions towards South Korea. Like Washington, Seoul also notes North Korea’s “military first” policy, its large conventional and special operations military forces, its chemical and perhaps both biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missile delivery systems.

Another war on the Korean Peninsula would probably devastate both Koreas. However, the advanced nature of South Korea’s development and population distribution mean its losses would be relatively much greater than the DPRK. Roughly one-third of South Korea’s population and much of its industry are located within 40 miles of forward deployed North Korean military forces. Should war erupt, at least one U.S. scholar anticipates a million casualties.\(^{34}\)

This estimate could be low given North Korea’s ability to attack densely populated Seoul and other urban areas with more than 12,000 forward based artillery systems, which can fire 500,000 rounds per hour for several hours, rockets, 500 SCUD missiles, and

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newer ballistic missiles armed with conventional and perhaps chemical weapons, if not biological warfare and nuclear weapons, as well.\textsuperscript{35}

ROK national security planners understandably believe every effort must be invested to sustain and improve credible military capabilities to deter another war. Knowing the difficulty and quality-of-life trade-offs necessary to match the military capabilities of current and long-term threats, they assign very high value to the ROK-U.S. treaty alliance. They also believe Seoul’s political, economic, and cultural engagement policies with North Korea will promote understanding, ameliorate tension, and facilitate peaceful unification over time. This reflects awareness that most wars begin as a result of misperceptions or miscalculations.\textsuperscript{36}

The United States

The United States has regarded North Korea as an enemy since June 1950, despite a brief attempt at rapprochement under the Agreed Framework through 2000. In 1953, the United States and ROK signed a treaty to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,” which included deterring further aggression against the ROK. In addition to concerns about assessed Chinese and Soviet challenges to U.S. interests, the United States and Korea were also concerned that North Korean might again attempt to conquer the ROK. The U.S. Trading with the Enemies Act still applies to North Korea. The State Department still lists North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, although the rationale is increasingly arguable. These factors prevent U.S. government officials from approaching North Korea as a normal state and from supporting a North Korean application for membership to international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund.\textsuperscript{37}

Security planners currently assess North Korea as capable of attacking two U.S. allies: the ROK and Japan. It could possibly attack Alaska and Hawaii, as well, with long range missiles -- albeit with questionable accuracy. U.S. intelligence analysts believe North


Korea will be able to attack continental U.S. targets if it develops a reliable ICBM by 2015. How the failed Taepodong 2 ICBM test affects this assessment remains to be determined.

The July missile demonstration reinforced U.S. criticism of North Korea for violating a self-imposed ballistic missile test moratorium that it established in September 1999, although such rhetoric ignores factors pertinent to the moratorium. At the time, North Korea entered into the moratorium "with an eye to creating an atmosphere more favorable for the [U.S.-DPRK] talks" that developed through the so-called "Perry process." Pyongyang extended the moratorium in October 2000 and again in 2001 for two years, despite an unfavorable U.S.-DPRK "atmosphere." When the UNSC passed Resolution 1695 on July 15, 2006, North Korea’s protest that it was "unfair" fell on deaf U.S. ears. The extent to which the North Korean missile demonstration, the U.S. reaction, and UNSC Resolution 1695 perpetuate a vicious U.S.-DPRK circle remains to be seen.

Another major U.S. concern is that North Korea will sell nuclear weapons technology to U.S. enemies. Preventing an East Asian nuclear arms race is another potential concern if Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul conclude that North Korea truly is a nuclear weapons state and the United States is not a credible security partner. Such developments could have catastrophic consequences for East Asian security and U.S. national interests – not to mention the NPT.

Stopping the North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are, therefore, major U.S. national security objectives. The Bush administration and its many key policy makers with Cold War experience came into office with a view that negotiating with Pyongyang was a waste of time, as mentioned. Many of these officials also questioned Pyongyang’s commitment to the Agreed Framework, as they learned of its activities to develop HEU

capabilities. They seemed to regard with contempt President Clinton’s efforts to improve U.S.-DPRK relations.

Therefore, the Bush administration’s approach to stop North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation has been to threaten North Korea and stop honoring its obligations under the Agreed Framework. This failed. Worse, it exacerbated the problem, as noted above, again perpetuating a vicious circle. Step two was to maintain the hard line and enlist the assistance of resident Northeast Asian states, despite some significantly different national interests and priorities. In 2003, these states and North Korea established the Six-Party Talks forum, discussed below.

Cultural differences are another, admittedly understated, factor complicating the U.S. approach. Americans understandably deplore authoritative rule in North Korea and the government’s stance on human rights. Many Americans, including some government officials, have harshly criticized the North Korean system and Chairman Kim Jong-il. Such a visceral approach, however, cannot succeed. First, it alienates North Korean government officials, i.e. potential negotiators. It also stiffens North Korean resolve to resist foreign involvement in internal affairs, leaving ordinary citizens to suffer the consequences. Witness Pyongyang’s willingness to let millions of North Koreans suffer from malnutrition rather than accept what it considered to be overly intrusive food monitoring requirements by international aid donors.

Paradoxically U.S. rhetoric and policies to punish and further isolate North Korea perpetuate its system of governance.

China

China seeks to become the dominant power in East Asia. Maintaining stability in Northeast Asia – and thus Chinese influence – is a major national security interest. Thus, Beijing seeks to strengthen its relationship with Seoul while nurturing a relatively close relationship and security alliance with North Korea. Beijing is Pyongyang's principal ally, friend and trading partner. China has provided invaluable energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. Total China-North Korea trade in 2005 was approximately $1.4 billion.\(^\text{42}\) In early 2006, more than 100 Chinese companies were reportedly active in North Korea, pursuing a variety of commercial ventures.\(^\text{43}\)

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With respect to the DPRK-China alliance, Beijing is not obligated to assist Pyongyang if it should attack South Korea or any other state. However, China will surely consider assisting North Korea if it becomes the victim of foreign aggression. Some Chinese officials and academics have privately outlined some conditions on an unofficial, non-attribution basis that might prompt China’s military intervention in North Korea. One would be internal instability beyond Pyongyang’s ability to control. Another would be if North Korea were the victim of foreign aggression, for example, a U.S. “preemptive” attack. Whether China’s role would be to maintain civil order, reinforce the KPA, or gain control of unsecured nuclear assets is not clear.44

With respect to Pyongyang’s aspirations to become a nuclear weapons state, China regards North Korea’s efforts with some concern. However, its principal worry since 2003 has been the possibility that the United States might use military force to destroy North Korea – for example, its nuclear weapons program facilities – and thus greatly destabilize Northeast Asia. North Korea almost certainly would retaliate against U.S. aggression, potentially fueling what could quickly become a major war. This scenario concerns all NE Asia resident states as mentioned. U.S. aggression would also prompt a massive flow of refugees to China, creating huge economic and perhaps internal security problems for Beijing.

China assesses the United States as a threat to regional stability because of its public rhetoric, declared “preemptive war” policy, and behavior as outlined above. To deter U.S. aggression against a Chinese treaty-ally and to advance other national interests, Beijing agreed to participate in Six-Party talks. As host, it has advanced accepted solutions to vexing issues and greatly improved Asian perceptions of China as a responsible leader. Asian perceptions of the United States as a responsible leader, however, seem to have declined, as Washington has failed to lead by advancing plausible solutions to the nuclear issue.

Russia

Like China, Russia places a higher value on maintaining stability in Northeast Asia than on stopping North Korean efforts to become a nuclear weapons state. It seeks to improve its role as a major actor in the region and reduce U.S. influence. It is promoting two major economic projects. One is a trans-national gas pipeline to connect Russian resources with Northeast Asian customers. Another is an

44. A China specialist who recounted off-record discussions with a number of informed Chinese officials and academics in early 2006.
“Iron Silk Road” that would connect an envisioned Trans-Korean Railroad to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This would create a trans-Eurasia transport system that would connect Korean and markets as far away as the United Kingdom.

Whether Moscow would reinforce Pyongyang should it become the victim of foreign aggression remains to be seen, but should not be discounted.

**Japan**

Among NE Asia resident capitals, Tokyo is the most closely aligned with U.S. hard line policy towards North Korea. A major factor is Japan’s persistent outrage over North Korea having kidnapped Japanese citizens. North Korea’s July 2006 missile demonstration further alarmed Japanese, prompting Tokyo to submit a stern resolution to the UN Security Council, which ultimately passed as Resolution 1695, a milder version.

In summary, the five resident states of Northeast Asia and the United States formed a “Six-Party” governmental forum in 2003 to negotiate a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. A primary objective for most members was to deter U.S. aggression against North Korea. As mentioned, the Six-Parties agreed on September 19, 2005 that the “directly-related parties” would negotiate a “permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” in a “separate forum.” Two months later, the ROK and U.S. presidents specifically endorsed this concept as a reinforcing complement to Six Party Talks, despite provocative U.S. measures outlined above. The North Korean missile demonstration in July 2006 reinforces the importance of redressing the sources of chronic instability on the Korean Peninsula.

**IV. Peace Regime**

A successful peace regime depends on the resolution of a number of issues in accordance with three confidence building principles: transactions should be transparent, verifiable, and mutually beneficial, recognizing the subjective nature of the latter. The key issues include resolution of the Korean question, legally ending the Korean War Armistice Agreement, normalizing relations among the Korean War’s major belligerents, and inducing North Korea to return to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state. Identifying the “directly related parties” and clarifying various terms including “separate forum” are also important topics, further discussed below.
Purpose

To achieve true peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Six-Parties seek to reduce North Korea’s stated sense of vulnerability to foreign aggression by calling for a peace regime, believing these are essential prerequisites for North Korea to return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

Some parties believe that relieving North Korea’s security concerns is the sine qua non for resolving the nuclear issue. Pyongyang claims U.S. “hostile” policy presents the greatest threat to North Korea’s security. Deterrence was one stated reason for the North Korean missile demonstration in July 2006.\(^{45}\) Redressing these concerns should be a top U.S. priority, but it’s not a one-way street. Pyongyang needs to redress U.S. concerns about the North Korean threat to U.S. security, treaty allies, and other global interests. What a vicious circle this is!

Complicating efforts to redress Pyongyang’s concerns is the use of North Korean issues in domestic U.S. politics. As a result, most Americans regard North Korea “very negatively,” almost on a par with Iran.\(^{46}\) Establishing new policies to create a virtuous circle of relationships will require more vision and courage than has been demonstrated to date by the key actors.

Six-Party delegates believe that North Korean and U.S. concerns must be addressed before progress can be expected on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The September 2005 Declaration of Principles clarifies this objective as noted in the following excerpts:

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the six parties held in a spirit of mutual respect and equality serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks and agreed in this context to the following:

1) The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.... [Emphasis added.]

2) The six parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations....

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3) The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

4) Committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. [Emphasis added.]

The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in northeast Asia.

5) The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action....”

Seoul sees the peace regime as necessary to resolve the nuclear issue and to facilitate its long-term efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea as a U.S. ally. Seoul envisions three phases to its unification approach: the current Phase I is for building trust; Phase II, a confederation, essentially one nation, two states; and Phase III, peaceful unification.

Pyongyang says a peace regime is necessary to reduce the threat of foreign aggression, specifically by the United States. Other possible motives include gaining heretofore elusive economic and political benefits, degrading U.S. influence in NE Asia, and possibly creating conditions for unification on terms favorable to North Korea. The sincerity of Pyongyang's rhetoric regarding its security concerns and desire to become a non-nuclear weapons state, for example, is questioned by many foreign observers. The reluctance of the United States to spurn belligerent rhetoric and engage in confidence building activities with North Korea fuels North Korean security concerns, although Pyongyang has also declined to implement or discuss appropriate CBMs with Washington or Seoul.

**Terms of Reference**

**Peace Regime, Mechanism, Treaty, Process**

A peace regime seems to be essentially synonymous with a peace mechanism. Informed ROK and U.S. government officials envision a peace process that would primarily involve each government's executive branch. An initiating instrument could be a joint communiqué of an appropriate high-level meeting articulating agreement(s), goals, and procedures or a Six-Party agreement on implementing the Declaration of Principles.

A peace treaty, on the other hand, is a formal instrument that would require ratification by signatory governments – the United States Senate in the case of the United States, for example. Concluding a peace treaty would probably be very difficult.

Some ROK and U.S. government officials have indicated that a peace treaty may be feasible if it avoids discussing particulars of the Korean War. Avoiding Korean War particulars would be essential but difficult, because resolving the Korean question is the root issue, not the Armistice Agreement. A peace treaty at this time would be a “red herring” that would distract attention from the root issue.

Gaining agreement on who were the major Korean War belligerents has been problematic. North Korea insists they were the United States and DPRK. Other concerned parties consider them to be North Korea, China, South Korea and other member-states of the United Nations Command (UNC), including the United States but not the United Nations per se.48

Given that the key issue must be resolving the Korean question – not legally terminating the Armistice Agreement– a peace process by any other name presumably could be crafted and brought to culmination more easily than a peace treaty for a war that is de facto over.

"Separate Forum"

The Six Parties called on the “directly related parties” to establish a “permanent peace regime” for the Korean Peninsula in a “separate forum.” The nature of this forum is subject to interpretation but one point seems perfectly clear: The Six Parties do not believe their forum is appropriate for this task.

Government officials of some Six Party Talk members have often called on the United States to engage in direct discussions with North Korea. This paper suggests that issues for inclusion in a peace regime generally require attention first by the “directly related parties.” Subsequently, they might request the Six Party forum to endorse their agreements.

Provisions of a Peace Regime

A permanent peace regime should address four goals: resolve the Korean question; legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement; produce normalized relations among the major

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belligerents of the Korean War; and facilitate North Korea’s return to
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

The Korean Question

The absence of inter-Korea agreement on the sovereignty and
territorial limits of each Korean government until they unify
constitute the heart of the unresolved Korean question. Its
resolution is unarguably germane to associated security issues,
including the North Korean nuclear and missile problems for two
reasons. One, U.S. and ROK anxiety about the potential for North
Korean aggression cannot be set aside until the Korean question is
resolved. Two, North Korean leadership cannot relax its stated
anxieties about foreign aggression and “regime change” stimulated
by foreign governments until the Korean question is resolved and
endorsed by the United States and China, for example.

The 1992 inter-Korea Basic Agreement represented major
progress in the bilateral relationship, but it did not resolve the
Korean question. Nor was the agreement fully implemented. A new
agreement is needed.

Key points of a new agreement should include cross-recognition
of each Korea as a sovereign state pending peaceful unification. It
should also define territorial boundaries in light of disputes
regarding the West (or Yellow) Sea, for example. Mustering public
support for amending each country’s constitution to recognize the
pre-unified Korean states promises to be difficult.

Ideally, such a new “normalization” agreement would also
address relevant portions of previous agreements that have not been
implemented, for example the 1992 Basic Agreement and Agreement
for the Joint Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. If it aims to
supersede the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement, it should also
address border enforcement, dispute resolution, prisoner-of-war
return, and other relevant portions of the Armistice Agreement.

Until key points regarding the sovereignty of each Korean state
in this pre-unification period are sincerely addressed, the Korean
question will remain unresolved. Achieving such an agreement will
be very time consuming. Agreeing to embark on such a process,
however, should require much less time and could be included as
part of a Six-Party agreement to implement the September 2005
Declaration of Principles.

49. Seoul believes North Korea holds approximately 500 South Koreans as Korean
War prisoners of war, according to an ROK government official.
Clearly, the governments of the DPRK and ROK are the “directly related parties” to resolve the Korean question with the support of interested parties, including the United States. Americans should be mindful of the impact of U.S. rhetoric and policies on the inter-Korea relationship. Once the Korean question is resolved, conditions would be appropriate to legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement and begin normalizing diplomatic relations among the remaining major belligerents of the Korean War.

**Legally Terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement**

The Armistice Agreement “shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or provisions in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement [of the Korean question] at a political level between both sides.” Resolution of the Korean question and the development of measures to replace still relevant Armistice Agreement provisions are essential prerequisites to terminate the Armistice Agreement.

Some additional actions may be appropriate. In 1996, the United States, South Korea, China, and North Korea embarked on a “Four-Party Talks” process to end the Korean War. The talks were ultimately inconclusive. More enduring, however, is a respected study of the Armistice Agreement and international law to inform the U.S. approach that concluded:

(1) Each of the governments contributing forces to the U.N. side was a belligerent in the war and is now technically a party to the Armistice;

(2) Although the [UN] Security Council and the General Assembly at various times endorsed one side to the conflict, the United Nations itself was not a belligerent and is not a party to the Armistice Agreement;

(3) The PRC, despite its disavowals, was a belligerent and is now a party to the Armistice.51

The cited study recommended, “the Armistice be supplanted by an agreement among the two Koreas, the United States, and China, accompanied by a resolution of the UN Security Council endorsing the agreements....”52

50. 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement, Article V, paragraph 62. Paragraph 60 also indicates that resolution of the “Korean question” is the sine qua non for terminating the Armistice Agreement.


52. Ibid., p.2.
Measures

Taking inter-Korea realities into account, only the two Koreas can resolve the Korean question. An inter-Korea normalization agreement as discussed above would satisfy the first recommendation.

The next step would be for Seoul and Pyongyang to gain support from China and the United States to legally terminate the Armistice Agreement, as they were de facto signatories. The four countries should concur and then recommend that the UN Security Council pass a resolution endorsing the agreements and affirming that they supersede the Armistice Agreement. A way to include the Six-Party Talks forum in this process would be for it to make such a recommendation to the UNSC, as the four major Korean War belligerents are also members of the Six-Party Talks forum. Russia and Japan are not Korean War belligerents per se,\(^\text{53}\) but their support in the Six-Party process could help lay a foundation for its transition over time to promote “security cooperation in northeast Asia,” per the Declaration of Principles.

Implications for the United Nations Command

Resolution of the Korean question and legal termination of the Korean War Armistice Agreement would eliminate the rationale for the United Nations Command, which the United States formed in July 1950 at the request of the UN Security Council to repel North Korean aggression.\(^\text{54}\) Another appropriate measure, therefore, would be for the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to report “mission accomplished” and recommend disestablishment of the command.

Disestablishing the UNC would not degrade the security of the Republic of Korea, as Seoul and Washington formed a (ROK-U.S.) Combined Forces Command in 1978 to be the “war fighter” should deterrence fail. Nor would the disestablishment of the UNC likely degrade alternative ROK-U.S. alliance command relationships under discussion in 2006.

Directly Related Parties

The “directly related parties” to end the Armistice Agreement would be the signatories and the ROK, at minimum. Once the Armistice Agreement is legally terminated, the next step would be for North Korea and the United States, to normalize diplomatic

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 13.

\(^{54}\) UN Security Council Resolution 84, July 7, 1950.
relations, as they would be the last remaining major Korean War belligerents without normal relations.

**Normalizing U.S.-DPRK Relations**

Resolution of the Korean question and the legal termination of the Korean War Armistice Agreement along the above lines would achieve the goals of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Next, North Korea and the United States must decide if they are going to be **permanent enemies**. Failure to change the status quo in which each country regards the other as an enemy is not in the long-term best interest of either country, especially the United States if it wishes to be a regional leader.\(^5^5\)

Normalization would be a clear signal that neither country harbors hostile intent against the other. U.S.-DPRK normalization would not require either country to accept the other’s system of governance. The United States and China, for example, have normal diplomatic relations but do not endorse each other’s system of governance. In fact, Washington and Beijing embarked on the path to normalization from February 1972 with an understanding of “essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems.” They agreed that their “countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of each country.\(^5^6\) The U.S. and China normalized relations in 1979, perhaps providing a model for Washington and Pyongyang.

U.S.-DPRK normalization would not automatically resolve a host of bilateral concerns. The decision to normalize relations, however, would demonstrate a desire to create good relations and provide a foundation for routine dialogue to address lingering concerns. It would also provide opportunities for the two countries to improve mutual understanding and communications on a range of topics.

Timing matters. While an early meeting of U.S. and North Korean officials to discuss normalization would be wise, two conditions should be resolved before Washington and Pyongyang formally normalize relations. First, the Korean question should be

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55. To achieve its national interests, the United States normalized relations with the Soviet Union for most of its existence and China since 1979, despite the fact that their communist governments killed upwards of 100 million citizens to retain power.
resolved, given ambiguities in North Korea’s intentions towards South Korea, a U.S. treaty ally, and North Korea’s stated concerns about U.S.-led foreign aggression. Second, North Korea should return to the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state. No other conditions should be permitted.

Critics

Critics of normalization will abound. Most U.S. critics will argue that North Korea presents an unremitting challenge to U.S. national interests, given its nuclear weapons programs, ballistic missile capabilities, oversized and forward-based military, and a range of illicit activities that include counterfeiting U.S. currency, which has been called an economic act of war. Some will argue that normalization should be established as a reward only when North Korea has improved human rights for its citizens, complied with the Missile Technology Control Regime (which Pyongyang has not signed), significantly reduced forward deployed KPA forces near the DMZ, returned to the NPT, suspended international state-sanctioned illicit activity, and met other U.S. goals. While compelling to some extent, such views ignore the reality that normalization enhances Washington’s ability to address issues of concern with foreign governments. North Koreans regard them essentially as surrender demands with no assurance of survival.

Critics set such high standards for normalizing relations that they imply perhaps a subconscious tendency to equate normalization with appropriately stringent requirements for U.S. citizenship. The two concepts serve quite different goals. Normalization provides a communications vehicle between governments. Given that most wars result from misperceptions and miscalculations, the importance of improving Washington-Pyongyang communications cannot be overemphasized. Standards for U.S. citizenship, by contrast, should be quite high to ensure that applicants understand, respect, and support the U.S. constitution and American values.

North Korean critics assess the United States as an unremitting challenge to North Korean security. Some may portray Washington as an unreliable negotiating partner. Many North Koreans are likely to be concerned about how normalization and opening the country to

foreign influences will affect their culture and system of governance. South Korea's modernization makes their case. The ROK has become a modern state within about two generations by embracing such foreign concepts as market economics and democracy. In making the transformation from an agricultural society firmly rooted in neo-Confucian cultural values in the 1950s, South Koreans have dramatically adjusted their 5,000-year old culture to meet modern conditions. This transformation is a source of great concern to many South Korean conservatives who lament the loss of traditional values. Such a transformation would be all the more traumatic for North Koreans, given their much deeper association with these authoritarian, neo-Confucian values.

Key points of contention: human rights and nuclear proliferation

One particularly contentious area for Americans is the extent of reported suffering among North Koreans who are considered "disloyal" to the state. Experience teaches that external pressure and criticism does not induce the changes sought by human rights activists in countries like North Korea. Normalization, however, can promote improvements as seen in China since Washington and Beijing normalized relations in 1979.

North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and Pyongyang's potential to export fissile material are sources of much more serious U.S. concerns about nuclear terrorism. Pyongyang should not expect the United States to normalize relations with North Korea until the Korean question is resolved and North Korea has returned to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state that is fully compliant with its IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement. Such compliance will greatly assuage U.S. concerns about Pyongyang's abilities to export nuclear weapons, technology, and fissile material as well. Therefore, Pyongyang must speak and act in ways that persuade Americans that it will return to the NPT and honor its commitments.

Conversely, Washington should demonstrate good intent by revising the Agreed Framework and reinstating the 1994 LWR project, for example. North Korea's utter dependence on foreign oil

and its declining availability makes nuclear power a sensible alternative source of energy. Except for North Korea, all resident NE Asian states use peaceful nuclear energy. South Korea and Japan are among the world’s top six producers.

**Confidence Building**

Resolution of the Korean question may inspire confidence among Americans that North Korea has made a key “strategic decision” to resolve contentious problems. North Koreans, however, are not likely to take a statement of intent to normalize relations by the U.S. executive branch at face value. Pyongyang has heard them before. Aside from a bilateral statement of intent to normalize relations, several interim measures would promote confidence:

- **U.S. Congressional Resolution:** A resolution by the U.S. Congress to support the president in normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations after inter-Korea normalization and upon North Korea’s return to the NPT under the above mentioned standards would likely be persuasive. Such a resolution would signal positive intent by the U.S. government during the lengthy time that will likely be required for inter-Korea normalization and North Korea’s return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. This period could transcend U.S. presidential administrations.

- **Special Envoys:** Upon mutual declarations to move towards normalization, the appointment of special envoys by each head of state to meet with one another and other senior officials would help promote confidence that each country has adjusted its stance towards the other. Former President George H. W. Bush or perhaps World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz might be particularly symbolic personal envoys for the Bush administration to launch this process and to introduce the U.S. special envoy to Chairman Kim Jong-il.

- **Liaison Offices:** Each country should quickly establish a low-level diplomatic presence in the other’s capital. Problems arose in the mid-1990s when this was attempted per the Agreed Framework. Germany agreed to let the United States use some of its office space in its Pyongyang embassy, but U.S. efforts to help North Korea establish a liaison office in Washington did not bear fruit, dooming progress on the mutual agreement. 61 Perhaps, Pyongyang lacked the funds to establish a Washington presence. Nevertheless, Pyongyang’s failure to establish a liaison office in Washington damaged U.S. perceptions of North Korean sincerity.

61. According to background discussion in May 2006 with a former U.S. government official familiar with the proceedings.
in improving relations. Repeating this mistake would be ill advised.

• **Adjusted Agreed Framework:** Agreement to adjust and reinstate the Agreed Framework – to account for interim developments including North Korea’s HEU program and other violations of Article III, as well as the disestablishment of KEDO in January 2006 and delays in the LWR construction project – would constitute another good faith indicator. Reinstating an adjusted Agreed Framework would require multinational coordination, given the involvement of South Korea and Japan in implementing the original agreement and KEDO.

• **TWEA, etc:** U.S. planning to remove North Korea from the Trading with the Enemies Act and list of states supporting terrorism upon North Korea’s return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state would be another effective U.S. confidence building measure. North Korea cannot qualify for assistance from international financial institutions so long as it is listed as a terrorist state.  

• **Humanitarian Assistance Monitoring:** North Korea would promote confidence among humanitarian aid groups if it were to honor their requests to monitor the distribution of provided goods.

North Korea may call for adjustments to the ROK-U.S. alliance, which was established in 1953 to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.” Alliance matters should not be discussed in any detail among non-alliance members. However, Seoul and Washington should keep in mind that Chairman Kim Jong-il acknowledged the benefits of maintaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula during his summit meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung in June 2000.

A Six-Party agreement to implement the 2005 *Declaration of Principles* would send a signal that peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue is indeed feasible if the United States and North Korea were to state unambiguous intentions to normalize relations upon North Korea’s return to the NPT and to implement CBMs in the interim.

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Facilitate North Korea’s return to the NPT

The Six-Party Declaration of Principles points out key concerns that must be addressed for Pyongyang to return to the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state. Some of the above measures to resolve the Korean question and normalize U.S.-DPRK relations go well beyond the September Declaration. As North Korea has stated its willingness to support the first principle – “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” – other measures should include the following:

- **NPT Return Commitment:** Pyongyang should clearly state its intention to return to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state and to certifiably comply with its IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement by a certain date or upon the completion of certain measures, including some outlined in this paper.

- **No-Fault:** Each of the Six-Parties should agree to recommend that the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA accept – indeed welcome – North Korea’s return to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state that fully complies with its IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement on a no-fault basis. Accepting North Korea’s return to the NPT on a no-fault basis is suggested to ease embarrassment if its nuclear status has been exaggerated.

- **Security Assurances:** Sincere movement towards resolving the Korean question and North Korea’s return to the NPT should prompt the United States, China, and other members of the Six-Party Talks to provide security guarantees not to attack North Korea or to instigate “regime change,” i.e. attempt to overthrow the DPRK government. The United States issued such a guarantee not to attack North Korea in June 1993, October 1994, and again in October 2000. It bears repeating. Issuing such a guarantee in the context of the above developments would likely prove to be very persuasive. Movement towards normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations would lend credence to such security assurances.

A peace regime as outlined in this paper should have no impact on the rationale for the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Korean Peninsula is

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the geostrategic center of Northeast Asia and has historically been the battleground for great power rivalries. Maintaining the alliance would eliminate the creation of a security vacuum and facilitate arms reductions on the Korean Peninsula, especially if the alliance were expanded to include North Korea or unified Korea in the future. In such a case, an appropriately restructured USFK should remain in the southern portion of the peninsula.

**Timing of the Peace Regime**

Timing of a peace regime and North Korea’s return to the NPT depends on a complex process to resolve the Korean question and build confidence among the key actors. The preceding discussion suggests the following sequence of events could prove to be appropriate:

First, the Six Parties would agree on a plan to implement the *Declaration of Principles*. The implementation agreement should address the following topics per the three guiding principles outlined at the beginning of Section IV.

- Resolution of the Korean question with Seoul and Pyongyang agreeing to recognize each other as pre-unification sovereign states through an agreement that would include procedures to implement relevant provisions of the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement and legally supersede it.
- Legal termination of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.
- U.S., DPRK, ROK, and Japanese agreement to revise the Agreed Framework.
- North Korea’s return to the NPT on a no-fault basis as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state pending inter-Korea agreement to resolve the Korean question and commencement of procedures to normalize U.S.-DPRK relations.
- U.S. and DPRK agreement to normalize relations upon resolution of the Korean question and North Korea’s return to the NPT and to implement interim CBM as discussed.

Upon reaching the above agreements, the parties should commence mutually beneficial, transparent, verifiable steps to implement such a Six-Party agreement.

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"Directly Related" Parties

The Declaration of Principles is ambiguous in naming the "directly-related parties" to establish a "permanent peace regime." As discussed, they vary depending on the issue, summarized below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>DPRK</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>PRC</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UNSC</th>
<th>IAEA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolve Korean Question</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accept DPRK NPT return on a &quot;no fault&quot; basis</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalize U.S. DPRK relations</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

P, Primary Role; S, supporting role.

V. Conclusions

Courageous leadership will be required to resolve the chronic sources of instability on the Korean Peninsula.

A process to establish permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and to induce North Korea’s return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state will be complicated and require leadership and support by a shifting cast of actors. Too much history, mistrust, and misunderstanding exist to make it simple. Establishing confidence calls for better understanding and sincerity among the parties than has been demonstrated to date. It also requires transparency, verification, and confidence that agreements are mutually beneficial. Above all, the key actors need to generate the political willingness and courage to address the issues at hand.

Permanent peace among the major Korean War belligerents depends heavily on the resolution of today’s Korean question, which is inter-Korea agreement on who should govern Koreans before unification. Two sovereign Korean states have existed since 1948. Neither recognizes the other. Until they do, the envisioned state of peace cannot exist.

Persuading North Korea to return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state depends on Pyongyang concluding that nuclear weapons are a liability, not an asset. The North Korean government
will not reach this conclusion so long as it retains plausible national security concerns. Two key measures to eliminate such concerns are resolution of the Korean question and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations.

Washington will probably not normalize relations with North Korea until its nuclear proliferation issues and the Korean question have been resolved. North Korea will not certifiably become a non-nuclear weapons state until its security concerns are resolved. To build confidence that each government sincerely seeks the stated goals, high-level dialogue and procedures to address key issues in a relatively direct way are needed. Sending a well-known personal envoy to launch the process, for example former President George H.W. Bush, could be especially effective. A resolution by the U.S. Congress to support normalization would be helpful.

Relationship to the Six Party Talks

Pursuant to the Six Party Declaration of Principles, U.S. President George W. Bush and ROK President Roh Moo-hyun agreed that discussions on a peace regime should take place amongst directly-related parties in a forum separate from the Six-Party Talks. They expected this peace process would complement and mutually reinforce the Six-Party Talks. The aforementioned approach respects this concept.

Confidence by all the parties will be enhanced if all transactions are conducted transparently and verifiably to provide mutual benefits, recognizing the subjective nature of the latter principle.

VI. Recommendations

This paper recommends seven measures to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea’s return to the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state.

- **Resolve the Korean Question:** The governments of the ROK and DPRK should recognize and establish normal diplomatic relations with each other as sovereign states within defined territorial limits. The normalization process should include appropriate amendments to each country’s constitution. To lay a firm foundation for legally terminating the Korean War Armistice Agreement, the inter-Korea normalization agreement

should stipulate this objective and include measures to address still-relevant Armistice provisions.

- **Legally Terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement:** Acting in accordance with an inter-Korea agreement that resolves the Korean question and recommends the legal termination of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, the signatories and the ROK should concur and recommend the UN Security Council acknowledge this development.

- **Normalize U.S.-DPRK Relations:** Once the Korean War Armistice Agreement is legally terminated, the governments of the major belligerents of the Korean War that have not yet normalized relations with each other should do so. Presuming the two Koreas normalize relations as a result of their resolving the Korean question, the remaining governments would be those of the United States and the DPRK. Washington and Pyongyang should promptly initiate steps to normalize relations with the process to be completed upon North Korea's return to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state. Interim confidence building measures should include a U.S. Congressional resolution to support normalization as outlined above and such other measures as appointing special envoys and establishing liaison offices in each capital. Washington and Pyongyang should consider the U.S.-China normalization process as a model.

- **Facilitate North Korea’s Return to the NPT:** The UN Security Council should agree to accept on a no-fault basis North Korea’s return to the NPT as an IAEA-certified non-nuclear weapons state in compliance with its full-scope Safeguards Agreement; North Korea should agree to return to the NPT on such basis and promptly initiate measures with the IAEA to commence inspections per the process outlined above and a revised Agreed Framework: Given a presumably lengthy process for North Korea to work out differences with the IAEA in complying with its full scope Safeguards Agreement, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea should agree to develop and implement an updated version of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in the interim.

- **Assuage North Korea’s fears of foreign aggression:** All concerned parties including the United States should clearly state their intentions not to attack North Korea and lend credence to such statements by implementing measures to legally terminate the Korean War Armistice Agreement, normalize U.S.-DPRK relations and other suggestions in this paper.
• **Develop a Six-Party Implementing Agreement**: The Six Parties should develop an agreement to implement the Declaration of Principles. The agreement should lay out each country’s intended actions and envisioned measures to resolve the Korean question, facilitate North Korea’s return to the NPT as a certified non-nuclear weapons state, normalize U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relations, and legally terminate the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement.

• **Guiding Principles**: Conduct transparent, verifiable, and mutually beneficial transactions.

• The *sine qua non* for effecting peace on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is willingness and courage by the key actors to replace the current vicious circle with a virtuous circle. Sincere implementation of the above measures should facilitate resolution of the Korean question and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Failure would imply truly intractable issues that would necessitate other approaches by the United States and the Republic of Korea.

**Additional Reading**


- **Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea**, (ARNE and also called the “Basic Agreement”) entry into force on February 19, 1992, [www.unikorea.go.kr/eg/load/D41/D4130.html](http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eg/load/D41/D4130.html)

- **Basic Agreement**, See Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea


Two,” December 12, 2004; “Toward Korean Unification – Part II: Transforming Two Cultures Into One,” February 9, 2005

- Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [also called Joint Accord], signed January 20, 1992 to enter into force on February 19, 1992


- U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, October 21, 1994

Chapter 4

The Inter-Agency Process and Future Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula

Cheon Seong-whun

The Korean Peninsula: Past and Present

During the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula had been a major hot spot where the two superpowers’ strategic interests were collided. The Soviet Union had Kim Il Sung, a young officer, stand for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—the DPRK. Kim Il Sung had ruled the country with brutal dictatorship for half a century and his power was inherited to his son, Kim Jong-il in 1994 when he suddenly passed away. As all know, North Korea of today is a showcase demonstrating how much miseries, mishaps and pains dictatorial leadership in generations could cause to the country and more importantly, its people.

On the other hand, the United States under the auspices of the United Nations, had helped South Korean people choose their leader and establish a free and democratic Republic of Korea—the ROK. The first President of South Korea, Dr. Lee Sungman, was a nationalist and an independence activist. At the same time, he was one of the few Korean intellectuals in the Japanese colonial period, which gave him a rare change to have a firm grasp on international security situations and on risks and dangers of Soviet-led communism. Not surprisingly, Dr. Lee was a natural anti-communist. Under Dr. Lee’s leadership, the ROK was able to protect itself and its people from a variety of psychological and physical attacks waged by the communist DPRK culminating at the Korean War in 1950-1953. If Dr. Lee established the country and laid the foundation of political entity, General Park Chung Hee modernized the country and laid the solid foundation for today’s powerful South Korean economy. Although these two Presidents had been criticized for their dictatorial ruling, as time passes, more South Koreans begin to appreciate what the two Presidents have done for them and their country.
In the process of nation building of the ROK, if there is the key outside figure that deserves great compliments, that is the United States. America has taken the major place in the modern history of the ROK, supporting the small country in Northeast Asia in every aspect of nation building and development after independence from Japan’s colonial ruling. During this process, U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) as a physical symbol of American friendship and security commitment to South Korea has been the backbone of deterring North Korean aggression and bringing about “miracle of the Han River.”

Even if the Cold War ended, the Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in the international security domain. A partial reason is that the Korean Peninsula is yet to get out of the quagmire of the Cold War. Technically, North Korea and China on the one side and South Korea and the United States on the other side are still at war. A major reason is ruthless adventurism and outdated ideological beliefs of North Korean leadership. Although North Korean regime has committed many wrongdoings, this paper is going to discuss two major issues where international agencies have keen interests to resolve. They are North Korea’s human rights conditions and nuclear weapon development. In particular, this paper will highlight gaping alliance differences over the issues between the ROK and the United States.

The UNCHR and Human Rights in North Korea

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) is the major international agency involved with North Korea’s human rights situation. It remains to be publicized how bad human rights conditions are in North Korea. Despite some modest gestures taken by the North Korean authorities, human rights conditions in the DPRK remain very poor in terms of the today’s international standard. A resolution adopted at the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 2005 expressed its serious concern at continuing reports of systemic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in North Korea. The resolution also expressed its deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the DPRK, in particular of infant malnutrition, and urged the North Korean government to fully respect all human rights and fundamental freedom.

According to one study, North Korean human rights violations appeared to stem from a variety of reasons: (1) the imperative of regime survival, (2) the need to maintain and reinforce political power base, (3) the excessive worship of North Korean leadership, (4) the inherent malfunctioning of its socialist economy, (5) a series of natural disasters, and (6) the self-imposed isolation from the international community. In the wake of looming concerns from the international community and repeated calls by the UNCHR about improving its human rights conditions, North Korea began to understand the importance of the issue and has taken some modest steps to demonstrate to the world that the human rights conditions are getting better. At the same time, however, the North Korean regime sticks to advocating for the country’s sovereignty and so-called “our-style human rights.”

The KINU study on human rights in North Korea succinctly describes the current situation of the issue and presents a future action plan to resolve it.

In short, although North Korea is taking some positive steps such as revising its laws, to improve human rights, so long as North Korea continues to approach human rights issues from a regime security standpoint, the laws do not necessarily translate into improved human rights for North Korean citizens. A large gap continues to persist between the legal measures and human rights realities. However, in view of the fact that North Korea has begun to gradually accommodate persistent international demands, the international community should continue to press North Korea to make concrete improvements in accordance with international human rights standards.

The South Korean government has held a mild attitude on North Korean human rights issues. The Roh Moo Hyun Administration is reluctant to press North Korea on human rights. It has not consented to international community consensus criticizing the North Korean regime for its poor record on human rights. For example, Seoul abstained from voting for two years since 2004, and did not participate in the voting in 2003 for Resolutions prepared by the UNCHR on human rights in the DPRK. President Roh’s position on

3. Ibid., p. vii.
the North Korean human rights issue was illustrated in a 2003 interview:

Ultimately, in order to secure the most protection for the most number of people in North Korea, the best method is to open up the Kim Jong-il regime [by persuasion]. Rather than confronting or opposing them politically, it is better to have dialogue with the regime to fundamentally solve this problem... As was the case with Iraq, I don’t think the North Korean human rights conditions can be changed from pressure coming from international public opinion. If I mention the North Korean human rights situation, it will not help to improve the human rights conditions in North Korea.

Contrary to President Roh’s wish, the United States, both Democrats and Republicans alike, have demonstrated a growing interest in the issue. The U. S. Congress unanimously adopted the North Korean Human Rights Act on July 21, 2004. The Bill aims to protect basic human rights in North Korea; to facilitate humanitarian resolution of the defector issue; to increase transparency and monitoring of humanitarian aids in North Korea; to promote free flow of information in and out of North Korea; and to help peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula under a democratic government.

Some members of the South Korean Parliament took action against this Bill. More than 20 members of the ruling Uri Party and one member of the Millennium Democratic Party sent a letter of statement to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate, asking him to consider the negative effects of the Bill. In their statement, the signatories expressed concerns that the Bill could increase tension on the Korean Peninsula; that North Korea will threaten to halt the ongoing inter-Korean talks fearing that the Bill is aimed at the ultimate collapse of the North Korean regime; and that the efforts made by South Korea and the international community will come to naught if the North Korean government feels threatened.

American reaction to such apparent anti-human rights sentiment in South Korea is troubling. In late July 2004, James A. Leach, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the U.S.

House of Representatives, wrote to the Chairman of the ruling Uri Party, expressing regret at the Party’s attempt to adopt a Parliamentary resolution to deter the House Bill of the North Korean Human Rights. In August 19, 2005, the Bush Administration took a further step to appoint Jay Lefkowitz as a special envoy on North Korean human rights.

Different Attitudes Toward the North Korean Regime

This gap between Seoul and Washington over North Korean human rights issue is a reflection of a broader discrepancy in the two sides’ perception of the North Korean regime. Especially since 1998 when Mr. Kim Dae Jung took presidency in South Korea, the perception gap has been widening.

The “Sunshine Policy” of President Kim Dae Jung and the “Peace and Prosperity Policy” of President Roh Moo Hyun were based on the notion that the North Korean regime can be induced to change by providing unsparing assistance. Sunshine Policy rests on the idea that North Korea’s threatening posture arises from insecurity, regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles as the only path to security and survival. According to this logic, engagement can reduce this insecurity and end the proliferation threat, supposing that various carrots will persuade the North Korean leadership to give up the pursuit of dangerous new weapons. In fact, then-President Kim Dae Jung praised Kim Jong-il as a leader of good judgment in 2000, setting into the foundations of the Sunshine Policy a deliberate strategy to refrain from criticism of the North Korean leadership.

President Roh’s perception of the North Korean regime showed some variations after his visit to Washington in May 2003. For example, in a March 2003 interview the President said, “I want to stress that North Korea [is] opening up and that it is already changing. If we give them what they desperately want—regime security, normal treatment and economic assistance—they will be willing to give up their nuclear ambitions. We should not, therefore, treat them as criminals but as counterparts for dialogue.”

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9. At an interview with TBS in Japan on February 9, 2000, President Kim remarked, “I have heard that he is a man of good judgment and knowledge as a leader.” See http://www.cwd.go.kr.
interview during his visit to the United States, however, President Roh evaluated the North Korean leadership in a quite different tone.11 “I think North Korea is insisting on an obsolete regime and the values that it pursues are not in the interest of its people. And its behavior and its demands are not those that can be accepted by the international community. And I — so therefore I don’t think North Korea is a partner to be trusted, and I don’t agree with its regime.”

For the United States, a deep-seated mistrust of the ruling regime underscores its perception of North Korea. Such distrust has resulted in demands for high levels of transparency and verification. For example, Secretary of State Powell pointed out that verification and monitoring regimes were missing in the Clinton Administration’s negotiation with the DPRK.12 President Bush expressed “some skepticism about the leader of North Korea” and worried that part of the problem in dealing with North Korea was the lack of transparency.13 Congressman Henry Hyde elaborated a hard-line Republican position on the DPRK, arguing verification is the key to dealing with North Korea since the North’s demonstrated willingness to embrace adequate verification measures is “a signal of a genuine break with the past and a commitment to future cooperation.”14

While agreeing to talk with North Korea in a multilateral format, the Bush Administration draws a firm and clear line on the North Korean leadership. Hawk engagement—President Bush’s North Korea policy described by Victor Cha acknowledges that diplomacy can be helpful, but sees the real value of any engagement lies in exposing the North’s true intentions and goals.15 They are to develop weapons of mass destruction, expel U. S. Forces from South Korea, overthrow the regime in Seoul, reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean dominance; and hawk engagement aims to thwart these goals by dealing with Pyongyang.

During his visit to Seoul in February 2002, President Bush articulated his opinion that North Korea’s regime and people should be dealt with separately. In 2002, President Bush reaffirmed his view of North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil,” where the regime

allowed the people to starve. He made it clear he did not intend to change his mind until the Kim Jong-il regime demonstrated change. Conversely, President Bush expressed his deep concern and sympathy for North Korean people, saying he wanted them to have food and freedom.  

President Bush’s differentiation between the North Korean people and their leadership is absent from both President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and President Roh’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. This suggests a significant gap between the attitudes of Seoul and Washington toward the North Korean leadership and people.

**Identity Crisis Between Seoul and Washington**

The underlying reason of the gaping alliance difference over the North Korean regime in general and the North’s human rights issue in specific is the fact that the ROK and the United States are currently going through identity crisis. The ROK-U. S. alliance has been forged and maintained against the aggressive nature of the leadership in Pyongyang and its physical military threat. That is, until recently, Seoul and Washington had shared common view that the North Korean regime was the principle security threat on the Korean Peninsula and countering it was the most important objective of the ROK-U. S. security alliance.

There are signs that this common view appears to change from the part of South Korea. According to opinion polls conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification, South Korean perceptions to North Korea showed significant changes. For example, in the 2005 opinion poll, 41.8% and 23.1% of the respondents perceived North Korea as an object of cooperation and assistance, respectively while 20.9% and 10.2% of the respondents regarded the North as an object of vigilance and enemy. In a similar survey conducted in 1998, only 24.8% and 12.4% of the respondents considered North Korea as an object of cooperation and assistance, accordingly while 40.6% and 13.8% regarded the North as an object of vigilance and enemy. For a possibility of North Korean invasion, in 2005, 7.2% and 35.8% of the respondents answered the possibility to be very high or a little bit, respectively while 35.7% and 21.3% of the respondents said the

possibility is little or zero. For the same question, in 1998, 12.2% and 45.5% of the respondents answered the possibility to be very high or a little high, accordingly while only 31.2% and 7.7% of the respondents said the possibility is little and zero.

On the other hand, having profound impacts on U.S. security perception and strategy, the 9/11 terror attacks have also changed American identity. As observed by John Lewis Gaddis, “September 11th was not just a national security crisis. It was a national identity crisis as well.”18 The North Korea nuclear crisis is one outstanding area where changes of identities of the ROK and the United States are most visible. For example, just days before leaving Seoul, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, succinctly pointed out that:19

It is a difference between the United States and South Korea that recently, many South Koreans feel lesser [a] threat from North Korea while Americans perceive [a] bigger North Korean threat after the 9/11 terror. Americans worry the connection between WMD and terrorism and fear that terrorists might have WMD in their hands. Because of this, I think they came to feel more nuclear threat from North Korea.

Identity can affect international relations in two ways.20 On the one hand, variation or changes in state identity can affect the national security interests or polices of states (see line 3 in Figure 1). Identities both generate and shape interests. And changes in identity can precipitate substantial change in interests that shape national security policy. For example, after the World War II, Germany reconstructed its identity—democratic and international pacifist, and sought to link this new identity to regional and multilateral institutions.21 On the other hand, configurations of state identity can affect interstate normative structures and regimes (line 4 in Figure 1). For instance, the formation of NATO created a common identity of liberal democracies and allowed for the development of new

practices of collective defense, multilateral cooperation, and its institutionalization.\textsuperscript{22}

**Figure 1.** Norms, Identity, State Interests and Policy

The second issue where international agencies have keen interests to resolve is North Korea’s nuclear weapon development. On February 10, 2005, North Korea declared that it had built nuclear weapons and would take steps to bolster its nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{23} This is the first official announcement confirming to the world that the DPRK is a nuclear weapon state. With the North’s declaration, it can be said that Northeast Asia enters into the second nuclear age.

It is widely held that the DPRK’s nuclear capability has been significantly enhanced since October 2002, when the current North Korea nuclear crisis was triggered. Prior to this, most analysts agreed that North Korea had probably extracted enough plutonium for one or two primitive nuclear devices before the IAEA inspection began in May 1992. Confronted by the U.S. accusation of its secret uranium enrichment program and consequential violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea has taken a series of provocative


steps—expelling the IAEA inspectors in December 2002; withdrawing from the NPT in January 2003; restarting the 5MWe reactor in February 2003; and reprocessing 8,017 spent fuel rods by July 2003 and another 8,000 spent fuels in 2005. As a result, the North Korean nuclear capability has been multiplied, turning a problem into a genuine crisis.

North Korea is the first country in the world that withdrew from the NPT and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. For the international nonproliferation community, North Korea triggered a serious concern about so-called “smart proliferator” that signs the NPT; gets technical and financial assistance for accumulating nuclear know-how; and then, breaks away from the treaty. This concern has made the international community take a firm position toward the Iranian nuclear issue in order not to repeat a bad precedent of North Korea.

On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's nuclear problem is the most dangerous security threat South Korea has faced since the Korean War and is likely to serve as a turning point that can trigger a structural change in the status quo of the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear problem was neglected by both the Clinton Administration's Engagement Policy and the Kim Dae Jung Administration's Sunshine Policy, and in the end, turned into a new nuclear crisis on the Peninsula.\(^\text{24}\) To the North Korean regime, nuclear weapons are a critical military element that can be used as a threat to dominate South Korea in the two countries' rivalry and a last resort to guarantee the regime's survival and continuity. At the same time, the fact that the North succeeded to develop nuclear weapons is a historic event that has a danger of transforming the geopolitical mapping in Northeast Asia and can have profound impacts on the international nonproliferation structure. Keeping in mind the

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24. Since the Geneva Agreed Framework signed in 1994, there were numerous indications that North Korea was maintaining clandestine nuclear weapon development programs. For example, a series of high-explosive tests—about 70 times and many attempts at running a uranium enrichment program were observed during the Clinton and Kim Dae Jung Administrations. Warnings were issued on North Korea's breaking away from the various agreements. For instance, the U.S. Congress warned that "there is significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests. This means that the United States cannot discount the possibility that North Korea could produce additional nuclear weapons outside of the constraints imposed by the 1994 Agreed Framework." North Korea Advisory Group, Report to The Speaker U.S. House of Representatives, November 1999. p. 5. See http://www.house.gov/international_relations/nkag/report.htm.
political, military and strategic importance of the problem, the four big powers around the Peninsula—China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—will do their best to maximize their own national interests in the course of resolving North Korea’s nuclear problem. From South Korea’s perspective, the seriousness of the problem lies in the fact that individual interests and influences of the four powers may lead to significant changes in the division of the Korean Peninsula without proper consideration of South Korean interests.

Looking back to the history of North Korea’s nuclear development, “deception” and “persistence” may be the two words that most succinctly describe the North Korean regime’s psychology and strategy. Throughout its history, the North’s nuclear weapon development program has been disguised by the Pyongyang regime’s peaceful rhetoric of having no intention to go nuclear. North Korean authorities, of course, stubbornly exerted themselves in furtive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons at the back door. Under the banner of “having neither intention nor capability to develop nuclear weapons,” guided by the late President Kim Il-Sung, this pattern of rhetorical deception on the one hand and persistent obsession to realize nuclear ambition on the other hand, continued until April 2003 when North Korea finally revealed that they had nuclear weapons.25

There have been several examples manifesting North Korea’s duality and dishonesty. First, by signing the Joint Denuclearization Declaration with South Korea in 1991, North Korea promised not to possess reprocessing or enrichment facilities. But the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection that was carried out just six months later found that the North had already constructed and operated a large-scale reprocessing facility—what they called a radiochemical laboratory. The ROK Ministry of Defense estimated that North Korea might have produced 10-14kg of plutonium before the IAEA inspection started in May 1992.26 Indeed, the Joint Declaration was a stillborn child from the beginning.

25. It was during the conversation with the editor-in-chief of NHK in October 1977 that Kim Il Sung first publicly expressed his intention not to develop nuclear weapons. At an interview with the President of Iwanami Shoten on September 26, 1991, he declared to have neither intention nor capability to develop nuclear weapons. At a luncheon with the South Korean delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks on February 20, 1992, Kim Il Sung stated that “we do not intend to have a nuclear confrontation with neighboring big powers and in addition, it is unimaginable to develop nuclear weapons that can wipe out Korean people.” Rodong Sinmun, February 21, 1992.
Second, the Pakistani government’s investigation of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and subsequent revelation of a nuclear smuggling network in early 2004 showed that there had been significant level of nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan. During the last decade, technologies, equipment and materials related to uranium enrichment had flown from Pakistan into North Korea. This is a clear violation of the Joint Declaration, the Geneva Agreed Framework, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Third, at the NPT withdrawal statement issued in January 2003, the DPRK government reasserted itself that it did not have any intention to go nuclear and invited the United States to verify their statement. About three months later, the government statement was nullified at the Beijing three-party talks when the DPRK representative Lee Gun informed to the U.S. representative James Kelly that North Korea already had nuclear weapons. Mr. Lee’s remark was the first case where a high-level North Korean authority revealed that Pyongyang possessed nuclear weapons. Since June 2003, North Koreans have argued that they have a “nuclear deterrent force.

In short, what the North Korean regime has shown to the international society as regards its nuclear ambition is indeed a historical masterpiece of ill-natured deception and unyielding persistence. Threats posed by North Koreans will be brought to an end only when such persistent deception no longer can serve as a guiding principle of their thinking and policy-making behavior.

The Six-Party Talks and its Bumpy Road Ahead

The six-party talks is another international gathering where an important Korean Peninsula issue is discussed. When the six-party talks produced a joint statement in September 2005, it was said that

27. Foreign Minister Paik Nam Soon and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan reconfirmed North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons when they met a U.S. Congress delegation led by Representative Curt Weldon in late May 2003. Dong-a Ilbo, June 3, 2003.
28. A commentary of the Korean Central News Agency argued that “if the U.S. keeps threatening the DPRK with nuclear weapons instead of abandoning its hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force [emphasis added].” Korean Central News Agency, June 9, 2003. Before this commentary, on June 6, spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said that “as far as the issue of a nuclear deterrent force is concerned, the DPRK has the same legal status as the United States and other states possessing nuclear deterrent forces which are not bound to any international law.” Rodong Sinmun, June 7, 2003.
the talks finally made a successful outcome and the discussion would move from the generalities to the practical specifics. Despite the joint statement, however, the road ahead for the six-party talks is very bumpy.

There are several factors that make the future of the six-party talks uncertain. First, the six-party talks have not made enough progress to allow for discussing the specifics. Only differences were staked out in such contentious issues as the existence of the HEU program, light water reactor, procedures of dismantling nuclear capabilities, etc.

Second, as the number of parties increases in a negotiation, reaching a successful conclusion grows to be difficult and time-consuming. Coordinating different interests and positions of the six participating countries surely is not an easy job. Compared to more than 17 months required for the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States, there is no question that the six-party talks will take much longer time.

Third, the goal of the six-party talks is more comprehensive and it is harder to reach a compromise than the Agreed Framework. In the early 1990s, the negotiation focused on freezing known nuclear activities. In 2004, the goal is so far reaching to encompass complete dismantlement of nuclear devices, facilities and equipments both in the plutonium and the HEU programs. Since the six-party talks involves many agenda and each agendum is weighty, it is too apparent that the talks will be extended far longer and need much more efforts than the Agreed Framework.

Fourth, North Korea is required to accept much higher level of verification than in the 1990s. The verification mechanism for the Agreed Framework was modest and carefully limited to monitoring the freeze status. The new verification mechanism must be across-the-board and in-depth to eradicate North Korea’s present nuclear capabilities and future potentials root and branch. Experiencing the North’s deceitful behavioral patterns and consolidating its will not to be fooled any more by a rogue regime, the international community will try to impose verification procedures as harsh as possible. And, the verification dilemma emerges here. The more rigid verification system the international society demands, the more difficult North Korea is able to accept, and the less likely any deal is reached successfully.

Finally, as time goes, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are accumulated and tension will increase. The 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon already produced enough plutonium for two primitive nuclear weapons after the nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002
and is still running at this moment. Therefore, as the six-party talks does not bear fruit, a hard-line view will get more support that argues that the North's accumulating nuclear capabilities cannot be tolerated any more and that negotiations should yield to more pressing approaches.

**Future Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula**

In the course of Korean unification, there will be major challenges or contingencies that must draw attention of the international community. Each contingency will necessitate a unique response from the international agencies and concerned countries. They are mostly related with the future of the North Korean regime. In this paper, the following contingencies are presented:

- **Continuance of the Kim Jong-il Regime**
  - Kim Jong-il will maintain his power or his favorite will succeed him. Authoritarian rules and secretive nature of the regime will persist. North Korea is not expected to fully cooperate with dismantlement and verification. It will play its traditional bargaining tactic of "minimizing the cost and maximizing the benefit." Despite international pressures like U.N. sanctions, the North is hardly likely to give up WMD capabilities.

- **Regime Change and a New Pro-Democracy Regime**
  - Kim Jong-il regime will collapse either by *coup d'etat* or by implosion from the grass roots and is replaced by a new leadership. A new regime will disconnect itself with past history of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-il eras. It will promote democracy and freedom, carry out market-oriented economic policies, and value human rights. But the new regime will draw a line at having intimate relations with a South Korean government that supported Kim Jong-il regime.

- **Peaceful Unification by South Korea**
  - South Korea will be lucky enough to have unexpected chance to achieve unification in its terms like West Germany. The unification process will move smoothly under South Korean government's firm control. The ROK will remain the historically legitimate entity representing Korean people on the Peninsula.

- **Strong intervention by China**
  - There are two possibilities conceivable in this scenario. The first is that China intervenes heavily in the unification process led by South Korea, strong enough to affect not only the process but also the shape of unification. The second is North Korea being virtually absorbed by China when it collapses, as suggested by
Ambassador Charles Prichard\textsuperscript{29} and it becomes the fourth of the Northeastern provinces of China.

- Chaos in North Korea
- During the course of reform and change, North Korea falls into chaos and even a civil war could occur. In this situation, it will be difficult to apply any institutional measure to control North Korea’s WMD and related capabilities. It cannot be ruled out that some weapons and materials might be used within North Korea or smuggled into terrorist organizations.

For the Better Future of Korea

Since the new nuclear crisis occurred in October 2002, South Korea has maintained a firm principle to resolve the crisis peacefully through dialogues. However, North Korea has paid little attention to South Korean demand in nuclear matters and has been expanding its nuclear capability against the South’s wish. It seems that South Korea’s security is pushed to the brink by North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy. Key to any national policy are reality and flexibility. So it is important to constantly check whether a policy is appropriate to solve a pending problem and to make changes if necessary.

The debate on whether North Korea possesses nuclear weapons or not cannot and should not be a focus of contention in South Korea’s domestic politics any more. The very fact that North Korea has persistently violated all major international agreements in developing nuclear weapons cannot allow for having a forgiving interpretation of North Korea’s malicious intention. Nuclear-armed North Korea demands South Korea to prepare itself for the worst scenario. It is an upside-down argument that officially acknowledging the North as a nuclear weapon state will increase security risks on the Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear weapon development is already a grave security risk. In fact, to disregard this solemn truth intentionally causes security concerns among the South Korean public and the international society.

The ultimate resolution of North Korea’s nuclear problem can be attained only when nuclear weapons and infrastructures are completely dismantled under a thorough verification mechanism.

The whole process will take many years, depending on North Korea’s cooperation. Until the nuclear-weapon-free status in North Korea is visibly confirmed, South Korean government’s North Korea policy should be based on the fact that North Korea is a nuclear weapon state. A national strategy omitting the fact of nuclear-armed North Korea contains a danger of bringing about too much security risks to South Korea. While rebuilding a failed economy is relatively easy, security cannot and should not allow for an inch of mistake because too much are at stake.

The North Korean regime has pursued nuclear weapon development while South Korea has hailed the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy as fostering the mood of goodwill and contributing to reduce tension and rivalry. Kim Jong-il smiled and shook hands with South Korean President publicly while developing nuclear weapons secretly. It is time for the Roh Administration to prudently reassess its North Korea strategy. Dialogue and peace are not the only virtues. Vigilance and prudence are and will remain the wisdom that should be held until the Korean Peninsula is unified on South Korea’s terms.
Chapter 5

The Role of State Institutions, Organizational Culture, and Policy Perception in South Korea’s International Security Policymaking Process, 1998-Present

Kim Byungki

1. This paper was presented at U.S. Marine Corps University Symposium, “The Quest for a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process,” at U.S. Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, June 13, 2006. Original idea for this paper was thought out in a piece entitled, “The External Factors That Are Shaping the World Views of Foreign Policy Makers in the Two Koreas: Towards A Preliminary Analysis” at International Conference, “Korea and Northeast Asia: A Half Century After the Korean War” organized by Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies, and co-sponsored by the Research Institute on National Security Affairs of Korea National Defence University, the Walker Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina, the Heritage Foundation, and Dongailbo at Radisson Seoul Plaza Hotel, October 26-8, 2000, Seoul, Korea. I would like to acknowledge the generous funding provided by Korea University Special Research Council for support in finalizing this study during the author’s sabbatical at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in 2005-6 as well as the useful comments on the draft by the late Ambassador Richard Walker, Professor Shin, Eui Kang of University of South Carolina, Professor Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University, Professor Kimberly Marten of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at Columbia University, Dr. Patrick Cronin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dr. Bruce Bennett of Rand Corporation, Ambassador Michael Geier of Federal Republic of Germany, John Feffer, David Straub, former Director of Office of Japanese Affairs at the U.S. State Department, Robert Mounts of the United States Forces in Korea, my Special Assistant, Park, Jinho—currently M.A. Candidate in National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and my Executive Assistant, Major (Republic of Korea Army) Kim, Duk-Hyun—PH.D. Candidate at Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies. This article, published in International Journal of Unification Studies, v.15, n.1 (July 2006), is republished here with the permission of the Journal. This study, moreover, is based on conversations with numerous officials, academics, journalists and industrialists both current and retired over the years to whom I am grateful for having had a unique opportunity to learn about national security policy-making process; all the short comings of the paper are, however, my own.
I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to identify, conceptualize and dissect in a very preliminary manner the general institutional context, information-gathering and processing trajectory, policy preference and dynamics underlying international security policy-making process in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Given the preliminary scope of this research note, the purview of analysis will only entail the identification and conceptual outline of the noted bureaucratic context, the information gathering/processing dynamics, the competitive policy deliberation process and, very briefly, the holistic Weltanschauung of the decision-makers in South Korea in the executive branch and bureaucracy: the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Defence (MND), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Ministry of Unification (MU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) as opposed to parliament, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), media, industry, and other actors making up civil society (which would deserve another lengthy analysis on its own merit).²

By analysing the bureaucratic process, one can understand one important institutional basis of foreign policymaking establishment under pressures for change generated from the international system as well as the domestic political environment.

For the limited sake of analysis, this paper will restrict its scope to the contemporary period, the presidential tenures of Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun (1998-) era. Due to systematic research constraints, including available sources, access to individuals involved in the policy debate, raw data, the objective of this study is to stimulate, inform, and point to further directions for research, rather than constituting a definitive argument.³

II. Domestic Institutional Setting and International Security: Macro Dimension


The most important foreign policy actors in the South Korean political system are the President and as noted earlier during Kim Dae-Jung’s presidency, the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security (the Secretary-General of the National Security Council), while today they are the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs (the Secretary-General of the National Security Council from the preceding Senior Adviser for National Security), Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), Senior Advisory for Foreign Affairs (the Secretary-General of the National Security Council), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). The Presidential Secretariat for National Security and Foreign Affairs (the Secretary-General of the National Security Council) is responsible for coordinating and directing foreign and national security policies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) is responsible for coordinating and directing national security policies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) is responsible for coordinating and directing national security policies.
Security Council (NSC), National Security/Foreign Policy Adviser (from preceding Foreign Policy Adviser and Defence Policy Adviser)


3. The actors' perceptions, institutional culture, information gathering/processing, and the deliberative policy process will include those of who work in the international security/foreign policy field. The policy elite in South Korea which will be relevant are, therefore, those operating in the Presidential Secretariat/the National Security Council (President, Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security during the Kim Dae-Jung presidency and Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary-General for National Security Council, Foreign Policy and National Adviser in the current Roh Moo-Hyun administration), Prime Minister's Office (Prime Minister, Chief of Staff and Special Assistant for National Security and Foreign Affairs) and Ministries (Ministers and Vice Ministers) of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Trade, Unification and National Intelligence Service. Also, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), mass media and the National Assembly have become increasingly influential in the Roh Moo-Hyun foreign policymaking establishment (2003-present).
as well as the head of the Presidential Secretariat, the Prime Minister, the Director of National Intelligence Service, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Minister of Unification, the Minister of National Defence and occasionally a trusted lieutenant of the President who serves as either special or secret envoy on a special foreign policy assignment. Even within this circle, it has been customarily the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security or the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs/the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC and the National Intelligence Service Director who have been the real power wielders in the formulation of foreign and national security policy.

The National Security Council has a staff in the Presidential Secretariat which is organizationally managed by the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security—or the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs as its Secretary-General. Executive Committee members include the aforementioned Ministers, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff and the Director of the National Intelligence Service. In the current Roh Moo-Hyun administration the Executive Committee of the National Security Council is chaired by the Minister of Unification. All other actors below this rank, such as those at the Vice or Deputy Ministerial level in the various security-responsible ministries, are implementers of decisions taken by their respective boss, to which one can add the chairmen of the National Assembly committees responsible for security, and foreign policy, namely, the Foreign Affairs, Reunification and Trade, Defence, and Intelligence Committees.

While the weight of policymaking with respect to both the domestic and international arenas has certainly shifted toward the National Assembly—lately it has been playing an increasingly important role by delaying and moderating the policy initiatives of the President and the security-responsible ministries—on the whole it does not constitute a policy maker in terms of the basic direction of a given policy. Rather, the National Assembly constitutes a facilitator, executioner, and rationalizer of foreign policy in a fractured policy environment. In fact, as one can witness the policy process with respect to South Korea's decision to send troops to Iraq, the National Assembly Committees were at most critics, even as they, more often than not, ultimately supported the executive branch's foreign and national security policy initiatives. Because the chairmanships of these important Committees are usually held by the party enjoying a working majority in parliament, currently the President's party, the prevailing political dynamic makes it that
much more difficult for them to oppose a given policy—although not impossible, as rank-and file party members have shown in the past.

In recent years, due to the ongoing pluralization of South Korean politics and, subsequently, the politicization of foreign and national security policy—especially towards North Korea and the United States—the chairman of the opposition Grand National Party has become increasingly influential. (During Kim Dae-Jung’s presidency, the chairman of the United Liberal Democrats, a party in coalition with Kim’s own party, was also influential.) But once again, for the reasons stated above these organs are important not so much in terms of a given policy’s planning, formulation and initial execution, as in their sustenance, moderation, and legitimization of policies and, sometimes, in the withdrawal of an unpopular policy. President Kim Dae Jung’s ability to push through his policy of engagement towards Pyongyang⁴ and President Roh Moo Hyun’s “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” towards North Korea⁵ despite much resistance from the opposition camp, are a clear illustration of such a state of affairs.

Other actors, such as the mass media and private corporations, have only marginal impact; in fact, they have sometimes been forced by the regime to mobilize support for its policies. Examples include Hyundai Corporation as well as some newspaper companies whose dire financial condition makes them dependent on a continuous flow of bank credit tacitly controlled by the regime. Such organizations are, therefore, amenable to presidential pressure, at least to the extent of not opposing the president’s evolving foreign and national security policy line.

National Security Council (NSC) Executive Committee: Senior Advisor for National Security and Foreign Affairs (Secretary-General), National Security & Foreign Policy Advisor, and Deputy Secretary-General

Accordingly, one can argue that most foreign policy decision-making power in South Korea customarily resides with the President, the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security (or the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs), the Minister of Unification (as Executive Chairman of the NSC) and the Director of the National Intelligence Service. Here I state that such has been customarily the case. Because, although there is a formal, organizational division of labour in the

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formulation and execution of foreign policy and national security affairs along the institutional or ministerial lines that I have outlined thus far and, thus, the evolving significance of individual organizational input varies with the nature of the given policy stake at hand, the empowerment of the key actor(s) in this policy deliberation process has been conditioned equally, if not primarily by, the degree of president’s political trust in his lieutenant (i.e., Lim Dong-Won during Kim Dae-Jung’s presidency, and Lee Jong-Seok under Roh Moo-Hyun).

Such a case is not surprising given the fact that even in a relatively open and pluralistic state such as the United States, there are only two or three personnel within the power elite who wield the authority to plan, formulate and execute foreign and national security policy. We are accordingly interested in those actors which significantly influence, or shape the overall international security policymaking process—namely the President, his chief lieutenant, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Unification and the Director of the National Intelligence Service.

The President receives foreign policy briefings daily from his Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security (or the Senior Advisor for National Security and Foreign Affairs) and weekly from the Director of the National Intelligence Service. The Senior Presidential Secretary—along with the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC—receives analysed information from the President’s National Security and Foreign Policy Adviser (Suh Joo-Seok)—an office previously occupied by a career Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official, called the Foreign Policy Adviser, which was merged with the office of the President’s Defence Adviser (which was occupied by a career official from the Ministry of National Defence until two years ago when Admiral Yoon Kwang Ung left the office to become Minister of National Defence). Both the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs (the Secretary-General) and the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC daily collect information, briefings, analyses and policy recommendations on major power relations, North Korea, defence, security, intelligence and foreign policy issues from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Unification and National Defence and the National Intelligence Service. These, in turn—with the exception of

The Quest for a Unified Korea

Unification Ministry which has embassy representatives in only four countries—collect and analyse intelligence from their embassy representatives in over 128 countries.\(^7\)

There are 185 countries with which South Korea enjoys diplomatic relations; of these Seoul maintains 128 embassies for reasons of budget and national interest. In terms of geographic setting, there are 23 embassies in Asia, 17 in the Americas, 28 in Europe, 12 in the Middle East and 14 in Africa. To this one can add the 91 international organizations to which South Korea belongs,\(^8\) including 16 under the United Nations (UN), 3 that are independent and 67 that fall under the category of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs).\(^9\)

In terms of the quantity of information with respect to foreign affairs and national security, the National Intelligence Service (which focuses on political intelligence and North Korea) possesses the most, followed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade (diplomatic intelligence), National Defence (military intelligence, defence industry) and Unification (North Korea). These four agencies have both formal and informal agreements on information; since the Ministry of Unification does not have direct access to first hand information except on an ad hoc or informal basis (other than from its embassy representatives in four countries through which it collects information on North Korea and major power relations), the intelligence which it receives may be viewed as pre-digested or second-hand, and thus liable to bias, especially from the perspective of those providing it. Given the increasing political weight attached to relations with North Korea in recent years, the evolving role of the Ministry of Unification as the lead agency and the practice of naming a political heavy weight to head the Ministry of Reunification (Lim Dong-Won during the Kim Dae Jung presidency, and Chung Dong-Young, and Lee Jong-Seok during the Roh, Moo-Hyun presidency) some of the prior constraints on the Ministry of Unification in terms of processing information obtained from other actors may have been significantly eased.

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\(^7\) This figure is as of March 2006. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul (www.mofat.or.kr).

\(^8\) This figure is as of March 2006. United Nations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul (I am indebted to Major Kim Duk-Hyun on this point).

Information Aggregation, Analysis and Deliberation

At Korean embassies abroad, information consisting of documents, press reports and communicated messages from human sources which are initially extracted in their original language are translated into Korean, reviewed, and contextualized in a given policy format. This content is then cabled to the respective Ministries in Seoul for further review, analysis, and policy contextualization. The packaged briefings for the Director of the National Intelligence Service and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Defence, and Unification are then reassembled to be sent to the relevant Senior Directors in the NSC as well as to the President’s National Security and Foreign Policy Adviser, the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC and the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security, who then, by himself or with the relevant minister or director, reports to the President. The President then takes this information into account as he deems warranted before formulating major foreign and national security policy initiatives with his key advisers—either the Senior Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC or the head of the NSC, i.e., the Minister of Unification or his alter ego in the NSC. Because the Director of the National Intelligence Service is responsible only to the President, he usually briefs the President alone.10

The content of the information which is collected, translated, and interpreted may be important in itself. But, what is more significant is why any given information is collected and analysed in a certain manner, cabled at a specific time and addressed to the chosen Minister, Director, the Senior Presidential Secretary or the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council, with an eye to

10. According to one confidential source, as a result of the financial crisis which hit South Korea in 1997, about 60% of the weekly intelligence briefing for the President during Kim Dae-Jung’s presidency was devoted to economic, industrial and trade issues. The fact that the former Research Institute on International Affairs under the National Intelligence Service in 1998 split into the Research Institute on International Economic Affairs, headed by a former Vice-Minister of Economic Planning Board with a Ph.D., and the Institute of National Security seems to offer support for the trend that economic issues have become much more important than they were in the past. For a useful work in a comparative light, consult, Jin Hyun Kim, and Chung In Moon eds., Post-Cold War, Democratization, and National Intelligence: A Comparative Perspective, Yonsei Monograph Series on International Studies n.1, (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1996). See, also, Kookminjungboosidae Kookajeonbangokikwaneweui Yeokhalkwa Kwaje, [The Role and Tasks of the National Intelligence Service in the Era of Civilian Government], (Seoul: Research Institute on Peace, April 30, 1998).
informing and influencing the President. Since there is far more daily information flowing in from the international arena than the ministries or the intelligence service could possibly cover and digest for the President, a reporting institution tends to select information that supports its bureaucratic interests in the competition for the President’s ear on high policy priorities, i.e., North Korea, proliferation, the Six-Party talks etc. Indeed, this competition can be considered as a primary variable in information selection, content modification, timing of delivery and choice of targeted actor.

Although North Korea, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Russian Federation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU) and Mexico are all of major importance to South Korean security and trade, some are more important than others—namely, the DPRK, the U.S., the PRC, and Japan. But these external actors or forces that shape—or, more often than not, reinforce the prevailing institutional culture and policy preferences of a given agency in relation to the President are significant to the degree that they also constitute information which is sifted by official institutions and actors. In this process, the foreign/domestic press and media, and NGOs play a secondary role in providing alternative sources of information to the President—often in more or less continuing conflict and cooperation with official channels of information aggregation, analysis, provision, and deliberation.

In this respect external sources of information by themselves do not come to the attention of major foreign policy makers. On the contrary, they are often sought after by the decision makers when he or she needs to engage in a given policy, such as in periodic meetings and negotiations on security and trade with the U.S., Japan, and the PRC and in dealings with North Korea, whose dynamic platform is usually germane to the given President’s domestic political support. Such policy nesting by the South Korean state—or the bureaucracies in our case—requires a continuous and stable flow of information, organizational adaptation and learning in order to enable maximum policy and ministerial input into the often turbulent and shock-ridden policy process.

Traditionally, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), together with the Ministries of National Defence (MND), Reunification (MU), and Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), have been concerned with the long-term development of a strategically independent South Korea enjoying the primary support of not only the United States and Japan—Seoul’s major allies and trade partners—but also the
understanding and confidence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) in the overall context of managing more normalized relations with Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{11} While the traditional role of these security, foreign affairs, intelligence-responsible agencies and ministries has remained quite robust up to the present day, the emphasis of Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun on accelerating integration with North Korea at the socio-economic—as opposed to military-political-level has given at least a political lead to the MU and the NIS in North Korea policy over the traditional role and initiative of others in the overall international security policy process. The result has been a sharp delineation of inter-agency differences over policies towards Pyongyang and alliance management, including open clashes during the initial years of the respective presidencies.

III. Domestic Institutional Setting and International Security: Micro Dimension

The National Intelligence Service (NIS)

The NIS has been preoccupied with the political security of the South Korean regime in power (read: the President and his loyal faction) and with the directly related problems of moderating and engaging North Korea, Japan, the U.S., Russia, the PRC, in ensuring this political security. Accordingly, for the National Intelligence Service the overriding agenda is not whether to contain or integrate North Korea, but how best Pyongyang can be utilized in maximally enhancing the staying power of the South Korean President and his supporters with the further enlistment of other major powers more or less at the covert level. Such a mission for the NIS under the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun presidencies meant the opening of confidential relations with Pyongyang at the highest level (the summit meeting in June 2,000). These contacts were intended to provide intelligence to the President in support of this mission as well as to sustain and accelerate proactive socio-cultural, humanitarian and economic engagement with Pyongyang on an array of projects at multiple levels (the inter-Korean railroads, the Kaesong industrial zone, the Mt. Keumkang tourism project,

\textsuperscript{11} For a recent view, see, Haksoon Paik, “Strategic Visions of South Korea,” manuscript, (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2005).
reunions of divided families, sports exchanges, and energy assistance to the North\(^\text{12}\) and to search for opportunities to address conventional/non-conventional security threats (i.e., chemical, biological, nuclear weapons, long-range artillery).\(^\text{13}\)

The NIS, unlike other ministries, has the mission of providing intelligence not only regarding its traditional responsibilities, such as terrorism, industrial espionage, drug smuggling, human trafficking, currency counterfeiting, but also, as noted earlier, its unique role of preserving and defending presidential power. Such duty entails, among others, providing intelligence estimates not only on North Korean political and military leadership to enable maximum socio-economic integration with Pyongyang as has been the case for the past seven years, but also on its military capabilities as well as the evolving military and political trends of its key ally, i.e., Washington, and of cooperative partners, i.e., Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow to minimize any major international disruptions to the President’s stated objectives.

The Service, aside from its operatives in embassies and international organizations around the globe, has intelligence agreements with other foreign agencies through which it shares information. When there are major crises, such as in the aftermath of the Korean-Russian diplomatic rupture in June of 1998, a major revision of the analytical framework comes into being. The Service, along with other Ministries, then advises the President as to the alternatively desirable direction in which a given foreign policy should steer.

The degree of external source of information’s impact on internal perceptions is, moreover, a function of existing level of political, diplomatic, economic, military and cultural exchanges between South Korea and the concerned countries. The National Intelligence Service has a number of qualified specialists on the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, the EU and major international organizations not to mention those covering private firms, media (domestic and foreign), NGOs and the domestic political community (although the latter activity has been legally banned by the current President). The sources of information which are collected are quite comprehensive, i.e., science, and technology, politics, economy, culture, foreign policy and military affairs of the major and relevant

13. For a salient analysis, consult, Bruce Bechtol, manuscript, (Quantico: Marine Staff and Command College, forthcoming).
powers. But the most determinative information for the National Intelligence Service concerns high level political information which would be most useful to the President for his own domestic political standing.

During the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun presidencies, these information included detection of signs of positive market reform in North Korea and the inertial failure of its market to resort to WMD development and other black market activities as a defensive means to survival. This information would include such reportage as the standing political influence of the U.S. President, Congressional climate and varying political disposition of the so-called power bureaucracies—in, i.e., U.S. Department of Defence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. State Department, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative—towards the South Korean President and North Korea. Accordingly, press evaluations, articulated views of high-ranking politicians (Senators, Congressmen, Russian Duma members, Japanese Diet members, members of China’s Supreme People’s Assembly etc.), press reports, analyses by think-tanks and public opinion polls figure crucially in the directives of NIS information processing and delivery.

The Ministry of National Defence (MND)

The Ministry of National Defence (MND) oversees the military alliance with the United States and increasingly cooperative security relations with Japan, China, Russia and North Korea. With its main goal of deterring and stabilizing the North Korean military—unprovoked attack, terrorism, continuing proliferation problems—the Ministry has prioritized and continues to emphasize mutual security commitments, and cooperation with Washington and Tokyo despite the increasing tensions in Seoul’s political relations with its erstwhile partners as a result of elite generational turnover, historical issues over Japan’s colonialism (textbook controversy, Yasukuni visits, comfort women etc.), territorial dispute, perceived U.S. unilateralism, and related divergence in threat perceptions towards North Korea. While the North Korean force structure has evolved from one primarily geared to conventional to unconventional warfare due to declining economic and social bases in relation to Seoul, the decisive ability of Pyongyang’s armed forces to threaten and, by extension, extort Seoul has given twin challenges to the MND: to maximize anti-air defence and counter-battery operation capability in light of the United States Forces in Korea (U.S.F.K.) force restructuring, and jointly stabilize larger Korea-U.S. Combined Force Command’s budgetary, organizational, acquisition, and doctrinal process.
Thus, the primary duty of MND, as in the past, is to evaluate as precisely as possible Pyongyang’s formidable ability to threaten Seoul and to devise most practical ways of meeting this threat by contextualizing Korea-U.S. alliance at budgetary, weapons system, and doctrinal level, on the one hand, and to insulate on the other negative political pressures generated as a result of democratization on civil-military relations. The latter impulse on the MND has been generated as a result of the rise of anti-Americanism, NGOs, media, urbanization, and the political leadership’s excessive attempt to engage socio-economically Pyongyang and overturn the formidable military threat without taking comparable steps in conventional and non-conventional confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Therefore, the primary mission of the MND is to address Pyongyang’s military threat and Washington’s force-in-transformation (the latter proceeded with some alarm within the MND as a result of lack of consultation). But the delivery of this critical evaluation, policy analysis and recommendation to the President may be becoming difficult not only because of the lack of the Office of Defence Advisor to the President under the Roh Moo-

Hyun government since 2004 (representing the MND, whose office was merged with the Office of Foreign Policy Adviser into President's National Security and Foreign Policy Adviser this year), but also, the President's priority on socio-economic engagement with Pyongyang and his core supporters in the Presidential Secretariat, who want to correct the human rights abuse, repression, and excesses of the bureaucratic-authoritarian past by implicating the MND and its institutional memory as a target of radical reform.

Accordingly, the Ministry of National Defence which has working relations with—in varying degrees—its counterparts in the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and the EU is foremost interested in receiving accurate data on the military capability and intentions of Pyongyang with particular respect to its WMD capability, long-range artillery and 100,000 strong special forces, accurate intelligence on evolving U.S. military posture in defending this threat, and, correctly charting the noted actors' relations with Pyongyang with eye to any increases in North Korea's ability to threaten Seoul. Thus, information of such nature as U.S. military budget, the U.S. Congressional, Japanese Diet, Russian Duma attitude towards their military, sustainability of U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula, the state of Japanese, Chinese and Russian civil-military relations, technology transfer and power projection capability are of utmost interest to the MND.

One caveat is in order. While the significance of Korea-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty cannot be emphasized enough, and hence, the overriding priority of U.S. forces in Korea (U.S.F.K.) and the supporting bureaucratic structure within the U.S. Department of

Defence, Armed Services Committee in the Senate and the National Security Council and so on, the South Korean Defence Ministry, it seems to this author, like the Ministry of Unification and the National Intelligence Service is concerned with the long-term development of a strategically autonomous South Korean armed force and defence posture. Such long-term perspective can be thought out in the context of both the U.S. military presence (in some combination of air, naval, and ground presence) or even in its absence—which is contingent on the evolution of both international and regional security environment as well as domestic politics in the U.S. and Korea. Thus, relative to the outstanding significance of the U.S. armed forces for the foreseeable future (and trade, investment, cultural, educational industry, common values and diplomacy, which nest the bilateral relations as the linchpin of Korea’s security with the United States), the quintessential objective of MND in the longer run also involves planning, provision, and execution of policy designed to reintegrate North Korea at the organizational, doctrinal, budgetary and weapons level in more or less continuing partnership with the United States.

*The Ministry of Unification (MU)*

The Ministry of Unification whose major concern is North Korea has been traditionally conservative in its outlook towards Pyongyang. And, it has been only in recent years (1998--) that active improvement of inter-Korean relations has been pursued by the Ministry of Unification although in a manner secondary to the National Intelligence Service which played a key, spearheading role in the two some years leading up to the 2,000 June summit. Given the limited resources of the Ministry through which it can directly collect, analyse and contextualize in a policy format those relevant information from the major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, one must argue that the impact of external factors on the formation of the Unification Ministry’s world outlook is indirect, limited and therefore, the weakest among the concerned Ministries that have been examined thus-far.

Nevertheless, given the institutional thrust of the Ministry towards stabilization of North Korea’s socio-economic and political conditions which would enable visible improvement in inter-Korean relations at the economic, cultural, humanitarian, political and military level, the most sought-after information would concern

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the articulated views of North Korea and major powers with respect to Pyongyang’s leadership, socio-economic, military conditions, foreign policy, and national security on inter-Korean affairs. These information are gathered from domestic/foreign press, journalists operating in Korea, officials, think-tank specialists and academics. Also, information is obtained from occasional research visits abroad by the Ministry’s special team often with outside experts in their meeting with mid-level bureaucrats, academic specialists and businessmen in the field of North Korean affairs. The Ministry also has its own research arm, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), which houses qualified experts on inter-Korean and major power relations through which further information is collected, analysed and delivered.

Given the mission of the Ministry as the major organ dealing with North Korea, it is protective of its jurisdictional integrity. This has been the particular case vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which has been instrumental in leading the Basic Framework Agreement with North Korea (1994-). Accordingly, the Unification Ministry while emphasizing the continued significance of the United States and the PRC in their role in bringing the peace process to the peninsula is inclined towards taking in information which help “re-Koreanize” inter-Korean relations. And such conditions can be brought about by a policy platform which relatively moderates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the U.S., and by extension, increasing the role of North Korea, Russia, Japan, and China in the inter-Korean policy and peace process.

**The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)**

Lastly, let us address the Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade and the external forces that shape, or I should say reinforce, and moderate its institutional culture. The Ministry has been until the mid-1990s likened to what the Japanese have termed her Foreign Ministry, namely, the Ministry of “courtesy.” Because, whenever major foreign policy events culminated as a success, such as diplomatic normalization it was either the President or his close associates who received all the credit, while if something went wrong, it was the Ministry which was blamed—not always, but most of the time.

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17. This author was a member of such a research visit to a select country eight years ago wherein counterpart from the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of External Economic Relations, a Special Assistant to the Chairman of a political party who was also a businessman and a researcher partook in a highly productive policy (closed) conference.
The state of foreign and national security policy being a function of domestic politics, particularly in developing and post-authoritarian political systems\(^8\) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) played a decorative role until the 1990s, as noted earlier. But with the growing globalization of Korean foreign policy and the consequent need for diplomatic activization, in particular relation to the expanding and often turbulent relationship with the U.S. as a result of rapid diffusion of political authority, Foreign Ministry’s role became relatively more important vis-à-vis other organs. Such change for the Foreign Ministry was reflected in part by the downgrading of Minister of Unification from its concurrent position as Deputy Prime Minister in the 1990s although such formal institutional lining has been redressed by renewed emphasis on North Korea since president Kim, Dae-Jung and subsequent appointment of political heavy weights during the current Roh Moo-Hyun presidency (in addition to the fact that the Minister of Unification now chairs the NSC).

Given the expansion in trade, investment, cultural/educational exchange and parallel security/trade interdependence with the United States, it is no accident that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade considers the maintenance of close and solid working relations with Washington as one of the most important corner stones of its policy. Such has been the case in the context of increased trade, and security cooperation with Japan, Russia and China during the last decade, invariably moderating the policy thrust of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from her prior US-centric platform to some, but not decisive degree (which is reflected by, for instance, Korea’s active role in ASEAN plus 3 framework as

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well as the East Asian Summit last year in which the U.S. was not involved).  

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade like all other Ministries is sensitized to her stake in the U.S.-led policy developments with respect to inter-Korean dialogue, major power relations and multilateral diplomacy, involving all international organizations (as was the case in U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to North Korea in October 1999 and the crystallisation of Four Party and Six Party Talks). Thus, for MOFAT continued activization of the U.S.’ and other international actors’ role, i.e., Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, Brussels in the inter-Korean peace process and the attendant intelligence at the aggregation stage which tend to support such trend will be most welcome, while signs that either weaken or derail the desired role of major international actors in such process will be either organizationally ignored, downplayed or moderated in policy analysis and its deliverance to the NSC or the President.

In this respect, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade keenly watches Washington’s unfolding attitude towards both Koreas, including that of the State Department, the Pentagon, the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of the President, the press corps, influential think-tanks, lobbying groups and academics with access to the corridors of power. The single most influential external source of this Ministry’s world view in the U.S. is the State Department, while in Korea it is the U.S.

Embassy and the U.S.F.K. along with the media, NGOs and the academia which occupy increasing weight in providing an alternative opinion and thus view on Korea—U.S. relations.

The President and the NSC Process

While I have not described what exactly constitutes the outside world view of the decision-makers (read: bureaucracy) as a whole in the overall international security policymaking process, it is clearly disjointed, disintegrated, compartmentalized, and even some what provincial when its packaged briefing gets to the President and his Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security or the Senior Advisor for National Security and Foreign Affairs. In a very rough manner, one can argue that the rudimentary basis of the President’s external perception of the outside world as provided by the bureaucracies is U.S.-centered, while increasing significance of Japan, China, Russia and the EU is being recognized. Of course, such cut is predicated in President Roh, Moo-Hyun’s inertial emphasis and belief in reintegrating Pyongyang with Seoul, as noted earlier, socio-economically, and culturally first, without instituting attendant steps in redressing outstanding political, military and diplomatic steps that would enable North Korea’s long-term integration not only with Seoul, but also the international community.

The rough paradigm of holistic South Korean foreign policy platform (or idea) that I have hitherto provided is also fundamentally calibrated by, as noted earlier, a President whose formative and given belief system is centered on autonomy, correcting of the past and so called “pan-national coexistence” with Pyongyang (nationalism), which is reinforced by the institutional lead given to the Ministry of Unification in the NSC and in the personality of his loyal lieutenant Lee Jong-Seok who is a firm believer and executioner of such Weltanshauung. The primordial picture that is assembled here, hence, is one of a major foreign policy actor being driven in his policy and personnel based on somewhat unreconstructed provincialism, nationalism, emotionalism, victimization and a irresistible need to correct the past facing continuous clash with the realities of international dynamics with profound domestic political implications, one of which includes the policy analysis and recommendations provided by all the security, foreign-policy, and intelligence responsible organs that we have analysed thus-far. Moreover, these institutions are, in turn, undergoing a not-insignificant organizational, cultural and personnel change, reflective of which is the minimal lip service that the respective heads of these organs have to give with respect to the
President's ongoing directive in the field of foreign and national security policy.

Currently, South Korea has a President who is quite well sensitized intellectually—as opposed to emotionally—to the events developing in the international arena with penchant for risk-taking and active diplomatic offensive towards the major powers. The imperative for the current President, is then, to integrate the sources of external information to his political standing, learn in both simple and complex manner and stylize the goal of developing long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, North East Asia (NEA) and globally. For only a strong political initiative from the President can cut through and harmonize the inter-departmental rivalry and sectionalism which impede the development of a robust, globally sensitized mid-to-long term policy platform on which sound foreign and national security policy lies.

IV. Conclusion

This research note has in a very preliminary manner examined the institutional setting of the decision-makers in South Korea in relation to the type of information which they are likely to digest, their perceptual orientation, bureaucratic interest and interagency policy deliberation process in international security policymaking. The modest goal of this research note is to stimulate further research in each of the area that has been examined in a much a more rigorous and systematic fashion which will serve as a constructive platform for generating policy recommendation for long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In order to do this I recommend the following research plans. (1) Systematic analysis of external perceptions, beliefs, principles, interpretations of major events and issues, relevant elite back ground (socialization path) and policy prescriptions articulated by varying institutional actors in the international security policymaking establishment over a period of time; (2) systematic examination of foreign and national security policy making order in an in depth manner by combining bureaucratic politics, coalition-building, learning, and bargaining model; and (3) collaborative research projects with foreign academic institutions with the goal of developing systematic, hard data on which above research can begin with respect to developing robust policy prescription for the South Korean policymaking community in the long term as is the case in the United States.
First of all, I would like to thank General Gardner who has made me available to participate in this conference. Personally, Quantico is very special to me. As a Korean Marine Officer, I was privileged to study in all three major schools at Quantico, including the TBS, the AWS and the Command & Staff College. Regarding my military career education, the town of Quantico, though hardly changed from my stay in the early 1980's, should be my 2d home town. During my schools at Quantico, they used to call us FMTs which stands for Foreign Military Trainees. Sometimes my American friends in the school called us this name with jealousy, because we were the ones who got to go on the most tours! Anyway, Quantico has provided me not only the foundation of academic knowledge, but also the acquaintance of good, even, life-long military friends. During my major commands of the Korean Marine Corps, I was very fortunate to work together with my classmates, including many US Marine Corps senior leaders from WESTPAC. Today, as a retired Marine, I am deeply grateful able to learn about many important security topics presented by these highly respected and professional intellectuals.

Discussion

Today’s topics and presentations have provided me many important learning points. Definitely Dr. Kim’s paper is one of those. Therefore I would like to deliver my comments from my point of view based on what I have learned today and my prior background. I hope you understand this. Dr. Kim has provided very professional information that is key to understanding major Korean decision-making agencies, actors and processes for international and national security. Particularly the area of analysis including actors, perceptions, institutional culture, information gathering, processing, and the deliberative policy process among different decision-making agencies must be highly valued. I would personally like to express my
appreciation for his presentation, which gives me a good knowledge in this area.

Those influencing factors that Dr. Kim mentioned include information available, perceptual orientation, bureaucratic interest and the interagency policy deliberation process for the institutional setting of decision-makers. I am very much in concurrence with his recommendation of research plans for long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

Instead of bringing up arguing points, I would rather like to make a couple of comments from my own perspective on this subject. While reviewing his research paper, one thing I found was that both the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments did put a lot of efforts into developing NSC functions either institutionally or organizationally by amending related laws and regulations. Another thing I found was, in spite of these efforts, the perceptual differences about contemporary security issues between the government and the public opinion have been much wider and even deeper than in the past. In other words, there’s a big gap between the Korean government and the Korean people in the interpretation of today’s security matters on the Korean peninsula. Why has this happened? My comments will mainly focus on this area.

A Brief Look at the Institutional Progress of the NSC Made by the Kim and Roh Administrations.

NSC Evolution

- One thing the Kim Dae Jung Government can be praised for may be the reorganization of the NSC by law. In May 1988, the Kim Dae Jung Government revised National Security Council Law 5,543 which sets the frame of the current NSC structure and functions.
- In fact, in 1953, we had the ‘National Defense Committee’ under the Presidential Directive to deal with national security matters. This Committee was composed of the President, Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense, Ministers of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Financial Affairs and Army, Navy and Air Force service chiefs. But this organization had become nominal since the cease fire.
- In Dec. 1963, under the 3d Republic, President Park Jung Hee established the National Security Council as an advisory agency for the president. However this organization was also to operate in name only through the 5th and the 6th Republic.
- Under the Kim Young Sam administration, the temporary
'Ministers' Conference for Security' was operated and chaired by the President with the Ministers of Reunification, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Director Security Planning, Director Emergency Planning and the Chairman of the JCS. They also operated the 'Ministers’ Conference for Reunification' for reunification matters. In 1994, these two conferences were integrated in order to respond to contemporary security and reunification problems together. In addition to this, there were several temporary committees chaired by the Prime Minister. This was not an institutionally and organizationally well organized process.

- There are several reasons why these NSC type organizations had become nominal in the past.
  a) National Security affairs were institutionally the matter of cabinet meetings and the NSC was only an advisory body in nature.
  b) The former presidents used the NSC as a symbolic advisory group, and did not empower it as a decision-making agency.
  c) The majority of the Security decision-making process was oriented to military affairs, so coordination among inter-governmental agencies was less frequent.
  d) Sometimes, those members who were representing each governmental organization were not free from bureaucratic and organizational interests.

- The Kim Dae Jung government intended to solve national security matters in a more comprehensive and integrated process of decision-making process at the trans-governmental level.

- There were seven members of the NSC, five members of the Executive Committee, five members of the Inter Working Group and four members of the Policy Analysis Group organized, and the NSC was chaired by the President. The Executive Committee was chaired by the MR and the other two working level committees were chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General of NSC.

- The rearrangement of NSC organization done by the KDJ Administration should be highly valued for establishing an institutional decision-making process on national security matters jointly.

- After this reorganization, the activities of the NSC under the Kim Dae Jung government were quite robust. During his term, there were 7 meetings with 32 agenda items at the NSC level and 172 meetings with 575 agenda items at the executive committee level.
• In spite of these positive activities under DJ administration, the two “western sea conflicts” between the south and North Korean patrol boats around Y-P Do should be reevaluated in terms of ‘crisis management.’ The South defeated the North in the first round of fighting in 1999. But in 2002 during the second round, the deliberate counter attack initiated by the North left the South Korean Navy with 6 KIAs and 19 WIAs including one boat sunk.
• The question is “Was the combat fighting inevitable?”
• This is a controversial issue although the KDJ government was praised highly for the victory of the ROK Navy.
• Under President Roh’s administration, the functions of the NSC have been even more focused and powerful. For example, under the NSC, the “Crisis Management Center” along with its ‘Integrated TOC for National Security’ was established.
• Also redefined were the ‘Types of national crisis’ and published “Crisis Management Manual” describing the coordinating authority, actions taken procedures, and other preventive and after action measures to be done by relevant branches of the government.
• In this respect, President Roh’s administration perhaps made good progress toward reacting to a national crisis. The Blue House working group is proud of reinforcing this sort of new working system and process particularly for natural disasters such as handling the forest fires within the DMZ in coordination of North Korean authority.
• In spite of this sort of success, as I mentioned earlier, the gap between the government and the people in recognizing the contemporary security issues has become wider and deeper. Many solutions produced by the national security agencies of this government were not widely accepted by the Korean people. In fact, the NSC even created serious controversies to burn and weaken domestic national power unnecessarily.

Why this happened?

The first thing I would like to mention is the President and his lieutenants as influencing actors. I am not arguing the existence of his close lieutenants at the inner policy ring. What I am concerned with is the existing negative perception and attitude of the Korean people toward this group. Ordinary Koreans are accustomed to the words: ‘Pro North Korea’, ‘wrong nationalism’ ‘anti-US’ ‘anti-military’ ‘too liberal’ ‘amateurism’ and ‘inexperienced’, “80s student movements graduates’ etc. These words are likely representing their Roh’s closest lieutenants in general through the Korean media.
It is believed that President Roh shares his command philosophy with these lieutenants who are able to influence directly or indirectly national security matters at the working level. But the question is whether they can handle national security problems with balanced perspectives. I personally doubt that the majority of Koreans share the same security values with these presidential power elites. When you recognize that your highest decision-maker has been taking his wheel on a different track of the security rail, it will be natural for ordinary Koreans to give low credit to his solutions for any security matter. This kind of perception may escalate to total distrust, particularly when a resolution of sensitive security policy has been done with uncertainty and inconsistency. I believe the majority of Koreans need badly to put their security problem solving process on the right track with the priority on realistic and practical approaches. It is also regrettable to see the internal dispute on security issues in Korea society. The division of South Korean society by ideological conflicts definitely favors the Kim Jong Il regime. He may enjoy today’s internal conflicts in the South. Thus, the majority of Koreans are concerned about their traditional security foundation becoming shaky. This makes Korean people uneasy and insecure, and has created a big gap in formulating a security consensus with their government.

In addition to this, we are aware of the leakage of power control in the Blue House. Earlier this year, a classified NSC document was privately released from a Blue House lieutenant to a ruling party (Uri) Congressman. This released document was used for attacking then newly elected MR Lee Jong Suk for his lack of duty performance while serving as the ‘Under Secretary-General of NSC.’ Reportedly, the fundamental reason for this incident was a power struggle within this new power elite group for dominating foreign affairs and national security initiatives. It was said that a systematic attack on Lee Jong Suk was launched by his old comrades because MR Lee “leaned too much” to the US side in negotiations, and he had “lost his original color.” Another classified document from the Blue House containing an ‘Evaluation of Yong San Base negotiation’ was released to a Labor Party congressman last year. Reportedly this document said that MOFAT tried to conduct Yong San Base negotiation with the premise of minimal intervention from the President and the Blue House NSC staff because they are all anti US. When you realize that your supreme command for your national security has been undisciplined and leaked many document, you may distrust that headquarters.
The composition of the NSC Staff under this administration has eliminated military security expertise. This makes many concerned that the president put the military security as a secondary priority. Although the security problem today should be understood in a manner of comprehensive spectrums and contexts, still military security must be the most important concern for one’s national security, particularly in a country like Korea. But technically speaking, it can be said that there’s no coordinating or adjusting of staff functions for military security affairs in the Blue House unless non military expertise handle this task instead. [So under the current situation, timely reports, accurate and sound advice or recommendations for military security affairs can hardly be expected unless the President himself calls the MND directly.]

Governmental resolutions or attitudes toward some sensitive contemporary security issues have created large conceptual caps between the Government and people. For example;

a. The institutional resolution of Military Reformation Plan 2020 creates many controversies in terms of time phased military reformation by law and a lack of careful evaluation of enemy threats in the future. This has made us lacking in knowledge about our future military posture in conjunction with the redeployment plan of USFK. The current Military Reformation Plan should be revised as a conditional phased plan and process.

b. By the same token, the transition of wartime operational command authority should be done carefully. Reportedly it is said that the president and the MND indicated this transition could be probably done in the next five years. This sort of comment will not help to stabilize security in Korea. Rather it has an unstable and negative impact on the internal security atmosphere with controversies regarding pros and cons.

c. The reaction by the government to the Pyung Taek US military Base problem damaged military dignity and lowered the morale of military officers. This made the Korean public disappointed and concerned about weakening our traditional alliance.

The attitude of the President on several security issues created serious leadership gaps between Roh and the Korean People. Under the current political culture, the “president-centric” decision-making process, the national security agencies have limited capability to propose pragmatic advice and recommendations to fill this kind of leadership gap.

• Most followers are not interested in the style of leadership of their leader. They simply want to believe the leader because they believe he or she is the one that they can put their trust and
confidence in as a reliable leader. In president Roh’s case, many media researches in Korea have revealed that he was not successful in earning credibility from the majority of the people. Here’s some examples recently revealed on the mass media concerning his leadership deficiency.

• President Roh reportedly said to one high figure who attended a National Economy Advisory Committee meeting at the Blue House recently: “I think it is solitude of those who have to lead the people, and stay one step ahead of them.” Then he added, “I have also suffered loss many times because I went one step ahead.” An editor of a journal criticized that: “Mr. Roh must be feeling exhausted as he has already managed to steer his troublesome ship, South Korea, through the danger of shipwrecks for the past three years...It does not seem appropriate for a national leader to reveal his inner feelings...It seems awkward for the president to rate himself as ‘a leader who goes ahead of time.’ It is even more difficult to sympathize with this belief that he had suffered a loss by taking that path...It may be difficult for a person who thinks of himself as someone who moves ahead of time to endure loneliness, but it is even more difficult for the people, who are dragged by a leader who insists he suffers by being ahead of his time.” If this is true, it surely means misery for the Korean people.

• His irresponsible nuclear talk creates serious arguing not only among Korean society member but in the international arena. At a recent meeting with the members of the Korean Veterans Association, President Roh allegedly defended North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. A recent report said that North’s nuclear weapons were being developed for defensive purpose although the Blue House insisted the president did not flatly say it that way. During his visit to LA in 2004, he claimed that there was some truth in North Korea’s argument that its nuclear program was for its protection. It’s hard to accept why he is speaking in this way. If nuclear weapons were developed for defensive purposes, what country would not develop them? When a South Korean President acknowledges North Korea’s right to nuclear weapons, obviously South Korea’s security will be shaken to the foundation. The question is, without any explanation of how South Korea security can be guaranteed, who is the President Roh representing?

• It is quite clear that the Roh administration’s policy on North Korea can simply be summed up as unconditionally covering for and defending North Korea. It is hard for many Koreans to accept.
• Many Koreans are concerned about weakening the relationship with our most important ally. It seems Roh tries to play a sort of zero sum game in his ROK-US-China relationships. Many Koreans are questioning why we have to weaken the traditional alliance with US in order to be closer to China. As long as this sort of zero sum game continues, Koreans think there’s no hope for stable and peaceful future of Korea.

• During his presidency, many a Korean has a question in their mind: Is he a problem solver or problem maker?

• This negative reaction was again epitomized by the result of this local elections of 31 May. The ruling party lost almost every race, meantime the Grand National Party won big. The people gave him “red cards.” It was the voters’ rebuke to the president’s record while in office. But President Roh’s interpretation of the result of the elections was completely different than that of the voters. He could not accept the results and intendsto continue the current policy. It seems the president has made a huge mistake.

• What it’s all about? The bottom line is that institutionally no matter how good you are, the actors are more important, in particular the president himself and the people who are operating the security agencies.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while I fully agree with the importance of the role of State institutions, Organizational Culture and policy perception for international Security policymaking, I would particularly like to emphasize the human resources who operate these security agencies for decision-making.

The systematic and scientific ability of long-term stability and peace can not be over emphasized. But what should be more important is the ability to handle contemporary security issues.

It seems the President has a very unique philosophy that what he is doing is not supposed to be judged by contemporary people but by long-term history—that means you are wrong and not matured to understand his philosophy of politics.

In this respect, I think earning the consensus from the people and sharing the vision together may be the most important and imminent task if Roh wishes to narrow the gap between himself and people.
Questions

1. President Roh’s term only has a year and a half remaining. It seems almost impossible for him to gather the attention and share a common consensus with the people in order to continue his policy. I just wonder how he will be able to run his presidency successfully for the remainder of his term. In this regard, what would be your recommendation to the key members of national security agencies under Mr. Roh’s administrations in support of their president faithfully and honestly?

2. What kind of security heritage can we expect from this administration? And what kind of security heritage will we deliver to our next generation?

3. Under the current Korean political culture, can we believe in a democratic way of open discussion to be raised between the president and the ministers of the national security agencies? If not, what would be your recommendation to reform this sort of decision-making process in the future?
Chapter 7

Compatibility and Consensus: A Conceptual Approach to Understanding China’s North Korea Policy

Paul Rexton Kan

It is common to hear many American scholars and policy makers express their desire for China to use its influence on North Korea to force Kim Jong-il to be less recalcitrant about his nation’s nuclear ambitions. Before departing on her first trip to Asia as US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice reiterated the sentiment by saying “What we have to do is to engage in policies that strengthen the chances that China will be a constructive force.” Secretary Rice seems to be echoing the position of President George W. Bush, “it’s particularly important to have China involved. China’s got a lot of influence in North Korea.” Americans, in particular, seem to hold the belief that the close but unequal relationship between China and North Korea is the key to working out a successful end state to the unfolding nuclear crisis on the peninsula.

Yet, throughout the numerous multilateral negotiations that have included China and China’s own independent shuttle diplomacy, North Korea has not been compliant and has in fact increased its belligerence at times. Some look at Chinese domestic politics for clues as to why China has been reluctant to push Kim Jong-il more forcefully, citing ideology and longstanding perceptions of North Korea as a “buffer.” Others have focused on China’s regional ambitions and global position to suggest that it faces a dilemma
between accepting a nuclear armed North Korea and precipitating a North Korean collapse. Missing is any discussion that bridges both domestic and international politics to understand China’s North Korean policy. Bridging both internal and external explanations may temper the expectations of American policy makers that China’s greater exertion of influence on North Korea will be more fruitful or even more likely. Such a tempering of expectation might lead to the pursuit of other as of yet unexplored policy alternatives for the United States and others in the region. This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding Chinese international behavior and its relationship with the North Korean regime by examining the concept of feasibility.

China’s foreign policy behavior must be measured against the concept of feasibility. What is a feasible policy for China to adopt vis-à-vis North Korea given domestic political pressures within Chinese society and the nature of global politics? The two concepts that comprise an answer to this type of foreign policy question are compatibility and consensus. “[T]he concept of compatibility is intended to assess the degrees of feasibility of various foreign policy goals given the strictures and opportunities of the international system...[while] the concept of consensus assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and means of foreign policy on the domestic political scene.” (emphasis in the original). Compatibility is a way to understand the feasibility of a country’s foreign policy goal given the prevailing conditions of the international system whereas consensus is a measure of the agreement on policy goals among the important elements of a nation’s internal decision making process. Using the concepts of compatibility and consensus lends greater understanding to China’s behavior towards North Korea and reveals the genuine limits of influence on the reclusive regime. When examining Chinese foreign policy, outside scholars and policy makers should be aware that these concepts must be viewed as being deeply steeped in China’s unique history and culture.

6. Ibid.
History and Culture and Their Effects on the New Generation of PRC Leadership

Surrounding the discussion of compatibility and consensus is the selection of China’s new leaders who assumed power in 2002 just as the North Korean nuclear crisis began to unfold. Understanding the historical and cultural nuances that are a part of contemporary Chinese decision making provides the context that surrounds China’s relationship with North Korea.

The new leadership is often referred to as the “fourth generation” of leaders since they are the fourth cohort to take power since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Unlike the previous three generations of leaders, this cohort did not play a first hand role in Mao’s revolutionary struggle or in building the party and political institutions of modern China. In many ways, they are not imbued with the same sense of legitimacy by the Chinese people since they are not viewed as having contributed or sacrificed as much as the old vanguard of leaders before them. Therefore the leadership will have to work harder to endear themselves to the Chinese people by paying greater attention to economic prosperity and national prestige.

The educational background of these leaders of the Standing Committee of the Politiburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also reflects characteristics common to members of an entire generation of Mainland Chinese. All of China’s nine new leaders are engineers by training. None of them has a law degree, medical degree or even a bachelor’s degree in any of the liberal arts. None of them studied outside of China, except Jia Qinglin who earned a master’s in engineering from an East German university. Like many their age, they all went to school during the Cultural Revolution in China when no one was allowed to study anything except the hard sciences.

From the late sixties to the mid-seventies, Mao Zedong and many in the leadership of the CCP feared that learning anything about the outside world or knowing anything about classical China stood in the way of perfecting communism in China. Neighbor turned against neighbor, family member against family member and many were rounded up, sent to labor camps or to the countryside or simply

executed for being “too bourgeois”. Museums were looted and destroyed, schools and public institutions were purged of “ideological contamination”. It was a time of national turmoil that many Chinese adults today only speak about in hushed tones. The impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution can still be felt in Chinese society and politics.

As a result, the present leadership of China is likely to be influenced by these events and is likely to stress internal stability to avoid similar national turmoil akin to the Cultural Revolution as the key to China’s emergence as a world power. To create internal stability, they believe that economic prosperity, rather than political openness, is the best route. To maintain the economic prosperity that was set in motion by the prior generation of leaders, they are increasingly aware of how their fortunes are tied to relations with other nations.

This awareness, however, is still tempered by the collective historical memory of the Chinese people. For the Chinese, the “century of humiliation” when outside powers began to carve up Chinese territory in the nineteenth century is approaching an end. With the return of Chinese territory after World War Two and the return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty in the nineties, China’s leaders have drawn the lesson that only their burgeoning power allowed such events to transpire. The end of the century of humiliation is a source of national prestige for both the leadership and the citizenry of the PRC. More significantly, the end of century of humiliation has only confirmed the Chinese leadership’s belief that economic backwardness invites foreign invasion, further strengthening their belief in the primacy of economic development.

Such economic development can only be sustained if China does not provoke a confrontation or engage in conflict with other major powers or its neighbors. As the previous leadership was preparing to leave power, they dubbed this policy “China’s peaceful rise” meaning that China should cultivate positive relations with other nations and avoid direct challenges of other previous rising powers in history.⁹ China’s economic and political interests can only be compatible with a stable environment in Asia that allows the leadership to focus on domestic concerns.¹⁰

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This generation of leadership has now been given caretaker responsibilities of consolidating the benefits accrued from the end of the century of humiliation and continuing the peaceful rise policy. In order to maintain "face", this leadership must continue the policies of the previous leadership who brought them up into the ruling party elite. Failing to maintain the positive trends would mean losing face, jeopardizing their standing in the Communist Party and even in China’s national collective history. Without the legitimacy that was bestowed upon previous generations of leadership, the current leadership is particularly sensitive to challenges to national prestige that come from external powers and events. To prevent the loss of face, the CCP's policy towards North Korea has in many instances been eclipsed by other priorities that figure more prominently into the caretaker responsibilities of the current leadership.

Compatibility Confounded

The feasibility of China adopting a bolder policy towards North Korea has been confounded by a number of events related to issues of national prestige. Taiwan, in particular, resonates more strongly with the caretaker notions of the Chinese leadership than bold initiatives toward North Korea. The caretaker responsibilities extend to China's desire to reunify with Taiwan. Taiwan is seen as the final part of Chinese territory that is being separated by foreigners through support from the US and Japan--the century of humiliation cannot formally end if Taiwan remains beyond Chinese sovereignty. The compatibility of a more forceful North Korean policy with China's national aspirations has been continually confounded by larger national interests associated with Taiwan.

Although the SARS epidemic was viewed largely as a domestic problem in China, it also had far reaching effects on China-Taiwan relations. In its belief that Taiwan is pursuing a policy of "creeping independence", the Chinese leadership faced a SARS related issue that had leapt to the forefront of political debate on Taiwan. April 2003 proved to be a crucial month. In April, the ruling party of Taiwan, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), put forth a proposal on holding political referendum on the island. The Chinese government has maintained that holding any such referendum would put in place a framework by which Taiwan could declare independence, forcing the Mainland to respond, perhaps militarily. In May 2003, China blocked SARS-stricken Taiwan's efforts to attain observer status in
In response, Taiwan’s President Chen Shuibian sought a referendum on the island to consider WHO membership—again stoking fears in China that Taiwan was seeking formal independence. China, however, was able to use the issue of a referendum on Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its relations with the US. The Bush Administration has stressed that multiparty talks are the proper setting for any negotiations with North Korea and that China should take a more active role in settling the crisis. China agreed to pressure North Korea into abandoning its desire for bilateral talks if the US would pressure Taiwan’s leadership to withdraw its referendum. The US again reiterated its position that no side should unilaterally alter the status quo.

In 2005, North Korea publicly declared its possession of nuclear weapons. China seemed unfazed by such a bold declaration. Once again, the Chinese leadership was occupied with Taiwan. Contemporaneously, China’s National People’s Congress was passing legislation authorizing the use of force if Taiwan declares independence. This year, Hu Jintao hosted Kim Jong-il for a nine-day state visit to China. The Chinese hoped to demonstrate how economic reforms could transform North Korea into a more prosperous nation. Shortly thereafter Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian formally dissolved the National Unification Council, the body formally established to seek ways to reunify with the Mainland. This once again signaled Taiwan’s seeming willingness to seek independence and was done just as North Korea was demonstrating greater willingness to return to the Six Party Talks. The international situation that resonated with China’s foreign policy priorities did not lend itself to a feasible policy that would have altered China’s behavior towards North Korea.

Obstacles to Developing Consensus

Developing consensus within China’s ruling elite to tackle international crises is extremely difficult, which also hampers the feasibility of any dramatic policy change towards North Korea. The People’s Republic of China has some political and institutional inadequacies in the handling of governmental transitions as well as dealing with international crises. Since China has been a one party

state for over fifty years, bureaucratic growth has increased over the years. A further complication is the lack of transparency in the process of leadership transition; this is a hallmark of Communist Party rule. One reason the Chinese were slow to react sooner to the unfolding nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was due to the leadership transition. Although the decisions on the leadership succession were made the year before, such political and party transitions since the Revolution have typically involved some level of upheaval and violence. During the latest transition there was a good deal of debate as to whether then President Jiang Zemin would stay on for an extra term beyond what the Chinese constitution stipulates. In fact, the party meeting last year was held months later than regularly scheduled due to this debate. Much of the attention of the Chinese leadership was directed to internal party maneuvering than to foreign policy concerns.

However, even with the official installation of China’s new leaders at the Party Congress in March 2003, it is still not entirely clear who sets the foreign policy agenda. The convoluted structure of state power in China creates a high degree of ambiguity. For example the new president, Hu Jintao was not vested with formal control of the military. In fact, the former president, Jiang Zemin is the chair of Central Military Commission, the main organ that controls the People’s Liberation Army. In essence, the former president is still the commander in chief. Also, after the party congress, the relationship between the current and former president is still unclear. When both leaders have met foreign leaders on the same day, the People’s Daily newspaper has published their pictures in identical size and side by side as if they are co-leaders.

Beyond the uneven and uncertain leadership transition, the People’s Republic of China continues to have weak institutions to handle international crises. There is no equivalent to an American National Security Council that has a permanent composition or a formal process of consultation. As a result, there continues to be a heavy reliance by Chinese leaders on private, extra-constitutional networks for sources of information and intelligence. Responding with a coherent, unified stance beyond continued rhetorical support

of their communist ally, North Korea, would have required a kind of consensus among the new leadership that was not possible during the transition period and a fixed institutional apparatus to handle any new initiatives beyond holding talks between the US and North Korea.

The Chinese leadership was not completely distracted from the crisis. In fact, the seriousness of the North Korean situation began to dawn on the Chinese when Beijing hosted and participated in three-way talks with North Korea and the US from 23-25 April 2003. At one of the meetings, a North Korean diplomat brazenly claimed that they possess nuclear weapons, might conduct a “physical demonstration” and might sell nuclear material to whomever would pay.\(^6\) This created alarm and caused a loss of “face” in the high levels of the China’s leadership which had vouched for North Korea’s cooperativeness to the American participants. Such a threat to sell nuclear materials might mean that North Korea would be willing to negotiate a deal with one of China’s restless minority populations who are seeking independence. In addition, the Chinese leaders became more acutely aware of how proliferation likely would not stop with Pyongyang, but would spread to South Korea, then possibly Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan.\(^7\) Such possibilities raised the stakes considerably for Beijing.

However, the ramifications of the SARS outbreak in China put the North Korean issue on the back burner. With a leadership seeing internal stability as paramount, the SARS epidemic represented the leadership’s first domestic crisis and demonstrated its preoccupation with stability. As newly selected prime minister Wen Jiabao said during the early days of the outbreak, “SARS directly affects the overall situation of reform, development and stability”.\(^8\) The outbreak in April occurred at the same time as the three-party talks with China, North Korea and the US. Some large moves such as closing schools, equipping hospitals and hosting investigators from the World Health Organization (WHO) and overseas epidemiological experts were made to contain the spread of the epidemic. Even potentially more troubling to the Chinese leadership was ordinary Chinese citizens beginning to demand more information and greater transparency from the government to protect themselves from exposure to the virus.

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Joseph Fewsmith, op. cit., p. 251.
The demands for more openness and the initial misstatements by Chinese officials culminated in the firings of the Zhang Wenkang, Minister of Health and Meng Xuenong, the Mayor of Beijing. On May 8, 2003 the Xinhua News Agency reported that another 120 officials had also been fired. As a result, some in the CCP feared that SARS would be the equivalent to a “Chinese Chernobyl” forcing greater political openness and eventually leading to the demise of one party rule in China. Therefore, containing the spread of the virus and preventing any social upheaval quickly took precedence over the North Korean issue.

Political issues in Hong Kong also rose to the forefront of the domestic political agenda with the potential of complicating internal stability. Hong Kong is the showcase for the experiment in “One Country, Two Systems” but began to display political fissures that worried the leadership. Only July 1, 2003, 500,000 people turned out for a peaceful demonstration. It was the largest gathering of Chinese citizens since Tiananmen Square in 1989. The target of the protestors was the imminent passage of national security bill that defined and imposed heavy penalties for treason, secession, subversion and the theft of state secrets. Such passage of bill was seen as undercutting the Basic Law of Hong Kong that granted citizens of the former British colony certain human rights guarantees. The proposed legislation seemed to be proof of Beijing’s heavy hand in Hong Kong’s political life, something that the Hong Kong leadership promised to avoid when the territory returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

Although this bill was defeated, the demonstration revealed the weakness of Beijing’s selected leader of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa. Great attention by the Chinese leadership was paid to demonstrating its continued support of his leadership in Hong Kong. In fact, he was summoned to Beijing and was greeted warmly in public by the newly elected president and prime minister.19 Rather than exclusively focusing on the North Korean issue during the summer of 2003, the Chinese leadership was designing a strategy to deal with growing demands of direct elections in Hong Kong. In fact, the Hong Kong demonstrations emboldened the leaders of Taiwan who pointed to them as an example of the failure of the one country, two systems formula, thereby placing additional stress on the CCP’s other national goals. Eventually in March 2005, Tung Chee-hwa stepped down as Hong Kong’s leader citing health concerns. This presented

the Chinese leadership with the additional responsibility to shore up its legitimacy in Hong Kong.

A seeming breakthrough occurred in September 2005. The Six Party talks produced a communiqué which North Korea made commitments to ending its nuclear weapons program in exchange for diplomatic, security and economic guarantees. The accord was a very fragile, since its wording left most of the delicate issues of timing, inspections and aid for future negotiations. Yet, shortly afterwards, North Korea began to dispute the American interpretation of the agreement and said that it would give up its program once the guarantees were put into place first. Hu Jintao once again tried to pressure Kim Jong-il by paying a state visit to North Korea in October. While there, President Hu was only given a promise by Kim to continue to work through the Six Party framework.20

Rather than pressing forward on North Korea, the Chinese leadership was presented with another domestic crisis. In November 2005, a chemical plant in the city of Jilin exploded, contaminating the Songhua River. The toxic spill forced the shutting of water taps to four million residents of the downstream city of Harbin. Initially, local officials dismissed the event and tried to cover it up. Enterprising journalists and grassroots environmental activists began to challenge the government’s version of events. Many journalists even defied Communist Party orders to refrain from printing stories about the accident for fear of sparking an uprising. The Chinese leadership was forced to act quickly to bring relief to the residents of Harbin and mitigate the damage to its legitimacy.

Throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis, domestic priorities intruded upon the attention of the Chinese leadership. From an awkward leadership transition to the SARS debacle, from political tensions in Hong Kong to the bumbled response to the Jilin chemical spill, the Chinese government was occupied with issues that they believed were more fundamental to its survival than North Korea’s misbehavior. In short, the domestic arena did not present the leadership with the conditions for alternative feasible strategy to take with North Korea.


122
The Feasibility of China's North Korean Policy

It has been infeasible for China to adopt a bolder policy towards North Korea given the demands of compatibility and consensus that are required for significant foreign policy actions. The constraints and strictures of the international system have required China to focus more on its peaceful rise as a power and its desire to reclaim control over Taiwan rather than to alter its behavior towards North Korea in any substantial way. Domestic pressures have likewise been of higher priority; coinciding with the ambiguity and seeming disarray during the leadership transition, was the outbreak of SARS on the Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong. These elements all combined to stymie the development of feasibility of a foreign policy agenda that would have given a higher priority to the North Korean issue.

As such, the leadership of the PRC has demonstrated a risk averse nature seeing domestic and regional stability as critical for its peaceful rise as a great power. This risk averse nature is also a result of the leadership’s pinning its hopes on generating economic growth to gain legitimacy among the Chinese people.

When crafting a feasible North Korean policy the Chinese leadership has operated under twin fears related to North Korea. The first fear is of a North Korean political implosion creating wave of refugees fleeing into China. The result would be the threat of social instability within China that would jeopardize economic prosperity, thereby undermining what little legitimacy the current leadership enjoys. The other fear is of a reunified peninsula with the continued presence of US troops in a country at the frontyard of China. These forces would be able to more quickly insert themselves in any conflict across the Taiwan Strait, thereby destroying China’s growing national prestige. The common characteristic of these fears is that they are not immediate and the leadership seems to be convinced that either possibility is in the distant future therefore more immediate concerns of leadership transition and consolidation, social stability, and long range political goals take precedence. The sum total of all of these factors in the analysis of compatibility and consensus equals the only feasible Chinese foreign policy stance toward North Korea—continuing the strategy of gentle persuasion of Kim Jong-il.

This strategy of gentle persuasion means coaxing North Korea to participate in the Six Party Talks in hopes of sparking a diplomatic breakthrough as well as offering more economic incentives to Kim
Jong-il in hopes of creating a greater willingness to disarm. During Hu's visit to North Korea last year, it was rumored that he promised another $2 billion in aid and when Kim visited China, he toured one of China's most successful cities, Shenzhen, to witness the benefits that economic reforms could bring.\textsuperscript{21} China is also undertaking a number of infrastructure projects in and around North Korea and 150 new Chinese firms have opened since 2003.\textsuperscript{22}

The immediate payoff from this strategy has been small—there have been no productive talks since September of last year. Additionally, the only concession China has extracted from this strategy is a promise by Kim Jong-il during his Chinese visit to "overcome the present difficulties encountered by the six party talks."\textsuperscript{23}

**Concluding Reflections**

The Chinese leadership's feasible policy of maintaining the status-quo on the peninsula rather than being able to adopt a policy along the lines of US desires did not mean that the leadership completely ignored the unfolding nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula and did nothing to pressure the regime of Kim Jong-il to be more forthcoming. In fact, China did interrupt the flow of oil to North Korea to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the provocations of the Kim Jong-il regime. The current debate in Chinese political circles is what to do about North Korea and proliferation in the region.\textsuperscript{24} Clearly any escalation of the crisis will divert attention away from domestic concerns about economic growth that leadership believes undergirds social stability. A ratcheting up of the crisis will also further distract the leadership from addressing more pressing domestic and international issues.

Moreover, we may have already seen the extent of a feasible policy for China regarding North Korea with the holding of numerous rounds of multi-party talks in Beijing. As North Korea continually sought bilateral talks with the US, the Chinese have been able to persuade North Korea into accepting a multilateral forum to talk

\textsuperscript{21} "A Frustrating Game of Carrots and Sticks", *The Economist*, February 11-17, 2006, 39-40.
\textsuperscript{22} "China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?" International Crisis Group, 1 February 2006.
with the US about its interests and intentions. If China places too much pressure on North Korea in the form of sanctions and the restriction of aid, the first fear of national implosion becomes a greater potential. In fact, siding too closely with the United States would only stoke the paranoia and militancy of the North Korean regime, making a conflict with the US more likely and increasing the Chinese fear that the reunification of the peninsula occur under terms unfavorable to Beijing.

These fears comprise the central reason that China has been unwilling to join the US in raising the North Korean situation to the level of the United Nations Security Council fearing that any resolution that imposed sanctions would lead to the further collapse of the North Korean economy with adverse effects for China.\(^{25}\) North Korea is heavily dependent on Chinese help; North Korea receives as much aid and assistance from China as one of China's southeastern provinces.\(^{26}\) Yet this aid has not been enough to prevent North Koreans from illegally crossing the border into China to seek food and work. Since the crisis has unfolded, several thousand troops from China's People's Liberation Army have been sent to the border to enforce law and order in an area that contains two million ethnic Koreans including an estimated 10,000 to 100,000 migrants at any given time.

As a result of these twin fears and the lack of compatibility and consensus, the Chinese leadership seems to be committed to the long-term survival of the North Korean government. However, China's leadership may play a more powerful role if it can be convinced that North Korea's nuclear ambitions are actually beginning to more immediately threaten China's peaceful rise and economic prosperity. More specifically, if the crisis grows to proportions that threaten internal stability as defined by the current group of Chinese leaders, there could be more flexibility in China's position. Policy makers in the US and South Korea should demonstrate the damage to the Chinese economy that a nuclear North Korea would have. Such a serious security situation in the region will certainly affect the level of foreign direct investment that China depends on for its economic prosperity. There is still some room for China to maneuver in terms of the feasibility of slightly altering its current policy. However, there is not as much room as

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many Americans believe and China is not likely to adopt a tougher policy along the lines desired by American officials.

The level of Chinese investment in North Korea, while looked at circumspectly by the US and Japan, may be part of a longer view adopted by the current Chinese leadership. A long term strategy may seek to integrate North Korea more completely into Chinese economy and thereby ensuring it not only remains China friendly (whatever happens on the peninsula), but also making North Korea more vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure. Regardless, this long-term strategy is still likely to bedevil American policy makers and political leaders.

The North Korean nuclear standoff is a serious situation that is occurring at a serious time for the Chinese leadership. International issues and domestic concerns are complicating what is already an awkward decision-making apparatus in China. To a certain degree, the way in which the current leadership has handled multiple domestic and international crises demonstrates a drifting and insecure ruling elite. Trapped in a caretaker role and lacking the legitimacy of the modern China’s founders, the Chinese Communist Party is inevitably perplexed by what to do with North Korea. Given the constraints of compatibility and consensus, for China to adopt a bolder policy or to even place North Korea higher on its agenda would be simply infeasible to do so at this time.
Chapter 8

Russia’s Role in the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Seung-Ho Joo

As a major power bordering on the Korean peninsula, Russia has inherent, keen interest in Korea’s future. After a decade of estrangement, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) achieved rapprochement in 2000. Since then, the two states re-established bilateral relations in various areas. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has pushed for numerous initiatives in the Korean peninsula in a bid to safeguard its security and economic interests and enhance its prestige. At the six-party talks, Russia has sought to resolve North Korea’s nuclear crisis peacefully. At the end of the 4th round of the six-party talks in September 2005, the parties reached the first significant agreement in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear programs in exchange for economic, security, and political rewards. The talks soon stalled as North Korea insisted on U.S. lifting economic sanctions as a precondition for returning to the negotiating table. As a result, tensions in Korea are unabated and peace on the Korean remains precarious.

This chapter raises the following questions and seeks to answer them: What are Russian interests in Korea? How Russian policies vis-à-vis the two Koreas evolved in the post-Cold War era? What are Russian attitudes toward Korean unification? And what is Russian role in the North Korean nuclear crisis?

I. Russian Interests in Korea

Russia’s role in Korea’s future will largely be determined by Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula. Russia’s interests in Korea relate to its geo-strategic importance and its value as an economic partner. It is, however, noteworthy that Korea in its own right has never taken up a central position in Russian foreign policy
considerations, and Russia’s Korea policy was mostly a by-product of Russian relations with other major powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and the U.S.). To put it differently, Russian policy toward the Korean peninsula was derivative in nature. Russian relations with the two Koreas were important primarily because of their effect on its relations with major powers. It is therefore important to examine Russian interests in Korea in the broad context of Russia’s overall policy goals and orientations as well as its regional commitments and concerns in Northeast Asia.

Geo-strategic Interest

Korea’s geo-strategic importance indeed is the oldest and most enduring factor affecting Russia’s Korea policy. Imperial Russia’s interest in Korea derived from Korea’s geo-strategic importance. Russia’s primary goal in East Asia in the late nineteenth century was to consolidate the newly acquired territory in the Far East. By the late nineteenth century, Russia acquired a vast territory in the Far East by a series of unequal treaties with China. In order to secure this newly acquired territory, Russia established de facto control of Manchuria. In order to secure Manchuria, Russia in turn sought a dominant power position in Korea. After Korea was forced to open its door to Japan in 1879, Russia established a diplomatic relationship with Korea in 1884 and a Russian diplomatic mission opened in Seoul in 1885. Against this backdrop, Russia’s political objectives in Korea came to be defined. Tsarist Russia came to be involved in Korea from a preventive point of view – Korea must not become a source of threat to Manchuria. Thus, Russia’s political aim in Korea from 1895-1904, when Russo-Japanese competition over Korea intensified, was not so much the attainment of an exclusively superior position for itself as to deny military advantage to Japan.

After World War II, the Soviet Union returned to the Korean peninsula and became deeply involved in Korean affairs in the atmosphere of the Cold War, and Korea’s geo-strategic importance again was the prime motivator. The geo-strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the security of the Soviet Far East led the Soviet Union to prevent any of the major powers in the region from gaining dominant influence in the Korean peninsula and to maintain friendly ties with North Korea. Strategically, the importance of

Korea lies in the fact that the port of Vladivostok is situated 70 miles from the Korean border and a Great Power in control of Korea would be in a position to easily attack this key base. The Soviets were interested primarily in the creation of a “friendly” state in Korea. With the onset of the Cold War, two Korean states on the Korean peninsula became a reality, and the DPRK constituted part of the Soviet Union’s outer empire and served as a buffer for the Soviet Union, first against a potential U.S.-Japanese threat and later against China.

In Putin’s Northeast Asia policy, Korea takes up a special place due to its geo-strategic location. Russian interest vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula may be summarized as follows: Russia is opposed to any power dominating the Korean peninsula; Since Korea is geo-strategically important to the Russian Far East, Russia considers Korea’s domination by one alien power a direct and grave threat to its security; Russia will thus continue to endeavour to minimize U.S., Chinese, or Japanese influence over the Korean peninsula; Russia at the same time seeks to enhance its influence over Korean issues. In this context, Russia’s new Foreign Policy concept adapted in April 2000 made a special mention of the Korean peninsula, expressing Russia’s intention to play an important role in the Korean peace process and to seek balanced relations with the two Koreas.

Economic Interest

In the last years of the Soviet empire, Soviet Russia turned to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) for economic cooperation and aid. In the post-Soviet era, Russia continues to look to the Korean peninsula as a major economic partner. Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiatives toward South Korea were driven primarily by economic


considerations. With Seoul’s help, he hoped to achieve overall economic development in the Far East by integrating the Soviet economy into the rapidly developing Asia Pacific community. Gorbachev intended to channel South Korea’s investment to increase consumer goods production, create a social-economic infrastructure, and develop natural resources in the Far East.

Economic considerations also drove Yeltsin’s Korea policy. Yeltsin focused on domestic economic development in his dealings with South Korea. Yeltsin focused on economic development of Siberia and the Far East, believing that they held the key to the success of Russia’s overall economic development. The Russian Far East has a special meaning in Putin’s foreign policy due to its critical location (link between East Asia and Europe) and abundant resources (gas and oil). Like his predecessors, Putin believes that development of the Russian Far East and Russia’s integration into the economic and security structures of the Asia-Pacific will provide the momentum for Russia’s overall economic development and guarantee Russia’s security in the region.

II. Russia between the Two Koreas

During the Cold War, Communist ideology bound Moscow and Pyongyang together. Gorbachev’s Soviet Union broke with this traditional policy when it approached and normalized its relations with South Korea over North Korea’s vehement protests. Yeltsin’s Russia cultivated friendly ties with Seoul and distanced itself from Communist North Korea. Yeltsin was too repulsed by the Stalinist Pyongyang regime to have normal ties with it. Yeltsin’s anti-Communist attitudes along with his idealistic expectations from South Korea led to Russia’s one-sided policy in favor of Seoul.

Under Putin, Russia’s Korea policy is finally rid of idealistic, naïve tendencies. Russia’s Korea policy is now predicated upon the principles of realism, pragmatism, and balanced relations with the two Koreas. In the mid-1990s, Russian leaders realized that the U.S. was expanding its influence over the entire Korean peninsula at the expense of Russia’s legitimate security interests and that Russia was no longer considered a major player in Korean affairs because it lost

5. For Gorbachev’s Korea policy, see Seung-Ho Joo, Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, 1985-1991 (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellon, 2000).
influence over North Korea. Russian leaders calculated that Russia could regain its lost influence on the Korean peninsula by restoring friendly ties with Pyongyang while maintaining cooperative ties with Seoul. From 1996 Russia sought to re-establish friendly ties with North Korea for political, security, and economic reasons, but bilateral normalization occurred only after Putin became the new Russian leader in 2000.

**Rapprochement with North Korea**

In 2000, Russia restored normal relationship with North Korea and embarked on diplomatic initiatives on the Korean question. DPRK-Russian rapprochement resulted when Putin’s pragmatism intersected with Kim Jong-il’s new diplomatic manoeuvres. Putin’s unilateral diplomatic gestures toward Kim Jong-il alone would not have been sufficient. Since then, Moscow and Pyongyang have re-established cordial relationship and have been forging cooperative ties in various areas. In 2000, the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between Russia and the DPRK was signed and went into effect. The new treaty, which was to replace the 1961 alliance treaty, provided the legal ground for bilateral relations. The new treaty does not include an automatic military intervention clause, nor does it include support for DPRK’s confederate unification formula. Instead, it contains the “mutual contact” clause. By including this clause, Russia wanted to increase its influence over North Korea without directly jeopardizing its security. By leaving the interpretation of this clause open, Russia would retain the right to intervene (or not to intervene) militarily or otherwise in a conflict situation on the Korean peninsula. Russia’s intervention would depend on its own interpretation of the clause in a specific conflict situation.

In July 2000, Putin visited Pyongyang for summit talks with Kim Jong-il. During Putin’s Pyongyang trip, the DPRK and Russia signed

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8. The Russo-Vietnamese friendship treaty also contains a similar clause that calls for ‘mutual contact’ in case of a security crisis. Russia initially proposed to the ROK that their basic treaty include a similar clause, but dropped the demand after the ROK opposed it.
9. In January 1993, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kunadze unilaterally notified North Koreans that Russia would assist North Korea militarily only when the latter was the victim of an unprovoked attack. The new treaty would allow Russia even more latitude than the proposed reinterpretation of the old treaty in its intervention in Korean affairs.
10. None of the Soviet or Russian leaders had ever visited North Korea before Putin.
the 11-point joint declaration. Putin’s Pyongyang trip amply demonstrated Russia’s eagerness to become an important player on the Korean peninsula. This trip was significant in three ways. First, it symbolized the beginning of a new era in Moscow-Pyongyang relations as normal neighbours. His visit marked the formal closure of uncomfortable relations and the onset of a new relationship. This trip sent a clear message that Russia wished to forge new ties with North Korea from a clean slate. Second, it was part of Russia’s diplomatic strategy designed to enhance its influence and prestige in Korea and Northeast Asia. Following the July summit, Russia has sought with renewed energy and persistence to cultivate its image as an honest broker (or facilitator) for peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. Third, Putin used the occasion to push for economic cooperation with the two Koreas in both bilateral and multilateral settings. During this trip, Putin expressed a strong interest in trilateral economic cooperation with both Koreas. He stated that Russia was ready to modernize DPRK plants and power stations with ROK’s capital. He also discussed multilateral economic projects, including the proposal to link the inter-Korean railway to the Trans-Siberian railroad.

Kim Jong-il held his second summit meeting with Putin in Moscow during his 24-day journey (July 26–August 18, 2001) to Russia. Russia became the second country Kim visited in the capacity of North Korean leader. Moscow and Pyongyang laid a legal groundwork for the development of bilateral relations by signing agreements on a wide range of bilateral issues. The summit talks certainly helped Moscow and Pyongyang forge new, cooperative ties but did not result in any breakthroughs or surprises. In 2002, Kim Jong-il frequently met in Pyongyang with representatives of the Russian leadership. He met twice with the Far Eastern Federal District Konstantin Pulikovski, received St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, and frequently met with Russian Ambassador to North Korea Andrei Karpov. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

11. For the full text of the joint declaration, see KCNA (Pyongyang), July 20, 2000.  
13. Kim Jong-il traveled to China in May 2000, which marked his first trip abroad after assuming power. The last time Kim visited Russia was in 1959 when he accompanied his father, Kim Il-sung, as a teenager.  
visited Pyongyang in July and held talks with Kim Jong-il. The frequent visits were a good indication that bilateral relations were improving rapidly in the wake of Putin-Kim Jong-il summit meetings.

Kim Jong-il made an unofficial visit to the Russian Far East on August 20-24, 2002. His itinerary included Komsomolsk na Amure, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. Towards the end of his trip, Kim held talks with Putin in Vladivostok. The main focus of the talks was the project of linking the trans-Korean railway to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway, and the two leaders reconfirmed their agreement to push for the railroad project. The main reason for this four-day trip was for Kim Jong-il to observe with his own eyes economic reform policies being implemented in the Russian Far East and to promote cooperation between the Russian Far East and North Korea.

**Forging a Partnership with South Korea**

Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy calls for continuing cooperative ties with South Korea. In September 2000, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Putin met on the sidelines of the UN Millennium Summit. Economic cooperation and inter-Korean relations were on top of the agenda. They agreed that improved inter-Korean relations would provide more opportunities for economic cooperation between North and South Korea, and Russia. Putin welcomed reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and pledged Russia’s support for the Korean peace process.

Putin made his first visit to Seoul on February 26-28, 2001. At the summit meeting, President Kim Dae-jung’s primary concern was to elicit Russia’s support for his sunshine policy toward North Korea, whereas Putin’s main goal was to enlist South Korea in crusade against the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the summit, Putin pledged to make concerted efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear and missile issues and expressed Moscow’s “readiness and willingness to continuously contribute to easing tension and securing peace on the Korean peninsula.” In return, Kim Dae-jung sided with Russia’s position regarding NMD when he agreed that “the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability and an
important foundation for international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”

The joint communiqué did not mention NMD per se, but clearly indicated Seoul’s opposition to the plan. Seoul does not support NMD because it may escalate an arms race in Northeast Asia and deteriorate inter-Korean relations. Kim Dae-jung’s foreign policies hinge on the “sunshine policy” and he does not want to jeopardize improved inter-Korean ties over NMD issue. Seoul’s support for NMD, which is designed to contain nuclear threats from North Korea and other rogue states, would certainly invoke Pyongyang’s anger and thus undermine Kim’s sunshine policy. In this context, ROK’s support for the ABM treaty is not so much Russia’s diplomatic victory over the U.S. as a reflection of shared interests of the ROK and Russia.

President Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Dae-jung’s successor, held a summit meeting with Putin in September 2004. This time, the two countries used the term “mutually trustworthy comprehensive partnership” to characterize their relationship and agreed on the action plan which called for boosting joint economic cooperation, considering a visa exemption agreement, and pursuing joint development of oil and natural gas fields. The two sides also agreed to cooperate in building a technology park in Russia and consult further on a project to link the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Trans-Korean Railway. Roh and Putin held two additional meetings in 2005 (May 2005, November 2005) and reconfirmed their pledge to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership.

Russia is even-handed politically between the two Korean states. Russia, however, is inevitably leaning toward South Korea in all other areas. In comparison, South Korea is by far a more important and beneficial partner for Russia in military, economic, and scientific-technological fields. Trade turnover between the ROK and Russia in

18. During his talks with President Bush in March 2001, Kim Dae-Jung stated that the joint communiqué should not be interpreted as Seoul’s opposition to NMD. Seoul has been deliberately ambivalent toward NMD and maintained that is still reviewing its position on the issue. See Don Kirk, ‘Now Pulls Back from Russia on Missile Shield’, New York Times, March 2, 2001, p. 6.
2004 amounted to $6.1 billion,\textsuperscript{21} whereas trade turnover between the DPRK and Russia in the same year reached $146 million.\textsuperscript{22} During Putin's Seoul visit in May 2001, the ROK and Russia signed a memorandum of intentions that included the delivery of Russian military hardware worth a total of 534 million to Seoul.\textsuperscript{23} In December 2002, the ROK agreed to accept $534 million-worth of Russian weaponry as part of Moscow's loan repayment plan. The agreement stipulates that the ROK will purchase by 2006 six types of Russian weapons, including the METIS-M antitank guided missiles, BMP-3 armoured vehicles, T-80U tanks, MURENA air cushion landing boats, IL-103 airplanes for training and Ka-32A search helicopters.\textsuperscript{24} ROK-Russian cooperation in the fields of aerospace, military technology and scientific research deepens.

III. Russian Attitudes on Korean Unification

During the Cold War years, Moscow's main concern was stability and security in the Far East, and therefore preferred the status quo in Korea to a unified Korea which might disrupt the delicate strategic equation in Korea and Northeast Asia. Russia no longer has the same stake in a divided Korea that the Soviet Union used to have.

Moscow's rapprochement with Pyongyang in 2000 marked the shift from de facto 'one-Korea' policy to 'two-Korea' policy. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russian policy-makers expected that the North Korean regime would face the same fate as that of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries that had disappeared into the "dustbin of history." They predicted that Korean unification would occur in the near future and on South Korean terms. At the time it seemed logical that Russia should cultivate a cooperative partnership with Seoul, while disregarding Pyongyang. Pyongyang still survives, however, and it does not show signs of imminent collapse. Given the situation, the Kremlin reconsidered its policy toward the Korean peninsula, and moved to re-establish a normal state-to-state relationship with Pyongyang in the mid-1990s.

Russians maintain that Korean unification should be accomplished peacefully and by Koreans themselves. Russia does not want to see Korean unification achieved by forceful means since another Korean war would inevitably disrupt its efforts to develop the Far East and implement reforms at home. Furthermore, the destruction of Korean nuclear reactors and the influx of Korean refugees into Russia in the course of another Korean war would directly threaten the security of the Russian Far East.  

Because of Korea’s geo-strategic importance, Russia does not want to see any country, particularly Japan or China, achieve a predominant position in Korea. Continued U.S. military presence on unified Korean soil will be a cause for concern to Russia, if Russia still considers the U.S. a potential military threat or rival at the time. If Koreans lead the unification process without direct foreign intervention, unified Korea would be less vulnerable to foreign influence and intervention. Russian leaders often say that only Russia supports Korean unification while other major powers (the U.S., China, and Japan) prefer divided Korea, and point out that Russia and Korea have never been at war. Russia, however, would not blindly support Korean unification; it would support unified Korea only if it would be willing to accommodate Russia’s interests. Most Russian leaders believe that a neutral and unified Korea would be in Russia’s interests.  

Russia is willing to support Korean unification to as long as unified Korea is either friendly or not-hostile to Russia. Russia prefers to play a dominant role in the Korean unification process to ensure unified Korea’s friendship, or alternatively to participate in the Korean unification process with other powers as an equal to ensure unified Korea’s neutrality (or non-hostility). It is conceivable that Russia views unified Korea as a counterbalance against a potential threat from Japan or China.

Russia has no reason to oppose U.S. military presence in Korea as long as inter-Korean relations remain precarious and U.S.-Russian relations are manageable. Russia prefers to concentrate on reforms and economic development at home for the time being, without being entangled in a Korean conflict. For now, U.S. military presence in South Korea does not pose a threat to Russia because it is no

longer aimed at Russian targets. American troops in Korea have served as a stabilizer in Northeast Asia and a deterrent against another Korean war. An abrupt and reckless withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea might lead to heightened tensions in Korea and intensify an inter-Korean arms race. Furthermore, U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and Japan may lead to Japan’s remilitarization and precipitate a dangerous spiral of arms race in Northeast Asia. Russia, however, is likely to oppose U.S. military presence in Korea and U.S.-Korea alliance after Korean unification. Unified Korea as a military ally of the U.S. would mean for Russia an “Asian version of NATO’s eastward expansion” or a “forward military base on Russia’s doorstep.”

However, Russia’s attitudes and policy toward U.S. military presence in Korea and U.S.-Korean alliance after Korean unification will to a large extent depend on the nature of U.S.-Russia relations and Northeast Asian regional system that will take shape in the future.

It is conceivable that the four major powers – the U.S., Russia, China and Japan – conclude an international guarantee of a unified Korea’s independence and integrity. In the guarantee, the signatories would pledge themselves, either severally or collectively, to respect Korea’s territorial integrity and punish violators. This type of arrangement, however, is effective as long as the balance of power among the guarantors is maintained and a potential violator is not more powerful than the united pressure of law-abiding guarantors. Currently the U.S. exercises predominant influence in Northeast Asia and as long as the current power structure persists, international guarantee of Korea’s independence and integrity is unlikely.

Historically, major powers turned strategically important countries into neutral states to eliminate a source of conflict among them. Contending powers often applied the neutralization formula “to remove minor states from arenas of destructive regional and global competition.” Turning the Korean peninsula into a neutralized state serves the interests of the major powers and Korea – the major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula can avoid a war over Korea, and Korea can preserve its independence and territorial integrity. A neutralized Korea is conducive to peace,

security and lasting prosperity in Northeast Asia since it will eliminate a major reason for conflict in the region. A non-nuclear, neutral state seems to be the best formula for unified Korea. The major powers may easily accept this formula since it would eliminate the need for them to repeatedly intervene in Korean affairs to safeguard their interests.

**IV. Russian Policy toward North Korea’s Nuclear Issue**

Russia wants North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs and to destroy its nuclear-weapons materials and nuclear weapons (if they are already available). Russia genuinely fears that North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would destabilize Northeast Asia and cause nuclear arms race in the region. Russia also maintains that North Korea’s nuclear issue should be settled through diplomatic negotiations and all peaceful means must be exhausted first before economic sanctions or military options are applied. Consequently, Russia has rejected U.S. attempts to adopt condemning statements (or sanctions) at international organizations or to bring North Korea’s nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.30 Russia also points out that the international community should satisfy North Korea’s security, political, and economic needs in order to resolve North Korea’s nuclear crisis and bring about a lasting peace and security in and around the Korean peninsula.31 Russia is ready to provide international security guarantee to North Korea jointly with the U.S., China, Japan, and South Korea, is willing to provide economic assistance to North Korea, and has urged the U.S. and others to normalize political relations with North Korea in exchange for North Korea’s freezing and dismantlement of its nuclear programs.

**North Korea’s nuclear capability**

It is interesting to note that Russia contends North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities have been overestimated and exaggerated. The CIA estimates that North Korea already acquired at least one or two nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. In April 2003,

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U.S. officials said that North Koreans claimed in private meetings they had at least one nuclear bomb\(^{32}\) and on February 10, 2005, North Korea officially announced that it possessed nuclear weapons. Russian officials and specialists, however, hold that North Korea possesses neither nuclear weapons nor requisite technologies and facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons,\(^{33}\) and they point out that Russia is in the best position to assess North Korea's nuclear capability since its first nuclear program began with Soviet help and its nuclear scientists were trained in the Soviet Union. Russian nuclear cooperation with North Korea, however, discontinued in 1993.

Russian officials and specialists raise doubts about North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. In February 2003, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev postulated that North Korea had the capability to manufacture only "dirty bombs" using nuclear waste.\(^{34}\) Vladimir Belous, Russian military analyst at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, denied North Korea's nuclear weapons possession: "It is impossible to make nuclear arms or vehicles of their delivery without field testing. In the meantime, seismic equipment and space monitoring means have registered no such tests in North Korea."\(^{35}\) Evgenity Kozhokin, director of Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, refuted North Korea's nuclear possession on technical and economic grounds: "First, it [North Korea] lacks qualified personnel in nuclear physics; second, it does not have supercomputers for designing tests; third, it will be very

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33. On March 10, 1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a February 1990 report on North Korea's nuclear program submitted by then KGB director Vladimir Kryuchkov to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The KGB report stated: "According to available data, development of the first explosive nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon." The report further stated that North Korea had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection. Then Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev later dismissed this report as "worthless." The Korean Herald, June 25, 1994.

34. “Russia sells uranium to South Korea, seeks nuclear contracts in Iran,” ITAR-TASS, February 5, 2003. Siegfried Hecker, former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, who visited North Korea in January 2004 as part of an unofficial U.S. delegation, stated that there is no clear evidence that the DPRK can produce atomic bombs although it can probably make weapons-grade plutonium Nicholas Kralev, “N. Korea Atomic Bomb in Doubt,” The Washington Times, January 22, 2004, p. A01.

difficult to master nuclear explosion technology without any nuclear tests." In August 2003, Alexander Losyukov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, dismissed the view that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons: "Our experts believe that North Korea has no nuclear weapons, but certain research work in Pyongyang may result in corresponding technologies." Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Chief Sergey Lebedev in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta in December 2005 responded after being asked if North Korea had nuclear weapons: "We have no such information."

Russia in the Six Party Talks

In fall 2002, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework that had sustained precarious peace on the Korean peninsula crumbled down, and a second crisis over DPRK’s nuclear ambitions erupted in the winter of 2002/2003. As tensions mounted on the Korean peninsula, North Korea could be the next target of the U.S. global crusade against the “evil” states.

Russia criticized G.W. Bush administration’s hard line policy toward North Korea. In November 2002, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Losyukov stressed that pressure would worsen the situation by getting on the nerves of the DPRK. He further stated: “it is necessary to understand the root cause of the issue related to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile program and the motive for the action of Koreans.” In the Russian view, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 significantly increased the chances that North Korea would accelerate its nuclear weapons program and forced North Korea to reinforce its defenses. In early April 2003, Losyukov reminded of North Korea’s warning against security threats: “North Korea has already said that if it senses any threat, it will take appropriate steps, including, possibly, the creation of a certain powerful weapon for its protection.”

With the convening of the six-nation conference in August 2002, Russia was for the first time allowed to participate in international

36. Chiang Ping, "Russian Experts Air Views on 'DPRK Nuclear Crisis,'" Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, April 30, 2003.
38. “Intelligence Chief Reports. Foreign Intelligence Service Director Reveals to Rossiyskaya Gazeta the Secrets of His Profession,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 23, 2005.
40. “Russian deputy minister says current situation in Korea could lead to war,” Interfax, April 1, 2003.
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Until then, Russia had been excluded from international deliberations on North Korean issues. The idea of six-party talks (or multilateral talks including “all interested parties”) to discuss Korean issues originated from the Russian side. For years, Russia had consistently advocated a multinational format (6-party, 8-party or 10-party talks) to discuss issues relating to Korean peace and security, while maintaining that the U.S. alone cannot untie the “Korean knot.” Russia’s call for multinational talks on the Korean issue fell on deaf years until July 2003 when the U.S. and the DPRK accepted the six-party format. At the time, the Bush administration agreed to Russia’s inclusion in the six-party talks in the hopes of enlisting Russia’s support to force the DPRK into dismantling its nuclear programs. The DPRK, in contrast, wanted Russia’s inclusion in an effort to offset U.S. military threat and inflexible stance at the negotiating table. The convening of the six-way talks was certainly a diplomatic triumph for Russia as it finally gained a foothold in a multinational forum to deliberate on peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia.

The first session of the six-party talks, held on August 27-29, 2003 in Beijing, did not produce any breakthroughs. The talks, however, established the objective of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and set in motion the Korean peace process. During the talks, the DPRK confirmed its overall objective of the nuclear-free Korean peninsula and the U.S. promised not to attack, threaten, or invade the DPRK. At the Beijing talks, the U.S. and the DPRK failed to reconcile their diametrically opposed positions. After a six-month hiatus, the second round of six-party talks was held on February 26-28, 2004 in Beijing. This session also failed to bring any breakthroughs as the U.S. and the DPRK refused to compromise. The U.S. stuck to its

41. In 1994 Russia complained bitterly about Russia’s exclusion from the negotiating process leading to the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement, and in 1996 Russia expressed strong regrets over its exclusion from the four-party—the U.S., China, North and South Korea—Korean peace talks.

42. As early as 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed a multinational negotiating mechanism in Northeast Asia. In fall 2002, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov reiterated its call for six-party talks to discuss North Korea’s nuclear issue.

43. Kim Jong-Il insisted on a 6-party format to include Russia. According to a Sankei Shimbun report, in late July 2003 Kim Jong-Il called Russian President Putin to ask for Russia’s participation in six-party talks and Russia’s hosting the talks. Putin agreed to Russia’s joining the talks but declined to host the talks on the grounds that Beijing should continue to host them because of its enormous contributions as a mediator between the U.S. and the DPRK. Tadashi Ito, “PRC Source Cited on Putin Rejecting Kim Chong-il Request to Host Talks in Russia,” Sankei Shimbun, September 9, 2003.
previous position—the U.S. would not provide the DPRK with a written security guarantee or economic aid before the DPRK implements “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” dismantlement (CIVD) of its nuclear programs. The DPRK in turn held on to a package solution—DPRK’s renunciation of the nuclear programs and U.S. compensation to the DPRK should proceed simultaneously. During the talks, North Korea offered to freeze its nuclear programs in exchange for aid, and South Korea offered to provide energy aid if the freeze was the first step to dismantlement. China and Russia agreed to provide aid along with South Korea.\(^{44}\) The six nations agreed to form smaller working groups that would handle more substantial and technical aspects of the nuclear dispute. The first working-group meeting of the six-party talks was held on May 12-14, 2004 in Beijing, but failed to produce a breakthrough.

As Losyukov pointed out, the “working group” meeting was a Russian idea as well.\(^{45}\) In fact, the working-group idea dates back to 1997 when Russia proposed a 10-party multilateral conference—the DPRK, the ROK, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Japan, the UN Secretary General, and the General Director of the IAEA—on the Korean question. This proposal included clauses on the formation of working groups to deal with specific issue areas and included the specific details of their operation.\(^{46}\) Although the six-party conference differs from the Russian-proposed 10-party conference in terms of context and preconditions, the idea of forming a working-group was adopted at the second full session of the six-party talks for its pragmatic application.

During the second phase of the 4th round of the six-party talks held in Beijing on September 13-19, 2005, a breakthrough was

46. The Russian proposal included the following points: 1) All interested nations and organizations are invited to the conference; 2) Cross-recognition will precede the conference; 3) During the conference, working groups that deal with specific issue areas will be organized. Other participants will approve these group’s agreements and become guarantors for their implementation [Italics added]. The working groups will operate under one ‘roof’, i.e., the international conference. The recommendations from the working groups will be submitted for approval to the sessions of the conference at the ministerial level. Valentin Moiseev, then Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, published an article in the May-June, 1997 issue of *International Affairs* (the journal published by the Russian Foreign Ministry) that, for the first time, included concrete details of the Russian proposal. For further details, see Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, *International Affairs* (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3 (1997), pp. 68-72.
reached when the six parties agreed on a "statement of principles" which stipulated Pyongyang’s dismantling all its nuclear programs in exchange for diplomatic recognition, security guarantee, and economic aid. Many of the agreed principles were general and vague, but this agreement was designed as the basis for further talks on North Korea’s dismantling its nuclear programs and the provision of economic, political, and security incentives to North Korea. China as the host country and mediator, played a key role in the process of inducing the compromise agreement.

Alexander Alexeyev, Russian chief negotiator at the six-party talks, hailed the joint statement of principles agreed on at the 4th round of talks as profoundly significant. The key issue at the 4th round of talks was North Korea’s demand to have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The DPRK insisted on its right to have peaceful nuclear program and the provision of a light water reactor (LWR) as part of the compensation for abandoning its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. The U.S. maintained the position that North Korea should abandon all nuclear programs including nuclear reactors to produce electricity. The U.S. and the DPRK in the end agreed to a compromise statement in which the U.S. agreed to accept North Korea right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to discuss “at an appropriate time” the supply of LWR to the DPRK and the DPRK agreed to return to the NPT and IAEA “at an early date” and to dismantle all its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. The timing and sequencing as regards North Korea’s denuclearization and other parties’ supply of LWR to the DPRK remained a thorny issue.

Russia thinks that North Korea has the right to peaceful nuclear energy programs to resolve acute energy shortages. But Russia maintains that North Korea’s demand for a light water reactor should be satisfied only after it returns to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a speech given at Stanford University on September 21 said that LWRs should be provided to North Korea only after it scraps its nuclear weapons and related programs: "We think North Korea’s nuclear weapons should be scrapped first and then the issue of the LWRs decided

afterwards.” Deputy Foreign Minister Alexeyev stated that the next round of talks should focus on a “road map” to specifically implement the agreed elements and carry out North Korea’s denuclearization based on the principle of “synchronization: “It is necessary to first of all determine the sequence, nature and volume of the steps to be taken by the parties in conformity with the synchronisation principle in order to give a start to the process of nuclear disarmament on the peninsula.”

Russian Ambassador to Seoul, Glev A. Ivashentsov said in an interview in November that the provision of LWRs to North Korea and the North’s dismantling of nuclear weapons should take place simultaneously: Here you see an issue of mutual mistrust. The only solution, therefore, is all the steps synchronize.” Russia expressed its willingness to provide energy assistance to North Korea and build a nuclear reactor in North Korea but only after the DPRK rejoins the NPT and IAEA. It is, however, unlikely that the DPRK will receive energy assistance from Russia or request Russia to build a nuclear reactor on its territory.

During the 5th round of the six-party talks held on November 9-11, 2005, the parties sought to find ways to fulfil the provisions of the joint statement based on the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action,” but no progress was made. North Korea refused to return to the negotiating table unless the U.S. lifts the financial sanctions. In October, the U.S. Treasury Department had imposed financial sanctions against North Korea for its alleged illegal activities of counterfeiting US dollars and other illegal activities. Pyongyang denies all charges of illicit financial activities. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Gleb Ivashentsov stated that his country did not have substantial evidence on the US charge regarding North Korea’s counterfeiting US dollars and demanded concrete evidence to support its charge: “Russia has not received any concrete evidence [of North Korea’s alleged counterfeiting]. There is rumour-level talk on the issue.” He further reiterated Russia’s position that sanctions on North Korea would not solve any problem and only through dialogue and cooperation solutions would be possible. In the meantime, the Iranian nuclear crisis erupted in

early 2006 and once again North Korea lost US attention and was sidelined.

Russia’s frequent and regular consultation and coordination with China over North Korea’s nuclear issue are noteworthy. During the first round of 6-party talks, Moscow and Beijing delegations worked closely for a fruitful conclusion of the talks. China was the first country with which Russia held diplomatic consultations in 2004. When Russian and Chinese diplomatic representatives met in Moscow on January 5, 2004, the North Korean nuclear issue topped the agenda. Moscow and Beijing frequently discussed ways of settling North Korean crisis peacefully. In this regard, Russian Ambassador to Beijing Igor Rogachev stated: "Sometimes we met almost every day, exchanged views, and compared our stances, in short, worked very closely together." Russia also held a series of talks with South Korean and Japanese officials and had comprehensive discussions with the U.S. officials, including in Washington in November 2003. On the eve of the 5th round of the six-party talks, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexeyev and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei met to discuss key issues.

**Muscle Flexing**

In so far as North Korea refrains from testing or exporting nuclear weapons and the U.S. stops short of applying a blockade or military force against the DPRK, North Korea’s nuclear problem is manageable. In the first half of 2003, Russia was sending out signals to the DPRK that the latter’s crossing the “red line” and going nuclear would be unacceptable and such eventuality would force Russia to collaborate with the U.S. against the DPRK. Russia has opposed any international sanctions or military action against the DPRK until all peaceful means are exhausted. Russia at the same time clearly stated that it would not tolerate North Korea’s acquisition or use of nuclear weapons.

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55. During his two-day stay in January 2004 in Beijing to participate in a ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russian foreign minister Ivanov and his Chinese counterpart confirmed their common approach to the settlement on the Korean peninsula and agreed to coordinate efforts in the interests of the political settlement. Valery Agarkov and Andrei Krylov, “Russia: FM Ivanov Ends Visit to China,” ITAR-TASS, January 16, 2004.
Shortly before the first round of six-party talks, the possibility of Russia’s preventive strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities was reported in the Russian daily newspaper Izvestiya. Izvestiya carried an article dealing with the effects on the Russian Far East of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and Russia’s military option of a preventive strike against North Korea. According to the article, if North Korea carries out a nuclear strike against Seoul, a radioactive cloud will reach Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays within a few hours: "In the event of a nuclear explosion on the Korean Peninsula there is a 70 percent probability of the appearance of a radioactive cloud over the Maritime region. It may cover the south of the Maritime region, including Vladivostok, within two to three hours of the explosion." The article stated that a number of senior Russian military officers consider a preventive strike a best option to avoid the radioactive contamination of Russia's Far East: “Russia's best response to a nuclear conflict between the DPRK... on the one hand and the United States and its South Korean allies on the other could be a preventive (preventivnyy) missile strike against North Korea's nuclear installations carried out by the forces of the Pacific Fleet.” The article further revealed the possibility of a U.S.-Russia joint military operation against the DPRK: [Both Russia and the U.S. can detect] “North Korea's preparations to launch nuclear-armed missiles and in this event, we will know this. In this event it is essential to undertake a pre-emptive (uprezhdayushchiy) strike. It will be better if the Americans do this, while we can limit ourselves to supplying intelligence data.” The article also added that Russia has military plans to destroy North Korean missile launch installations.57 By leaking this information to the mass media, Russia probably wanted to tell the DPRK where the “red line” stands.

Russia also demonstrated its military capability to the U.S. and the DPRK by conducting massive military exercises in the Far East on August 18-27, 2003. This was the largest-scale exercises in the Russian Far East in 15 years, involving 70,000 servicemen and civilians, 58 ships, and 69 aircraft and helicopters and covering four Far Eastern territories -- Maritime Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Sakhalin Oblast, and Kamchatka Oblast. For the first time, a state of emergency was imposed in Russia for the duration of exercises. The main feature of the exercises was to rehearse actions to accept up to 100,000 North Korean refugees who might enter the Russian Far East in the event of a military conflict between the U.S. and the

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57. Oleg Zhunusov and Yelena Shesternina, "If Tomorrow There Is a War That in Two to Three Hours' Time Involves Vladivostok," Izvestiya August 1, 2003.
DPRK. Russia's Tu-160 strategic bombers were also participating in the multi-purpose exercises. Russia was clearly engaged in saber-rattling to remind the U.S. that Russia still was a formidable power to reckon with.

On August 18-25, 2005, China and Russia carried out the first joint military exercises "2005 Peace Mission." The military manoeuvres involved 8,800 men (7,000 Chinese and 1,800 Russians), 17 planes and 140 warships and submarines. These exercises began in Vladivostok and completed in Shandong peninsula in eastern China. The ostensible purpose of the exercises was to counter the threats of terrorism and separatism. As to its true purpose, speculations abounded—China wanted to deter Taiwan's independence, Russia and China wanted to demonstrate their military capabilities as a warning to the US not to encroach on their interests in the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Georgian, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), Russia wanted to show the capabilities of its weapons to China for arms sales, and Russia and China wanted to counter recent movements of the US and Japan to strengthen their military ties.

It is likely that the military exercises were intended for an emergency in North Korea. As North Korea's second nuclear crisis remains unresolved, North Korea may collapse suddenly from internal or external pressures or the US may initiate military strikes against North Korean targets. In either case, the US-ROK combined forces are likely to move north to unify Korea by force. In such eventuality, Russia and China may jointly intervene by sending troops and occupying northern parts of the DPRK to prevent further

60. Japanese and South Korean forces participated in the exercises as part of sea rescue and anti-poaching operations. China and North Korea sent their observers. The U.S., however, rejected Russia invitation to participate.
62. Ivan Safranchuk, the director of the Moscow Defense Information Center, stated that the exercises "are designed primarily on the Russian side to show China the capabilities of the national weapons already acquired by the Chinese or that may be future purchases." Marie Jego, "Chinese and Russians Complete Novel Military Maneuvers," LE MONDE, August 25, 2005.
advancement of US troops near their borders or to buy time to install a new government in North Korea. 63

2005 Peace Mission was “unprecedented anti-American military deterrent action.” 64 After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia lost its former status as a global superpower. In recent years, Russia has enjoyed political stability, economic growth, and increasing national strength. Besides, Russian military capabilities strengthened following its military reforms. The eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and "Colour Revolutions" in the member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) weakened Russia’s strategic position. Russia now asserted its right to be treated as a major power and sought to restore its military prestige. The military exercises were an act of saber rattling aimed at the US. 65

It seems that the Izvestiya article about preventive strike and the military exercises were intended as warnings to North Korea and the U.S. against reckless behaviour. They also reflect Russia’s desire to be recognized as a major power that has the will and capability to make a difference in case of an armed conflict in and around Korea.

V. Conclusion

Russia’s role in the Korean peace process in general and at the six-party talks in particular has been indirect and marginal. Russia’s impact on the talks was limited to the format (six-party multinational talks) and the procedural matters (working-groups), and its impact on substance of the negotiated outcomes was negligible.

Knowing its limits, Russia does not attempt to take a leading role in North Korean nuclear talks. Instead, it seeks to play a supporting role in the negotiation process. It is fully aware that the main issues should be resolved between the US and North Korea and wants

63. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun quoted a high-ranking Japanese defense official as saying the exercise was to show "whether the Chinese and Russian armies are capable of bringing North Korea under control before allied South Korean and U.S. forces." The official further argued that airborne and amphibious units involved in the exercise constituted "the operational axis" to prevent an advance of the US-ROK combined forces to North Korea. “Japan Paranoid About Sino-Russian Exercise,” Chosun Ilbo, August 17, 2005.
65. Russia held military maneuvers in the Far East since 2002. In July 2005, the military exercise titled Vostok 2005 involved a total of over 5,000 troops from Russia’s Far East Military District and Pacific Fleet.
China to exert its influence to bring these two antagonists back to the negotiating table and mediate a compromise to implement North Korea’s denuclearization.66

Russia exerted negative power (or veto power) throughout the talks. The outcome of negotiations depended largely on the US and the DPRK and the diplomatic skills of China to bridge the gap between them. Russia, however, was in a position to effectively veto certain actions (North Korea’s testing or exporting nuclear weapons, U.S. blockade or military action against North Korea) or negotiated outcomes (North Korea’s status as a nuclear power, US denial of LWR to the DPRK). Russia along with China and South Korea set a certain boundary and would not accept any action or agreement beyond it. Russia carried out military exercises alone or jointly with China to show to the US and the DPRK that it had the military capabilities and the will to use them to protect its interests.

Russia has manifested a strong penchant for multilateralism for regional security or economic cooperation. The Soviet Union (and later Russia) was the first country in Northeast Asia that advocated a multinational security mechanism to deal with a multitude of issues, including the Korean question and nuclear proliferation, confidence-building measures, and others. The Soviet Union was never accepted as a full-fledged member of the Northeast Asian community and Russia is still uncertain about its acceptance as a member. In other words, Russia’s political influence in and its economic integration into the region are limited. Under the circumstances, Russia wants to promote multinational mechanisms as a vehicle to increasing its status while undermining U.S. domination in the region. Putin’s pet economic projects of the “iron silk-road” and the East Siberian gas pipeline projects, both involving Russia and the two Koreas, are also to help Russia find a secure place in Northeast Asia.

Chapter 9

PSYOP in the Korea War: Anecdotes from Yesterday - Considerations for Tomorrow

David S. Maxwell

Psychological Operations in the Korea War: Success, failure or not of importance? Before we begin let me relate a story. In early July 2003 I attended a luncheon sponsored by the American Foreign Policy Council, a conservative organization based in Washington, DC. The featured speaker that day was Mr. Park Gap Dong an elderly gentleman in his 80’s, originally from South Korea but a socialist who aligned himself with Kim Il Sung against the US military in the South and who believed Kim’s rhetoric that they could prevail through peaceful means. Although disillusioned by the attack on 25 June, Mr. Park went first to Seoul and then after MacArthur landed at Inchon he retreated along with the North Korean People’s Army (nKPA) to Pyongyang and became the Chief of the European section in the Department of Culture. He was later purged in 1953, incarcerated until 1956 and was able to escape from North Korea in 1957. He currently is chairman of the National Salvation Front for the Democratic Reunification of Korea and lives in Japan. He relayed a couple of things that I will come back to later in this paper, but the most interesting is that much of the north Korean leadership was disillusioned at the time of the Armistice signing in 1953 and were actually extremely disappointed that it was signed. He said that had the negotiations continued for at most six months, along with continued military pressure by UN forces, the Kim Regime would have collapsed from within then and Korean unification would have occurred in 1953 or 1954.1 Now of course this is a bold statement, one that I do not think can be supported by the facts as we know them; however, it does come from someone with an

1. Luncheon hosted by the American Foreign Policy Council on 9 JUL 2003 in Washington, DC. Guest speaker was Mr. PARK, Gap Dong.
apparent insider’s view. What is most important to think about, assuming this is true, is first, did we have any idea that there was this kind of dissension? Second, if we did, what did we do to exploit it? Third, did our PSYOP efforts have any effect on these attitudes? Finally, had we known of these attitudes did we have the PSYOP capability to exploit them? Just imagine if we had known and exploited them how much different a world we would be living in today.

Now, with those sobering questions in mind let’s discuss what PSYOP is and why it is important. Then we can look at the state of our PSYOP capabilities leading up to and during the war. Next we can look at some of the significant activities that occurred during the war. Finally we should think about the future and what we need to consider for the next war and/or the collapse of the Kim Family Regime.

What are Psychological Operations? Of course we must start off with the obligatory DoD doctrinal definitions: Psychological Operations are “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.” Then we have Psychological Warfare or PSYWAR which we do not hear discussed very much: “The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.” Finally we have Psychological Consolidation Activities: “Planned psychological activities across the range of military operations directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behavior that supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders.” These definitions seem to be differentiated by the target audience more so than the actions or the intent. The definitions seem to imply PSYOP against foreigners in general, PSYWAR against hostile parties, and PSYOP consolidation activities against the civilian populace in order to facilitate military operations. As important as these doctrinal definitions are, ultimately though, I think we can simplify them to the fundamental

essence and that is PSYOP, PSYWAR or Psychological Consolidation Activities are all simply focused on influencing human behavior. Clausewitz words are timeless: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Equally timeless is the great Chinese General Sun Tzu who said:

“Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take a battalion, a company or a five-man squad intact is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack his cities.”

Both these great theorists understood the psychological component or moral domain of war and captured throughout their writings that all efforts must be focused on influencing human behavior in order to achieve the nation’s aims. Sun Tzu especially clearly lays out the necessity for strategic as well as tactical psychological operations. The humans we are talking about are enemy government and military leaders, soldiers on the battlefield and often most importantly, civilians. PSYOP can be strategic, such as influencing a government or military to capitulate or not use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or tactical, such as influencing soldiers and units to surrender or not fight. In terms of civilians it can be as basic as ensuring a “stay put” policy to minimize civilian interference with operations as well as protect civilians from casualties. The common tools for PSYOP are electronic, such as radio, television, and local broadcasts by like loudspeakers, and print such as newspapers or hand bills and leaflets. However, what is often overlooked is that every military or government action taken (and sometimes not taken), including diplomatic and economic, every kinetic weapon fired (or not fired), has psychological effects that must be considered in the scope of military operations, including before, during and after conflict. One of the most important things to consider and remember is that psychological operations are not separate and discreet activities. It is an integral part of any strategy

and campaign and all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic must work in harmony to achieve the desired end state or strategic aim.

This would be my first and most important criticism of PSYOP in the Korean War. It does not appear that all the elements of national power were working in harmony to achieve the psychological objectives and aims necessary for victory. Of course it is also a statement of the obvious that no one in the west predicted war on the Peninsula, thus there was no plan for the defense of the Republic of Korea. I think it would be fair to say that we started out behind the power curve and we really never got out in front of it. But of course today things could and should be different.

To understand PSYOP in the Korean War we must understand where PSYOP was in the US military up to that time. To be honest, it did not rank way up there very high particularly when compared to development of nuclear weapons (the ultimate PSYOP weapon of course!) or the development of fighter and bomber aircraft. After WWII and at the beginning of the Cold War, Special Operations in general, the OSS and then the CIA, unconventional warfare, and Psychological Operations were all undergoing radical reorganizations and debates as to importance or were not organized at all. These organizations and concepts pretty much occupied the back burner of all the military services if they occupied any space at all! There were numerous studies and debates among the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, and most importantly within the Army. At the time the concepts of PSYOP and Unconventional Warfare and Covert Activities were all entwined. In fact as most of us know, Special Forces grew out of the Psychological Warfare Division in the Army G3 through the efforts of the likes Gen Robert McClure, Russell Volckman, and of course the father of Special Forces, Aaron Bank. While this time period was one of turmoil for the development of Special Operations, one thing that is important is that for the most part the people involved in the debate looked at the various disciplines such as PSYOP and PSYWAR, unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, covert activities and operations as all inter-related. In fact if it was not for GEN Eisenhower we might not have Special Operations as we know it today. In 1947 as Chief of Staff he directed the Army "to take those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of psychological warfare and of cover and deception and that there should continue in being a nucleus of
personnel capable of handling these arts in case an emergency arises." He clearly understood today's SOF truth: "competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur."

Of course an emergency did occur on 25 June and as we all know, we were caught virtually unaware and un-prepared. Before we discuss the war, let's look at two incidents leading up to the war that are particularly illustrative of the power of information and ideas and their ability to influence actions. First is Secretary of State Dean Acheson's infamous speech in which he stated to the effect that the US sphere of influence ended at Japan. This glaring omission of the Korean Peninsula was sufficient to allow Kim Il Sung to argue to both Stalin and Mao that the US would not intervene in a war on the peninsula. As Kim was playing Stalin and Mao against each other and executing his own agenda, Secretary Acheson's statement was exactly the message he needed to convince Stalin to provide at least tacit approval of his invasion plans. This is an example of the inadvertent effects that seemingly routine speeches can have on the decision-making of foreign leaders. The question must be asked, had Secretary Acheson included Korea (and Taiwan) within the US sphere of influence in his speech, would that have had the deterrent effect on Stalin to cause him to try to prevent Kim from attacking? Of course we will never know, but it is very important to learn from this that every speech and pronouncement by a government can have psychological effects on foreign governments both intended and inadvertent.

The second key point leading up to the war was that North Korea had embarked on a propaganda campaign against the South and the west nearly from its inception. What is notable here is that while for some time anti-Republic of Korea rhetoric was being broadcast, two things occurred just weeks prior to the start of the War. First, the propaganda dramatically ceased. Second, the Kim Regime began calling for peaceful reunification discussions in Kaesong. The combination of these two actions in my own opinion led analysts in the South and in the US to believe what they wanted to believe and that was that the north sought peace and not war. Now we have the

20-20 hindsight to know that what these actions provided were the cover and deception for the initial attacks on 25 June. This clearly demonstrates the power of PSYOP at the strategic level.

So as the war began where was PSYOP? As noted above it was in a state of disrepair and disorganization. In MacArthur’s Far East Command (FECOM) responsibility for PSYOP in Asia rested with a small special projects office in the G2 section headed by a civilian named J. Woodall Greene. In Washington; however, the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr. confirmed his view that that there needed to be a Psychological Warfare organization within the Department of the Army and on 31 July 1950 he was told that such an organization was established within the G3 “to provide staff supervision of psychological warfare and special operations activities. Additionally a study had been undertaken to determine how to provide for a nucleus of personnel trained in psychological warfare.”8 However, it would not be until 15 January 1951 that the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) would be established with MG Robert McClure as its head.9 Again, this is a clear and classic example of the SOF truth.

Because there was not a PSYOP or special operations organization in existence at the outset of the war a truly effective and integrated PSYOP and unconventional warfare program never really got off the ground. The Army, Air Force and CIA all undertook varied programs often with tactical success but as a whole then I would have to assess PSYOP and special operations as not decisive elements in the Korean War. Such tactical success though was important and a study by Johns Hopkins University revealed that the cost of a “PSYWAR capture” to a conventional or kinetic kill had a probable ratio of 70:1 in favor of PSYWAR.10

Examples of tactical success are numerous and demonstrate the creativeness and ability of special operators to adapt to the conditions at hand. Although Americans had very little understanding of Korea in general and North Korea in particular, South Korean personnel had a good understanding of how to influence fighters from the north. An example of tactical success was the use of Korean females in C-47 aircraft to broadcast to isolated and starving nKPA units. A combination of reasons made these C-47

9. Ibid., p. 94.
broadcasts successful. First, the very fact that a C-47 could fly low and slow around an isolated unit without being attacked by north Korean fighters had a demoralizing effect on the nKPA troops as they realized they were not going to be reinforced or supported. Second, the fact that the broadcasters were female was insulting and finally because most of the troops were illiterate, the broadcasts were more effective at conveying information than leaflets.  

The Army’s PSYOP was focused on loudspeaker and leaflet operations. The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in theater in the fall of 1950 and would be the 8th Army’s tactical PSYOP unit for the remainder of the war. Most of the themes were focused on influencing enemy soldiers to surrender or desert. The themes centered around the "happy POW," "good soldier-bad leaders," "surrender and you will be well-treated," "we can crush you," and nostalgia for home, family and women."12 Probably the most produced type of leaflet was the safe conduct pass which had the signature of every UN commander from MacArthur to Mark Clark. Interestingly many of these safe conduct passes were printed with one won notes on one side which was believed would cause soldiers to pick them up. The counterfeiting of the North Korean currency was so good that these passes sometimes were passed as money. Two things to note here though and this is an example of a failure to know the target audience. One won was roughly the equivalent of one and a third month’s pay for an nKPA soldier and anyone found with that much money would be cause for suspicion. Americans had no idea this seemingly petty sum was so much money. The second was that when a North Korean picked up the leaflet thinking it was money and then seeing that the ROK flag was on the other side caused his first exposure to the PSYOP message to be one of disappointment. However, the effectiveness of the safe conduct passes overall cannot be underestimated. At the end of the war more than 132,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners were in UN control. It is likely that these safe conduct passes provided a counter to the communist propaganda that was disseminated to the troops stating that prisoners captured by UN forces would be tortured and executed.13

The Army received its air support from the Air Force. The majority of missions were flown out of Taegu Air Base (K-2) and

11. Ibid., p. 38.  
Seoul City Air Base (K-16) and Kimpo Airfield (K-14) by the Special Air Missions (SAM) unit that was charged with the task (among many other missions) "to operate psychological missions as requested by 8th Army."

A point must be emphasized here. While most of the PSYOP undertaken by the Army and the Air Force seemed to be tactically focused, there are a couple of examples of psychological warfare conducted at the strategic level. It must be noted that the majority of operators and planners conducting behind the lines operations in North Korea believed that their greatest impact was at the strategic and psychological level. They believed the impact of their operations was to cause North Korean leaders to divert conventional forces for rear area security and demoralize both the leadership and the population by demonstrating a large resistance capability. Estimates are that as many as 20,000 to possibly 50,000 nKPA troops were diverted from the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) due to partisan operations. An integral part of partisan operations were attempts to "terrorize" and demoralize the enemy by leaving "Leopard’s Claw" leaflets as calling cards wherever they conducted operations. In January 1953 the Far East Command Liaison Detachment Korea (FED/LD(K)) established a school that was two fold. It was focused both on troop information and education (TIE) in order to boost the morale of the partisans as well as on psychological warfare. Thus PSYOP was a recognized part of partisan operations.

Finally, one last example of PSYOP is worth noting. There is only one major example of PSYOP focused at the strategic level. This was the use of counterfeit currency by partisans and agents in the north. North Korean currency was printed and disseminated in an attempt to destroy the North Korean economy. Disrupting the economy was considered a legitimate target and the UN forces and in particular an Air Force officer named MAJ Don Nichols undertook operations to try to disrupt the economy by flooding the north with counterfeit money. The commercial printing presses used by the PSYOP personnel (presumably the Stars and Stripes newspaper presses) produced excellent counterfeit money and in fact it was too perfect. The quality of the counterfeit money was better than what the north

16. Ibid., p. 38.
17. Ibid., p. 78.
was producing and this did lead to a number of agents being caught by North Korean security forces.\textsuperscript{18}

There are indeed many lessons to learn from the Korean War. Hopefully none of them will be repeated as we have many advantages over those who came before us. It is clear that today we have a better understanding of the threat in the north. We have PSYOP organizations in place with trained ROK and US personnel and equipment both on the peninsula and in the US. We have plans for execution of PSYOP that are focused on fielded military forces and civilians (consolidation activities). However, we must look critically at the situation in the north and ask are we doing all we can to prepare to conduct PSYOP and PSYWAR against the north. What are the problems we face and what actions can and should we be taking to overcome them now? Most importantly is there a way to seize the initiative when war or collapse occurs?

Let me return to my discussions with Mr Park Gap Dong. He relayed a few other interesting things to me when we spoke. First he downplayed the Juche ideology of the north and stated his firm belief that Confucianism still dominates. In fact he claims to have contact with some of his former students within the regime and he believes they will listen to him because of the teacher-student relationship and Confucian philosophy. Because of his alleged contacts with ranking regime personalities in the north he also asserts that the North Korean population as well as enlightened leaders believe that the United States is the only country that can liberate the north and cause reunification. Most significantly though he asserts three very suspect beliefs: First, a surgical strike by the US will cause Kim Jong II to cut and run and seek protection in China thus creating a power vacuum and in effect a collapse of the regime because there is no succession mechanism. Second, the nKPA leadership knows it cannot win a war against the Alliance and if faced with the prospect of war will chose not to fight and to disobey the orders of Kim Jong II. However, he also assesses that any attack by the US or the Alliance on the north will not be interpreted as “surgical.” It will be assessed as a prelude to a full-scale invasion. The result is likely to be that Kim Jong II will order execution of his campaign plan and the question then is will the nKPA execute as ordered or take actions as described by Mr Park? This is quite a risky scenario.

Now as much as we should desire to believe in Mr. Park’s conjecture, I would view his ideas as a best-case scenario. I think

\textsuperscript{18} Friedman.
from a prudent standpoint we should keep the above possibilities in mind because we must plan for the contingency of success as well as for contingencies against setbacks. However, what we really need to do is ask what are we doing now to prepare the battlefield for the future?

I would submit that we are focused on three things from a PSYOP and general strategic standpoint at this moment. First we want the obvious and that is the noble goal to deter war. Second, we are focused on countering North Korea’s alleged nuclear program. Third, we are conducting planning and training to prepare to conduct PSYOP if deterrence fails and we must fight. I believe these are shortsighted and that we must focus on the deeper “fight” that is the one that is post-collapse and post war. It is important that we approach this “deep fight” from the perspective of what should be our long-term strategic vision for the Korean Peninsula. Although our policy has been stated in many different forms I think we need to take the view that what we want the peninsula to look like is this:

“A peaceful, secure and stable, economically viable, non-nuclear, unified Korea with a democratic form of government.”

If we adopt this or some variation of this as our strategic aim or desired end state then we can work backwards from that and identify the various courses of action we must adopt using all elements of our national power to achieve this. Of course this is a complex and difficult undertaking, one which will likely require volumes to outline and describe. However, I am going to touch on the some of the psychological and emotional problems we face in North Korea and identify some broad actions we need to consider for the future.

Before we attempt to implement any PSYOP actions to support achieving our strategic aim it is very important that we identify and understand some very important aspects of North Korea, the regime and the population. First and foremost we must understand that the legitimacy of the regime is built on the myth of Kim Il Sung and the inner circle being the great guerilla fighters who liberated the Korean peninsula through anti-Japanese Partisan Warfare. This myth is part of all that is North Korea. North Koreans are taught from birth that they must protect their homeland and fight against the imperial United States and its puppet the ROK. They are taught that all citizens must resist and be prepared to fight to the death. Most importantly the fundamental North Korean ideology of Juche, or
so-called self-reliance can be looked at as the ultimate “guerilla philosophy” where the small can overcome the large through moral superiority and determination. This characteristic of the regime and the population could make the problems the coalition is experiencing in Iraq look like child’s play. This Juche ideology is of critical importance because it has been raised, in my opinion, to a religious stature and the people have been taught that should they give their life for the fatherland they will achieve immortality. We see that in effect Kim Il Sung has been deified and today “lives on” even though he died in 1994. This could very well cause the rank and file people to fight to the death.

Now it is important to digress a bit here and make a point about reunification comparisons. Many will ask why cannot there be peaceful reunification such as occurred between East and West Germany. The simple answer is that the German people had a much great knowledge of the people’s of each country and of course they did not fight a civil war. The North Korean people are the most closed society in the world and are cut off from most outside information about the world. For to know the truth would undermine the regime’s legitimacy. As a fundamental precept of Juche most people in North Korea learn that there are only five countries in the world: the US, China, Russia, Japan, and North Korea. Of course all other former countries in the world are now the “puppets’ of the four major powers and it is only north Korea that has maintained its true independence and has the military ability to stand up to the rest of the world.

Now, since the population has been so thoroughly indoctrinated in the last 58 years and has been living with Juche since the late 1950’s when Hwang Jong Yop developed it for Kim Il Sung, the people do not have any understanding of the outside world. They know only what they are taught. However, they are so indoctrinated at this point that I believe that if there is war or collapse when the people learn the truth they are going to come under tremendous psychological and emotional problems. I would submit that for some it will be the equivalent of Christians learning that there is no god and that the bible was written solely for the purpose of social control. Dealing with these emotions is going to be a daunting task for the ROK, the Alliance, and the United Nations, if it is involved.

Now that we have a basic understanding of the challenges of dealing with the population we must ensure we understand the regime and as Dr. Perry said in his 1999 policy review, we must
deal with North Korea as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. There are three key facts that anyone dealing with North Korea must know and take into account in every action:

**Vital National Interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime**

**Strategic Aim: Reunification of the Peninsula under Regime control.**

**Required Condition to achieve the Strategic Aim: Removal of or neutralization of US troops on the Korean Peninsula.**

Understanding these three points is critical to dealing with North Korea and provides the underpinnings for developing courses of action. One can draw the conclusion that the above interests and aims are diametrically opposed to the survival of the Republic of Korea. If you reach that conclusion then you can also say that the ROK-DPRK relationship is zero sum and the only outcome is either military conflict or collapse. There is no middle ground, no room for compromise, no chance for any kind of transitional authority or commonwealth phase that has been proposed by both nations. At the heart of the problem is that because of North Korea's interests, aims, and philosophy the ultimate conclusion that can be reached is the one Mr Stephen Bradner has often pronounced: There is no non-military solution to the problem of the divided Korea.20

Now given the problem of the isolated population combined with the regime's interest and aim we need to look at the PSYOP measures that we should consider now and for the future. I propose a three part plan based on the use of PSYOP and the integration of the elements of national power in order to forestall war, win decisively when war or conflict occurs, and sustain the peace in either a post-conflict or regime collapse situation.

The key to deterrence and forestalling war or conflict is to sustain the illusion for Kim Jong Il that the regime can survive. As long as he believes he has a chance to survive he will continue to maintain the status quo. The question then becomes how do we sustain the illusion? We must take two fundamental actions. First is to talk to him. Again to quote Dr. Perry, who was quoting JFK, we must never be afraid to negotiate but we must never negotiate in fear.21 Understanding that North Korea is not going to change we should not be hesitate to give him such intangibles as recognition

19. Dr. William Perry during a lecture at the Brookings Institute, 3 DEC 02.
20. Mr. Stephen Bradner, Special Advisor to CINCUNC during numerous command briefings.
21. Dr. William Perry, 3 DEC 02.
and non-aggression treaties. We should also embark on the negotiation process as called for in the Armistice Agreement of 1953. None of these actions calls for making any real concessions to the north. Sure, the north has demanded these things, but we need to look past that and understand that if we embark on this path ultimately we are going to see the north undercut its own international legitimacy when it continues its normal provocations against the ROK. Most importantly if we embark on a peace process it is likely to drag on for years which will have the effect of forestalling conflict as the regime will be patient and wait for the right conditions to achieve its strategic aim. Of course the key thing for the Alliance is to never provide the right conditions. This has to be done by maintaining a strong deterrent force. The second part of this course of action is to announce that the US does in fact plan to withdraw forces completely from the peninsula at some time in the future, perhaps in 2015 as an example. This single act alone could have the effect of Kim Jong Il postponing any major military undertaking in the hope that by 2015 when the US withdraws from the peninsula that he will then have the balance of power to swiftly attack the ROK and reunify the peninsula. Buying this time gives the Alliance the chance to begin two other major PSYOP tasks.

Second, we must target the second tier leadership in the nKPA. We must get information to them and convince them of two things. One is if they maintain control of and do not employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they will have an opportunity to survive and prosper in a post-Kim Regime situation. Second, those leaders must be convinced that it is in their own and Korea’s best interest that they continue to maintain positive control over the military forces they command and that those military forces will be respected and employed after collapse or in post-conflict if they do not initiate hostilities. By second tier I mean those Corps and Brigade commanders that control the bulk of the maneuver forces and WMD. Although they are key members of the regime they are generally not part of the inner circle. It is of critical importance that we reach these personalities so that can believe that there is a chance to survive and prosper if they do not support Kim Jong Il. And of course if Mr Park is right in his assertions then we are taking steps to ensure they do not support the regime. Most importantly by targeting these leaders we will be taking actions that will undermine the regime.

The toughest problem we face is undoing the brainwashing of the population. We have to gain access to the population. Although we have tried to get leaflets and radios into north Korea and in the hands of the population this has proven marginally successful at
best. There is no substitute for personal contact. There is such limited personal contact now with foreigners that it is easy for the regime’s security apparatus to minimize outside influence of its population. However, what we must do now is take advantage of the north’s dire economic situation and work to gain access to the country on a widespread scale. The key is we have to get information to the people and the only way this is going to be is through personal contact. We need to fully support the access of humanitarian assistance organizations. But more importantly we need to encourage economic investment and business development in the north. We must provide incentives to corporations to attempt to gain access to and exploit the vast untapped natural resources that lie in the Tumen River Region. We must encourage development of light industry and manufacturing to include energy development.

We must be under no illusion that the Kim Regime is going to immediately open up and allow this. We must be prepared to take the long-term approach – it is going to need a minimum investment of at least 10 years. Furthermore, we will have to live within the restrictions that the regime will place on humanitarian organizations and businesses. However, if we go along with these restrictions we stand a better chance of gaining increasing access and at a point in the future we could have such a significant amount of access that the regime will not be able to adequately control.

What are the benefits to this approach? First it can forestall conflict by sustaining the illusion that Kim can achieve his aims at some time in the future. Second, it can exploit the second tier leadership to do our bidding and reduce the likelihood of widespread conflict and employment of WMD. Third, it can change the north’s perception of the outside world which will be critical in any post regime scenario. Finally and most importantly it can seriously undermine the regime and could weaken it to the point of collapse and then ultimately reunification.

The real question for the ROK and the US is do we want to embark on a deliberate, long term, disciplined, and comprehensive campaign to undermine the regime and attempt to cause its collapse before it can execute its military reunification campaign plan?

One important point must be kept in mind when dealing with the regime. For the past 50 years the regime has been completely consistent in that it has used provocations against the South and the US in order to gain political and economic concessions and in most instances has achieved some degree of success. One of the few times that the north backed down was after the tragic axe murder at Panmunjom in 1976 in which the ROK-US alliance launched
The Quest for a Unified Korea

Operation Paul Bunyan and demonstrated a significant show of force along with the willingness to use it. There is a key lesson in that. The only thing the north really respects and understands is strength and power.

Whatever we do in the future must be done from a position of strength. If we want to influence the north it must be done along with a credible capability to use military power if necessary and our actions on the Korean Peninsula must take that into account. Declaratory policy is a critical component of this but just as important is the deployment and positioning of US forces on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. That said, there is nothing to be lost from talking to the regime. While we will never change its behavior we can influence it and forestall war; however, that influence can only come from a determined demonstration of strength, power, and will.

In conclusion we can make a comparison between yesterday and tomorrow. In 1950 we were woefully unprepared not only for the war in general but to execute PSYOP in particular. We did not have a long-term vision and strategic aim for the peninsula and the region. We did not understand the situation, thinking only in terms of communism for democracy. We did not understand the people of the peninsula and most importantly we did not have the means, the organization, or the plans to execute effective Psychological Operations before and during the war. Now, however, we face an equally complex situation on the peninsula, but one for which we have a better understanding. We have the ways and means to execute PSYOP. The issue is are we going to take advantage of the situation and embark on a comprehensive strategic PSYOP campaign to achieve a desired strategic aim and necessary end state?
The Quest for a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process

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The quest for a unified Korea